پژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122Scientific Diplomacy and Urban Governance: A Comparative Analysis of Barcelona, Boston, Beijing, Istanbul, and a Strategic Framework for Tehranدیپلماسی علمی و حکمرانی شهری: تحلیل تطبیقی تجارب کلانشهرهای بارسلون، بوستون، پکن، استانبول و ارائه الگوی راهبردی برای کلانشهر تهران73423615510.22034/fr.2025.565028.1745FAمحمدرضامجیدیهیئت علمی مطالعات منطقه ای، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0000-0001-6801-9136رحیمبایزیدیهیئت علمی روابط بینالملل، پژوهشکده تحقیقات راهبردی، تهران، ایران0000-0003-3330-0395عسگرصفریفارغ التحصیل دکتری روابط بین الملل، پژوهشگر مرکز پژوهش های مجلس شورای اسلامی، تهران، ایران0000-0003-0122-0278مهساگلابی دزفولیدبیر کمیته راهبری پایش و رتبه بندی شهری مرکز مطالعات و برنامه ریزی شهر تهران, ایرانJournal Article20250605Scientific diplomacy, as an emerging instrument in urban governance, has the potential to enhance the position of global cities within the knowledge-based international system. Focusing on Tehran and employing a comparative analysis of four metropolitan cases—Barcelona, Boston, Beijing, and Istanbul—this article seeks to answer the following question: How can urban policymaking, through scientific networking, knowledge-based branding, and the engagement of universities and innovative enterprises, contribute to improving urban management patterns and strengthening the international standing of a city such as Tehran?
The findings, derived from a comparative methodology, indicate that each city has pursued a distinct model of urban scientific diplomacy: Barcelona through its “innovative ecosystem initiative,” Boston through “university-driven innovation,” Beijing through “state-developmental scientific diplomacy,” and Istanbul through “cultural-identity advantage building.” The comparative analysis reveals that despite Tehran’s significant potential—stemming from its universities, research institutes, and technology ecosystem—it lacks a strategic document for urban scientific diplomacy, a stakeholder coordination mechanism, and a coherent scientific branding structure. The article concludes by proposing an integrated strategic model for Tehran, built upon four pillars: networked governance, university-centered diplomacy, scientific-cultural branding, and alignment with national science, technology, and cultural policies. This model can facilitate Tehran’s transition toward becoming a knowledge-based city with active participation in regional and global scientific networks.
<strong>Keywords</strong>: Scientific Diplomacy, Urban Governance, Innovation Ecosystems, Global Cities, Barcelona, Boston, Beijing, Istanbul, Tehran
<strong>Extended Abstract</strong>
<strong>Introduction</strong>
In the emerging knowledge-based global order, cities have become significant actors capable of shaping transnational scientific interactions, innovation networks, and cultural-knowledge exchanges. Urban diplomacy is increasingly intertwined with scientific and technological capabilities, enabling cities to develop distinctive global identities and attract flows of talent, investment, innovation, and collaborative research. Within this context, scientific diplomacy has evolved into a strategic instrument for strengthening the international visibility of cities, expanding their innovation ecosystems, and contributing to national soft power. This study examines the role of scientific diplomacy in urban governance through a comparative assessment of four global cities (Barcelona, Boston, Beijing, and Istanbul) and proposes a strategic model for Tehran.
<strong>Purpose</strong>
The purpose of this study is to analyze how leading cities use scientific diplomacy as a tool of urban governance, to identify the strengths and gaps in Tehran’s current approach, and to offer a strategic framework that can assist Tehran in transitioning toward a knowledge-based and internationally engaged metropolis.
<strong>Methodology</strong>
The research employs a qualitative and comparative methodology. First, a thematic review of the scientific diplomacy practices of Barcelona, Boston, Beijing, and Istanbul is conducted, focusing on governance mechanisms, institutional actors, frameworks of scientific collaboration, and policies for city branding. Second, these findings are compared with the current situation in Tehran using dimensions such as innovation infrastructure, stakeholder coordination, international presence, and cultural-knowledge positioning. Data were drawn from policy analyses, institutional reports, and qualitative insights derived from the structure and discourse of the urban innovation and diplomacy landscape.
<strong>Findings</strong>
The comparative analysis identifies four distinct models of scientific diplomacy in global cities:
1. Barcelona, the Creative Ecosystem Model: Barcelona leverages its culture of design, creativity, and urban innovation to build research networks, foster technology districts, and cultivate an international scientific brand rooted in openness and collaboration.
2. Boston, the University-Centered Innovation Model: Boston’s scientific diplomacy is deeply connected to world-class academic institutions such as MIT and Harvard. These universities anchor global collaborations, attract top talent, foster high-tech entrepreneurship, and form the backbone of the region’s international scientific presence.
3. Beijing, the State-Driven Science Diplomacy Model: Beijing utilizes a state-led developmental approach that aligns urban scientific diplomacy with national science and technology strategies. Through large-scale investments, scientific megaprojects, and strong government coordination, the city has rapidly built global research networks.
4. Istanbul, the Culture–Science Hybrid Model: Istanbul promotes a culturally grounded identity combined with expanding academic networks and regional connectivity. Its scientific diplomacy blends cultural heritage with emerging innovation initiatives.
When comparing these cases with Tehran, several significant strengths and gaps emerge:
v Strengths: Tehran hosts leading universities, research centers, a rapidly expanding technology ecosystem, and strong cultural assets. It possesses human capital and scientific capacity that could support an active urban scientific diplomacy strategy.
v Gaps: Most notably, Tehran lacks an integrated strategic document for urban scientific diplomacy, suffers from fragmented governance across scientific and municipal institutions, and does not possess a coherent international scientific branding strategy.<br>Existing capacities are dispersed and insufficiently connected to global networks.<br>Coordination between academia, industry, and city governance remains limited.
<strong>Practical Implications</strong>
The findings suggest that Tehran requires a multi-level governance strategy that integrates science, technology, culture, and urban development. Practical steps include:
v Establishing a dedicated scientific diplomacy office within Tehran’s municipal governance structure;
v Developing international partnerships with universities and innovation districts in leading cities;
v Enhancing branding initiatives to position Tehran as a city of science, heritage, and innovation;
v Strengthening collaboration among universities, research institutes, technology parks, cultural organizations, and the municipal government.
<strong>Social Implications</strong>
A robust scientific diplomacy strategy can foster social innovation, enhance public engagement with science, improve the city’s talent retention, and encourage a more inclusive knowledge society. It can also facilitate cultural-scientific linkages that promote mutual understanding and global dialogue.
<strong>Originality</strong>
This study provides one of the first comprehensive frameworks for conceptualizing scientific diplomacy within the context of Iranian urban governance. By combining comparative global insights with Tehran’s specific opportunities and challenges, the paper offers an innovative hybrid model tailored to the sociocultural, technological, and institutional realities of Tehran. The strategic model proposed here contributes to broader debates on the emerging role of cities as scientific actors in the global system.دیپلماسی علمی بهعنوان ابزاری نوین در حکمرانی شهری، ظرفیت آن را دارد که جایگاه کلانشهرها را در نظام بینالملل دانشبنیان ارتقا دهد. این مقاله، با تمرکز بر تهران و بررسی تطبیقی تجارب نوآورانه چهار کلانشهر «بارسلون»، «بوستون»، «پکن» و «استانبول»، میکوشد به این پرسش پاسخ دهد که چگونه سیاستگذاری شهری میتواند از طریق شبکهسازی علمی، برندینگ دانشبنیان و مشارکت دانشگاهها و شرکتهای نوآور، به بهبود الگوهای مدیریت شهری و همچنین تقویت موقعیت بینالمللی یک شهر از قبیل تهران کمک کند؟ یافتههای پژوهش با استفاده از روش تطبیقی نشان میدهد «بارسلون» با ابتکار عمل «اکوسیستم نوآورانه»، «بوستون» با «نوآوری دانشگاهمحور»، «پکن» با «دیپلماسی علمی دولتی-توسعهای» و «استانبول» با «مزیتسازی هویت فرهنگی»، هر یک الگوهای متفاوتی را در دیپلماسی علمی شهری دنبال کردهاند. تحلیل تطبیقی نشان میدهد تهران علیرغم ظرفیت بالای دانشگاهها، پژوهشگاهها و زیستبوم فناوری، فاقد یک سند راهبردی دیپلماسی علمی شهری، نظام هماهنگکننده ذینفعان و ساختار منسجم برندینگ علمی است. مقاله در پایان یک الگوی راهبردی تلفیقی برای تهران پیشنهاد میکند که بر چهار محور استوار است: «حکمرانی شبکهای»، «دیپلماسی دانشگاه محور»، «برندسازی علمی–فرهنگی» و «پیوند با سیاستهای ملی علم، فناوری و فرهنگ» که میتواند مسیر گذار تهران به یک شهر دانشبنیان با حضور فعال در شبکههای علمی منطقهای و جهانی را هموار کند.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_236155_541395b92ec9714486546526ac9b824c.pdfپژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122Politics and International Relations in the Hybrid Life of Artificial Intelligenceسیاست و روابط بینالملل در جهانزیست هیبریدی هوش مصنوعی356422888210.22034/fr.2025.496648.1619FAوحیدذوالفقاریپژوهشگر پسادکتری سیاست تطبیقی و مدرس دانشگاه مونیخ، آلمانعلی اکبرجعفریاستاد روابط بینالملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران0000-0002-7543-6365Journal Article20241229<span style="mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">An updated understanding of the knowledge of international relations (IR) needs a critical thought of international politics and its following developments. Without referring to this logic in an age of artificial intelligence (AI), thinking about these international developments would be invalid that could never review its theoretical approaches. Accordingly, the advent of informative-communicative mega-technologies have necessitated the rethinking of the theoretical logics of IR to manage the existing objective imbalance and empower the analytical richness of IR in order to understand the politics as a technic of thinking, not just a thought. According to above mentions, the central research question is how the different understanding of international developments by media will deepen the mutual relation of AI and IR? Paradigmatic developments in IR theories and the ongoing events in global politics on one hand, and deconstruction of the existing theoretical discourses on the other hand, shape the mutual relations of IR and AI. The finding of this research will herald a possibility of Algorithmic IR and Data governance. By employing the theory of proliferative and pluralist smart order, this paper will analytically test the hypothesis.</span><br><strong><span style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman';">Keywords:</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 9.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman';"> </span></strong><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">Informative-Communicative Revolution, International Politics, Knowledge of IR, Global System, Artificial Intelligence</span><br><span style="font-size: 9.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;"> </span><br><span style="font-size: 9.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;"> </span><span style="font-size: 9.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;"> </span><br><strong><span style="font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">Extended Abstract</span></strong><br><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">An updated understanding of the knowledge of international relations (IR) needs a critical thought of international politics and its following developments. Without referring to this logic in an age of artificial intelligence (AI), thinking about these international developments would be invalid that could never review its theoretical approaches. Accordingly, the advent of informative-communicative mega-technologies have necessitated the rethinking of the theoretical logics of IR to manage the existing objective imbalance and empower the analytical richness of IR in order to understand the politics as a technic of thinking, not just a thought. According to above mentions, the central research question is how the different understanding of international developments by media will deepen the mutual relation of AI and IR? Paradigmatic developments in IR theories and the ongoing events in global politics on one hand, and deconstruction of the existing theoretical discourses on the other hand, shape the mutual relations of IR and AI. The finding of this research will herald a possibility of Algorithmic IR and Data governance. By employing the theory of proliferative and pluralist smart order, this paper will analytically test the hypothesis.</span><br><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">Introduction</span></strong><br><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">As a theoretical and perceptual science about politics and global structure, international relations discuss about the global developments based on linear approach and method. However, the dimensionality and space-oriented of international politics has demonstrated the intellectual and theoretical deficit of the current theories in the international relations. Furthermore, formation of quadrupled grand discussion in international relations between idealism-realism, behaviorism- traditionalism, post-behaviorism- behaviorism and rationalism-post-structuralism have mostly shown the theoretical challenges of the mega-approaches in international relations. Moreover, transition to the period of political pluralism and advent of artificial intelligence have unclosed the new type of theoretical revisionism and necessitated an updated interpretation about global developments. This brand new relation between science and technology is outspokenly confessed by realists, liberalists and constructivists as well.</span><br><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">Literature review</span></strong><br><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">The appearance of AI in the international relations has convinced the researchers to review their aged thoughts about the global politics. According to the existed literature, there are three different interpretations about the relation between IR and AI. Based on negativity orientation, some researchers understand the international relations as an independent science that has no connection with the advanced technologies. By accenting on the theoretical richness of IR, They reject any mutual relation of AI and IR. Some other literatures are commenting that although the IR is affected by digital technologies, however these types high-techs lack sufficient ability to provide a well-based opportunity for creative and independent activism in the international relation. So, they could be recognized as an advisory and supportive instruments that will not have power of independent decision making. Last but not least, the deep gap between theoretical analysis and the realities of international politics has paved the way for new group of researchers who concentrate on the mutual relation between IR and AI. Based on the experience of COVID-19, a huge gap has been appeared between theoretical approaches of IR and the current political realities, according to the supporters of the mutual relations of IR and AI.</span><br><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">Theoretical framework</span></strong><br><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">The pervasive and pluralist interpretation of IR is found as a new theoretical frame that challenges the intellectual monopoly of grand approaches in the IR such as realism, liberalism and constructivism. As a game-changer, this noval approach has vetoed the prerogative positions of the grand theories of IR and prepared the multilateral context for alternative theory. Furthermore, the manifestation of multi-voiced and multi-faced societies and transition of international politics to the new era of complex interdependency have attracted the AI to support the multilayered analysis. Finally, reproduction of democratic regimes around the world in an era of accelerated globalization, has feed the proliferative order in the new IR.</span><br><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">Main discussion</span></strong><br><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">As a techno-theoretical approach and the fourth industrial revolution in the IR, exhibition of AI has been known as the detached logic of the IR. This new data-based and algorithmic regularity has entered a brand new of analytical method on the IR to appraise the current political developments in the IR properly. The growing importance of AI in the IR is owed to several functions. Firstly, the AI has well-equipped the science of IR with the fresh informative networks. Secondly, the AI has demonstrated the imperfectness of the old version theoretical analysis of the existed theories in the IR. Thirdly, omnipresence of the AI in the new life of global politics has encouraged the theoreticians to review on their accepted views. Finally, the AI has emerged as a mega-plan that seriously discuss with the grand theories of IR and propose a brilliant alternative.</span><br><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">So, this informative and epistemological jump in the science of IR is changing the context of intellectual analysis from geopolitical to techno-geopolitical situation. In other word, by applying the neo-weberian approach and understanding the IR as a multi-facet and multi-world science, will test the optimality of the current macro-perceptions especially power, security, war, peace and liberty based on the standards of digital and data-oriented regularity. According to the digital standards of the AI, three different approaches are labeled. Based on one approach, the IR is as a transcendent politics which is needless to any change in its rule and remark. However, the IR is seen as a responsible politics that is subject to different environmental structure, geopolitical and institutional position of the countries. Finally, some are believed the IR as an institution-based and organization-oriented politics that is suffered by political power. By focusing on these different interpretations, two grand approaches can be extracted from the relations between AI and IR. According to one approach, AI is a normalizer in the new global politics that tries to support the theories of IR to well-analyze the current developments. However, AI in the view of the other approach is called as a veto-player that devalue the standards of analysis of the existed theories in the IR and press them to update their theoretical rules with digital data by increasing the costs of analytical dysfunction. The main lesson of this huge development in the new global politics is that the proliferation of AI and advent of intellectual pluralism does not turn to termination and demise of IR, but try to herald a new turning point in the IR that the analytical regulations of the global politics needs to change simultaneously with the technological evolutions in order to accredite its theoretical investments.</span><br><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">Conclusion</span></strong><br><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">The advent of AI in the IR is representing a new rationality in the theoretical analyses that gradually turn the science of international relations to a technical and digital art. Despite of the growing importance of AI, it needs to be mentioned that every change between AI and IR has to comply with 'regularity', 'legitimation' and 'appropriation'. In other word, every single influence of the AI on the structure of political analysis needs to be based on the rules of the science of IR. Moreover, the power of AI and its standards in the chain of analysis needs to be concurred with the logical goals such as updated analysis, development of the science of IR and representation of real analysis. Finally, the revision of the intellectual standards of the IR theories needs to be appropriated with basic accomplishments of the IR.</span>درک روزآمد از علم روابط بینالملل، محتاج درنگ نقادانه در سیاست بینالملل و تحولات جاری در نظام جهانی است. اندیشهسازی درباره رخدادهای بینالمللی بدون رجوع به این سازه ادراکی، شهودی از آرای بیاعتبار در عصر هوش مصنوعی شناختهشده که استعدادی برای بازاندیشی در سازههای تئوریک نخواهد داشت. عطف به این حکم، پیدایش ابررسانههای ارتباطی-اطلاعاتی در معادلات جهانی، بازاندیشی در تدابیر نظری تئوریهای روابط بینالملل جهت مدیریت معوقات فکری را به یک ضرورت بدل ساخت. اقتضای این ضرورت، مزید بر تلاش برای تدبیر ناترازیهای نظری، تقویت غنای تحلیلی علم روابط بینالملل است تا سیاست را نه یک اندیشه خام، بلکه فن نظرورزی فهم کند. بررسی مبادی فوق، پرسشی را نزد نگاشته جاری بها داده که چگونه درک دیگرگون رخدادهای بینالمللی توسط رسانهها، موجد تعمیق پیوند هوش مصنوعی و علم روابط بینالملل میشود؟ تحولات پارادایمی در نظریههای روابط بینالملل و دگردیسیهای مستحدث در سیاست جهانی از یکسو و رهیدن چرخه اندیشهورزی از سلطه گفتمانهای تئوریک از سوی دیگر، به چنین مناسباتی شکل میدهند. در صحتوسقم این سخن، یافتههای پژوهش خبر از امکان ظهور روابط بینالمللِ الگوریتمی و حکمرانی دادهها میدهند. فرضیه پژوهش با استقراض از نظریه نظم تکثیری و هوشمند، با روش تحلیلی به آزمون گذاشته میشود.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_228882_f14fe06f4b9d4176fd65114f34e9dddc.pdfپژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122Networked Regionalism and Iraq's National Security with an Emphasis on Iran's Roleمنطقه گرایی شبکه ای و امنیت ملی عراق با تاکید بر نقش جمهوری اسلامی ایران659223516910.22034/fr.2025.519360.1660FAفرهادقاسمیاستاد گروه روابط بین الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0000-0001-9237-4197محمدالطائشدانشجوی دکتری روابط بین الملل، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0009-0001-5864-0399Journal Article20250429National security has been one of the main and fundamental concerns of Iraq since its establishment (1920) as a country or actor in the modern international system. In the meantime, regionalism has been raised as one of the most prominent ways to achieve national security, which has gained particular prominence with the transformation of the international system into a complex network system; however, international relations literature, especially in Iraq, has neglected such an issue. For this reason, the fundamental question arises: given the transformation of the international system into a network system that has essentially changed the regionalism model to network models, what is the position and consequences of this new model of regionalism on Iraq's national security and what is Iran's position in this process? In response to this question, the research hypothesis is that in complex-chaotic international systems, due to the interconnectedness of networks and layers of order, regionalism as a mechanism for managing layers of order through managing and controlling the regional system environment and transforming it into various patterns of cooperation in controlling threats affects the national security of countries including Iraq, and Iran plays a connecting role in this network. The findings show that new patterns of network regionalism in Iraq and its strategies, including networking and linking, especially with Iran, will be a way to overcome geopolitical deadlocks and create intelligent deterrence. The most prominent innovation of the research is the presentation of a network regionalism model based on distinct clusters for the country of Iraq.
Keywords: Network Regionalism, National Security, Emergence, Iraq, Iran, Adaptive Network
<strong>Extended Abstract</strong>
National security has been a central and enduring priority for Iraq since its founding in 1920, when it first emerged as a modern state in the international system. Because of its strategic geopolitical and economic position, as well as its cultural significance, Iraq has often been at the center of regional and global competition. As a result, ensuring its national security has remained a persistent challenge for the country’s policymakers. With the growing complexity of the international system, new opportunities—as well as constraints—have arisen in how Iraq approaches its security. In this environment, regionalism has emerged as a potential framework for building security, offering a promising path in an increasingly complex and chaotic world system. Although regionalism has a long history in international relations, dating back to the Persian Empire, it has evolved within the modern complex and chaotic global order to take on a networked form. Through this "networked regionalism," Iraq can open new pathways for achieving national security. This model positions specific countries, particularly Iran, as crucial connecting nodes and network builders. Nevertheless, the literature in International Relations, especially within Iraq, has largely overlooked this dynamic. This neglect raises a central research question: Given the international system's evolution into a networked structure, what is the significance and what are the implications of this new model of regionalism for Iraq's national security? Furthermore, what is Iran's role in this process?The study's hypothesis posits that in complex-chaotic international systems, characterized by layered and interconnected structures, regionalism serves as a mechanism for managing these layers of order. It achieves this by managing the regional system's environment, transforming it into cooperative arrangements to counter threats, thereby directly influencing the national security of countries like Iraq. Within this network, Iran plays a pivotal linking role. However, networked regionalism requires the formation of regional clusters. Iraq's geopolitical situation presents significant obstacles to forming such clusters in its western sphere, to the extent that the country faces a strategic deadlock in its regional branching. Crisis-ridden and even crisis-exporting states in this region can be identified as primary causes of this impasse. Iraq's geopolitics, conversely, enables network clustering to its east and south. In sea geopolitics terms, the country's direct access is limited to the Persian Gulf. However, by extending this sea corridor through Iran to the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman, Iran emerges as a critical nexus within Iraq's regional network. This Iranian sea pathway grants Iraq access to new strategic clusters, particularly in South Asia and the Indian subcontinent. The potential extensions of this network could further incorporate clusters in Africa, Latin America, and East Asia, forming subsequent layers of Iraq's sea geopolitical architecture.
Simultaneously, Iran acts as Iraq's essential land bridge to Central Asia and the Caucasus, regions developing within the sphere of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This connection projects Iraq's continental influence towards the rapidly ascending economic and political axis of China and East Asia. For Iraq, this network clustering offers a mechanism to mitigate systemic pressures—a primary source of its modern insecurity. The branches of the network can distribute these pressures while simultaneously generating significant new opportunities. This enhances the capacity of Iraq's regional network to meet national needs, effectively transforming the nation's power into a more resilient "networked power." Consequently, the network itself becomes the manifestation of Iraqi influence in the global arena. The findings of this study suggest that in the context of a complex and chaotic international system, networked regionalism has become a fundamental strategy for nations in general, and for Iraq in particular. Iraq's unique position at the intersection of regional and global geopolitical forces presents it with a complex and nested structural layers, making an adaptive, networked regionalism a viable security strategy. Crucially, the success of Iraq's networked regionalism in interlinking and nested clusters is profoundly dependent on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is the pivotal actor for expanding Iraq's constricted sea domain—currently limited to the port of Al-Faw—by connecting it to the vast strategic expanse of the Indian Ocean. On the continental front, Iran links Iraq to clusters in the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, the SCO, and ultimately to China and East Asia. Therefore, Iran is the indispensable hub for Iraq's networked regionalism. The integration of Iraqi and Iranian network clusters, and the subsequent formation of a nested regional system between them, would fundamentally reshape regional international politics. This new regional order would create a foundation for synergy between Iranian and Iraqi foreign policies. Furthermore, by connecting with the SCO, this partnership could contribute to the emergence of a global "super-network," representing a significant step toward a new world order in this era of global transition.امنیت ملی ازجمله دغدغههای اصلی و بنیادین عراق از زمان تأسیس (1920) بوده که بهعنوان یک کشور یا کنشگر در سیستم بینالمللی نوین مطرح شده است. در این میان منطقهگرایی بهعنوان یکی از برجستهترین راههای دستیابی به امنیت ملی مطرح بوده که این موضوع با تحول سیستم بینالملل به سیستمی پیچیده - شبکهای از برجستگی خاصی برخوردار شده است؛ اما بااینوجود، ادبیات روابط بینالملل بهویژه در عراق چنین موضوعی را مورد غفلت قرار دادهاند. به همین سبب این پرسش اساسی مطرح میشود که با توجه به تحول سیستم بینالملل به سیستم شبکهای که قاعدتاً الگوی منطقهگرایی را نیز به الگوهای شبکهای تغییر داده است، این الگوی نوین از منطقهگرایی چه جایگاه و پیامدهایی بر امنیت ملی عراق دارد و جایگاه ایران در این فرایند چیست؟ در پاسخ به این پرسش فرضیه پژوهش این است که در سیستمهای بینالمللی پیچیده-آشوبی به دلیل به هم پیوندی شبکهای و لایههای نظم، منطقهگرایی بهعنوان سازوکاری برای مدیریت لایههای نظم از طریق مدیریت و کنترل محیط سیستم منطقهای و تبدیل آن به الگوهای گوناگون همکاری در کنترل تهدیدات، امنیت ملی کشورها ازجمله عراق را تحت تأثیر قرار میدهد و ایران دارای نقش پیوندی در این شبکه است. روش پژوهش حاضر مبتنی بر روش آبداکشن و تأکید بر واقعیتهای نوپدید و یافتن بهترین راه برای تبیین موضوع است. یافتهها نشان میدهند که الگوهای جدید منطقهگرایی شبکهای عراق و راهبردهای آن ازجمله شبکهسازی و پیوندسازی بهویژه با ایران راهی برای عبور از بنبستهای ژئوپلیتیکی و ایجاد بازدارندگی هوشمند خواهد بود. برجستهترین نوآوری پژوهش ارائه مدل منطقهگرایی شبکهای مبتنی بر خوشههای متمایز برای کشور عراق است.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_235169_b34f9d8ea15c7b87bc4258f0135dbf4c.pdfپژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122Analysis of proponents and opponents coalitions of Iran joining the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (Using the advocacy coalition framework)تحلیل ائتلاف های موافق و مخالف الحاق ایران به گروه ویژه اقدام مالی(FATF) (با استفاده از چارچوب ائتلاف حامی)9312622849510.22034/fr.2025.469757.1556FAیحییکمالیدانشیار سیاستگذاری عمومی، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده حقوق و الهیات، دانشگاه شهید باهنر کرمان، کرمان، ایران0000-0002-7392-6395راحلهاحمدیدانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد سیاستگذاری عمومی، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده حقوق و الهیات، دانشگاه شهید باهنر کرمان، کرمان، ایران.Journal Article20240725There is a long-standing debate about Iran’s accession to the Financial Action Task Force. In this regard, there are supporters and opponents, each with their own goals and arguments. The aim of the present study is to examine the two coalitions of supporters in favor of and against accession to the Financial Action Task Force using the framework of the supporting coalition. To achieve this goal, the qualitative coding research method was used. The research data includes interviews and reports of supporters of these two groups, which were selected using the purposive sampling method. The research findings show that the two coalitions in favor and against have different core beliefs and policy cores, propose different tools, and to some extent have similar resources. These two rival coalitions also have different orientations on other foreign policy issues. The priority of the coalition in favor is economic development, and the priority of the coalition against is security. Accordingly, they have adopted different policies or made proposals. The findings of this research can provide a basis for understanding the two coalitions based on different layers of core beliefs, policy core, and tools.
Keywords: Financial Action Task Force, foreign policy, joining, advocacy coalition framework
<strong>Extended Abstract</strong>
Introduction
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) aims to strength the international response to money laundering. The FATF issued Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering In October 2001. These recommendations provide a basic framework for combating money laundering and are designed and formulated for implementation at the global level. 198 countries currently have agreed to implement the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force. The FATF publishes a blacklist or list of non-cooperative countries every year. Iran is currently on the group's blacklist. Some conditions are in place for Iran to cooperate with this group. The Anti-Money Laundering Law passed in 2007 by the Islamic Consultative Assembly(The Iranian Parliament), as well as the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law passed in 2015, have provided the opportunity to exchange experiences and information with anti-money laundering organizations in other countries and to exchange information or judicial cooperation with other countries. But so far, no decision has been made regarding Iran's joining to the Financial Action Task Force. There is a long-term debate about Iran's joining The FATF. There are proponents and opponents who each have their own goals and reasons. This debate has prolonged the decision-making process on joining. Each side of this debate has principles, values, and interests that have, in some way, led to wide-ranging policy debates in other areas of foreign policy. This research aims to analysis two coalitions of joining the Financial Action Task Force by using the advocacy coalition framework.
Research Question
What are the components of the three layers of the proponents and opponents Advocacy coalitions of and Iran's joining the Financial Action Task Force, and what resources do these coalitions use to achieve their goals?
Methodology and Theoretical Framework
Qualitative coding research method has been used in this research. Open coding leads to the creation of initial codes. Codes are the main components of the analysis. The axial coding stage involves categorizing the various codes into potential themes and organizing all coded summaries into a specific theme. The research data includes interviews and reports of the supporters of these two coalitions, which collected by the purposeful sampling method.
This research analyzed Iran's foreign policy regarding joining the Financial Action Task Force based on the Advocacy coalition framework (ACF). Advocacy coalitions are indeed groups of individuals with shared beliefs who coordinate their actions to influence public policy. These coalitions include a wide range of actors like legislators, interest groups, public organizations, researchers, journalists, and subnational entities, all working together within a specific policy domain. Their goal is to shape policy outcomes by influencing the policy process.
In the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), Sabatier distinguishes between three levels of beliefs: deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary aspects. Deep core beliefs are fundamental, normative, and widely shared across different policy domains. Policy core beliefs are more specific to a particular policy area and represent the core commitments of an advocacy coalition within that domain. Finally, secondary aspects are non-essential details or specific policy preferences that are more likely to change. In advocacy coalitions, while there might be disagreements on specific policies or secondary beliefs, there is generally a strong consensus on the core values and fundamental principles that unite the group. These coalitions form around shared beliefs and strategically coordinate actions to influence policy, even if they differ on the specifics of how to achieve those goals.
Results and discussion
Research findings organized based on the components of Advocacy coalition framework, which includes a "deep core values" layer of normative belief or ideology; second layer of "policy core values" and a third layer named secondary aspects are non-essential details or specific policy preferences that are more likely to change.
Research findings show that the core beliefs of the coalition of proponent of Iran joining the FATF include economic opening and lifting sanctions; improving banking and trade exchanges; and increasing foreign investment. The core beliefs of the opponent’s coalition include prioritizing national security; supporting resistance groups; and preventing the dominance of advanced countries over Iran's economy.
Proponents coalition consider foreign policy and issues such as joining the Financial Action Task Force and the JCPOA as paths or mechanisms for other goals, including in the economic Development, but the opponents coalition views foreign policy as a way to preserve the country's independence and national security.
Conclusion
Research findings illustrate that the two coalitions have different deep core values and policy core values, they propose different tools and they have similar resources to some extent. These two rival coalitions have different orientations in other foreign policy issues as well. The proponents coalition wants more interaction with international organizations, while the opponents coalition believes in caution and attention to the limitations of these organizations. The first coalition has an optimistic view of international organizations and tries to create opportunities through them. The second coalition is pessimistic about international organizations and considers them as a tool of Western countries to control countries like Iran. The priority of the proponents’ coalition is economic development and the priority of the opponents’ coalition is national security. Based on this, they have adopted different policies or made recommendations. The results of this research can provide a basis for understanding the two coalitions based on different layers of deep core values, policy core values and policy tools. By analyzing the layers of these two coalitions, this research provides a picture of how the issue is raised and decision-making is done in the field of Iran's foreign policy. The findings of this research can provide the basis for the two coalitions to understand the different ideological, political, and instrumental layers of the rival coalition. If this understanding is accompanied by political discussions and debates, it can provide the basis for making decisions about Iran joining the FATF.درباره الحاق ایران به گروه ویژه اقدام مالی مناظره طولانیمدت در جریان است. در این زمینه موافقان و مخالفانی وجود دارد که هر یک، اهداف و استدلال های خود را دارند. هدف پژوهش حاضر این است که با استفاده از چارچوب ائتلاف حامی، دو ائتلاف حامی موافق و مخالف الحاق به گروه ویژه اقدام مالی را بررسی نماید. برای دستیابی به این هدف از روش پژوهش کدگذاری کیفی استفاده شده است. دادههای پژوهش شامل مصاحبهها و گزارشهای حامیان این دو گروه است که با استفاده از روش نمونهگیری هدفمند، انتخاب شدهاند. یافتههای پژوهش نشان میدهد که دو ائتلاف موافق و مخالف دارای هسته اعتقادی و هسته سیاستی متفاوتی هستند، ابزارهای متفاوتی را پیشنهاد میکنند و تاحدی از منابع مشابهی برخوردارند. این دو ائتلاف رقیب، دارای جهتگیرهای متفاوتی در سایر موضوعات سیاست خارجی نیز هستند. اولویت ائتلاف موافقان، توسعه اقتصادی و اولویت ائتلاف مخالفان، امنیت است. بر این اساس، سیاست های متفاوتی را اتخاذ کرده یا پیشنهادهایی ارائه کردهاند. یافتههای این پژوهش میتواند زمینه شناخت دو ائتلاف را بر اساس لایههای مختلف عقاید محوری، هسته سیاستی و ابزارها را فراهم نماید.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_228495_307f66f2e04e670fa332d0fdfc6793e0.pdfپژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122Obstacles to Strategic Cooperation in Iran's Foreign Policy: An Analysis from the Perspective of Macro Theories of International Relationsموانع همکاریهای استراتژیک در سیاست خارجی ایران: تحلیلی از منظر کلاننظریههای روابط بینالملل12715822567310.22034/fr.2025.525712.1671FAلیلامولاییدانشجوی دکتری علوم سیاسی، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران0009-0001-6469-9362فریبرزارغوانی پیرسلامیدانشیار روابط بینالملل، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران0000-0002-6180-7751سیدجوادصالحیدانشیار علوم سیاسی، گروه روابط بینالملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0000-0002-9492-6992Journal Article20250523The globalization of the economy and international relations has made securing national interests depend more than ever on expanding and strengthening international cooperation. This necessity is felt more in the case of countries such as Iran, which enjoy a privileged geopolitical and geoeconomic position. The present study, based on the theoretical basis of the macro theories of international relations and reviewing the conceptual approaches of realism, liberalism, structuralism and criticism, seeks to explain the conceptual and theoretical arrangements that have delayed the development of strategic cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries at the international level. This article raises the question of what are the obstacles to strategic cooperation in Iran's foreign policy? With a theoretical approach and explanatory method, it has been concluded that the lack of common horizons in the representation of security threats, the rupture in economic interaction infrastructures, the difference and conflict of identity and ideology with other actors in the international system, and the non-discursive and deconstructive nature of Iran's foreign policy towards the established order have led to the formation of a kind of continuous geopolitical isolation and chronic strategic divergence. This situation has not only kept Iran away from the contexts of cooperation within the framework of classical and institutional alliance-building, but has also strengthened the reproduction of a kind of strategic self-sufficiency as an alternative arising from the historicity of resistance to the hegemonic logic of the West. Accordingly, Iran's foreign policy is redefined in a system of structural and conceptual conflicts that have presented the path of any strategic cooperation in the context of the contemporary international order with serious challenges.
<strong>Keywords</strong>: Strategic Cooperation, Foreign Policy, Iran, International Relations Theories, Geopolitics
<strong>Extended Abstract</strong>
In the current international system, where the issues of a country are rapidly becoming international issues and no country can face challenges alone, cooperation between countries is not only a calculated choice but also an inevitable necessity. This cooperation, which can occur in a reciprocal (bilateral) or multilateral (involving more than two countries) form, plays a crucial role in shaping the international system, the transfer of power, and the promotion or erosion of regional and global security. Therefore, understanding this phenomenon and its role in international relations is crucial. In this framework, international cooperation is not only introduced as an effective strategy in dealing with global challenges, but also cooperation between countries is considered as a fundamental factor for the continuation of the international order, conflict resolution, economic interactions, and the establishment of sustainable development and a necessity for promoting a stable and secure future of the world. The continuation of cooperation between two or more countries to achieve a common goal within a specific period leads to the formation of an alliance between countries. The alliance of countries is a vast and multilateral phenomenon that has occurred abundantly throughout history. In proportion to changes in international dynamics, the concept, nature, and structure of the alliance also change. A clear example is the change in the meaning and nature of the alliance during the Cold War and the current period (globalization). During the Cold War and the era of globalization, the interpretation and meaning of alliances shifted from a regulatory and military dimension to a multilateral and geostrategic one. This change indicates a transition from the traditional model of alliance towards variable and unstable cooperation. Instead of dividing the world into two opposing blocs, these alliances shifted towards cooperation to address common global challenges, leading to the formation of new alliances and cooperation in various fields, including trade, global security, and the resolution of shared global problems.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is among the countries that, despite observing these developments, continues to insist on using traditional alliances based on a security approach to strengthen its international position and expand its norms and perspective in the global arena. Iran's relations with countries during the Cold War were complex and influenced by global developments, as well as by political and military tensions and events. With the victory of the Islamic Revolution and a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran's foreign policy underwent significant changes from the perspective of countries seeking alliance and cooperation. During this period, alliances with countries sharing similar ideologies and partnerships with countries such as Russia and China became key criteria for decision-making in foreign policy, serving as a strategy to counter the adverse effects of sanctions, international pressure, and the influence of the United States. This research aims to critique and analyze the obstacles to strategic cooperation in achieving the country's national goals, drawing on the experiences and challenges of Iran's foreign policy, and to examine the necessities and challenges of Iran's strategic cooperation with the outside world through case studies.
The present study, based on the theoretical foundations of the major theories of international relations and the reinterpretation of the conceptual approaches of realism, liberalism, constructivism, and criticism, seeks to explain the conceptual and theoretical arrangements that have delayed the development and deepening of strategic cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries at the international level. By posing the question of what are the obstacles to strategic cooperation in Iran's foreign policy, this article has concluded with a theoretical approach and explanatory method that the lack of common horizons in the representation of security threats, the rupture in economic interaction infrastructures, the difference and conflict of identity and ideology with other actors in the international system, and the non-discursive and deconstructive nature of Iran's foreign policy towards the established order have led to the formation of a kind of continuous geopolitical isolation and chronic strategic divergence. This situation has not only kept Iran away from the classical and institutional contexts of alliance-building, but has also reinforced the reproduction of a kind of strategic self-sufficiency as an alternative, arising from the historicity of resistance to the hegemonic logic of the West. Accordingly, Iran's foreign policy is redefined in a system of structural and conceptual conflicts that have presented a path to any strategic cooperation in the context of the contemporary international order, with serious challenges.
The present study, based on multi-paradigm analyses and the macro theories of international relations, especially the theories of Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and Critical theory, emphasizes the need to rethink the fundamental principles of strategic cooperation and the challenges of its development at the international level. This study demonstrates that strategic cooperation in the international system cannot be analyzed solely from the perspective of rationality and objective interests, but also depends on relevant semantic, identity, and discursive structures. From the perspective of realism theory, the lack of a common threat is a fundamental issue, as it is a basic condition for the formation of strategic alliances, especially in Iran's relations with other powers. Realists emphasize that common threats are the driving force of strategic alliances and convergences. However, due to its independent and revisionist foreign policy, as well as its specific geopolitical position, Iran is unable to synergize security threats with other international and regional actors effectively. The Islamic Republic of Iran perceives its security threats differently from other countries, and this difference in threat perception reduces the possibility of forming strategic convergences with other countries. Therefore, the absence of a common threat is a significant obstacle to the formation of strategic alliances.
From the perspective of liberalism, economic interdependence can provide a suitable platform for strategic cooperation. This economic interdependence leads not only to trade cooperation, but it can also strengthen political and security ties between countries. In this context, Iran faces serious challenges. The Iranian economy, which relies primarily on hydrocarbon resources and is significantly impacted by extensive international sanctions, has struggled to integrate effectively into the global economy's networks. This lack of economic integration not only reduces material incentives for cooperation but also significantly weakens the platforms for political convergence. Within the framework of constructivist theory, Iran's different and sometimes contradictory identities and norms with other countries are identified as a fundamental obstacle to strategic cooperation. By emphasizing its revolutionary identity, which stems from Islamic principles and resistance to Western hegemony, Iran is experiencing identity conflicts with other countries, especially Western powers and some regional countries. This identity conflict directly impacts trust and strategic cooperation, severely limiting the possibility of sustainable convergence. Finally, from the perspective of critical approaches, Iran's opposition to the existing international order, which is mainly under the hegemony of the United States and the global neoliberal system, is presented as a normative and ideological obstacle to strategic cooperation. As a revisionist actor, Iran has built its legitimacy on the discourse of opposing Western hegemony and supporting resistance movements in the region. This critical approach not only prevents Iran from convergence with extraordinary powers; it also strengthens ideological and normative gaps, which ultimately weaken Iran's ability to create sustainable alliances.
According to the findings of this research, to facilitate and accelerate the processes of strategic cooperation in Iran, it is necessary to put a set of structural, economic, identity, and political solutions on the agenda.
First, Iran must fundamentally redefine and revise its security concepts, redefining threats in a manner that facilitates strategic cooperation in standard formats with other countries, especially at the regional and global levels. This revision should encompass military, economic, environmental, and cyber threats and be considered a common framework for strategic cooperation with other countries.
Second, Iran must focus on strengthening its economic relations with various countries, particularly in areas beyond oil and energy. These efforts can be carried out through diversification of trade bases and development of production and industrial capacities within the country. This action will not only strengthen Iran's economic ties with various countries but also facilitate platforms for political and security cooperation at the global level.
Third, at the identity level, Iran must emphasize strengthening its soft power and promoting balanced and fair narratives of its cultural and civilizational identity in the global arena. This measure can foster mutual trust and sustainable convergence across various fields by mitigating identity and cultural conflicts.
Fourth, designing and implementing multi-layered and comprehensive diplomatic strategies that can respond to security, economic, and political needs at various levels is one of the most important measures to facilitate Iran's strategic cooperation with other countries. These strategies should be designed and implemented based on creating common agreements that are compatible with mutual interests, even with countries with different identities and goals.جهانیشدن اقتصاد و ارتباطات بینالمللی سببشده است تا تأمین منافع ملی بیش از هر زمان دیگری درگرو بسط و تقویت همکاریهای بینالمللی باشد. این ضرورت در مورد کشورهایی همچون ایران که از موقعیت ژئوپلیتیک و ژئواکونومیک ممتازی برخوردارند، بیشتر احساس میشود. پژوهش حاضر با ابتنای نظری بر تئوریهای کلان روابط بینالملل و بازخوانی نحلههای مفهومی رئالیسم، لیبرالیسم، سازهانگاری و انتقادی در پیِ تبیین تمهیدات مفهومی و نظری است که تکوین و تعمیق همکاریهای استراتژیک جمهوری اسلامی ایران با سایر کشورها را در سطح بینالمللی به تعویق انداختهاند. این مقاله با طرح این سؤال که موانع همکاریهای استراتژیک در سیاست خارجی ایران چیست؟ با رویکردی نظری و روش تبیینی به این نتیجه رسیده است که فقدان افقهای مشترک در بازنمایی تهدیدات امنیتی، گسست در زیرساختهای تعاملی اقتصادی، تفاوت و تعارض هویتی و ایدئولوژیک با دیگر بازیگران نظام بینالملل و سرشت گفتمانگریز و ساختارشکن سیاست خارجی ایران در قبال نظم مستقر موجبات شکلگیری نوعی انزوای ژئوپلیتیک مستمر و واگرایی راهبردی مزمن را فراهم آورده است. این وضعیت نهتنها ایران را از بسترهای همکاری در چهارچوب اتحادسازی کلاسیک و نهادینه دور نگاه داشته بلکه بازتولید نوعی خودبسندگی استراتژیک را بهمثابه بدیلی برآمده از تاریخمندی مقاومت در برابر منطق هژمونیک غرب تقویت کرده است. بدینترتیب، سیاست خارجی ایران در منظومهای از تعارضات ساختاری و مفهومی بازتعریف میشود که مسیر هرگونه همکاری راهبردی را در بستر نظم بینالملل معاصر با چالشهای جدی مواجه ساخته است.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_225673_2bd53f8892a54dfb37369449af9e30de.pdfپژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122Analysis of The Discursive Formation and Practices of Security-Military Discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran and The Three Discourses of Western, Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi-Takfiri In The West Asian Regionتحلیل صورتبندی گفتمانی و کردارهای گفتمان امنیتی- نظامی جمهوری اسلامی ایران و سه گفتمان غرب، اخوانی و سلفی-تکفیری در منطقه غرب آسیا15920022078810.22034/fr.2025.506132.1642FAنیمارضاییعضو هیئتعلمی گروه روابط بینالملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه خوارزمی، تهران، ایران0000-0002-8500-8882مجتبیشریعتیاستادیار علوم سیاسی، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه یاسوج، یاسوج، ایرانJournal Article20250211The collapse of the Syrian political system on December 8, 2024 and the inauguration of Donald J. Trump at the White House on January 20, 2025 will have profound impacts on the West Asian region. The primary objective of this research is to examine the new discursive formation and, consequently, analyze the discursive articulations, as well as the security-military practices, of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the three discourses of the Western, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafi-Takfiri in West Asia(Middle East) region. Thus, this study seeks to answer the central research question: "In the discursive formation of West Asia following the collapse of the Syrian political system in December 2024 and the inauguration of Donald J. Trump in January 2025, what will be the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s security-military discourse?" The proposed hypothesis is as follows: Beginning in January 2025, the discursive field in West Asia region will witness the presence of four security-military discourses, none of which will hold a hegemonic status: 1) The 'Resistance' discourse'', whose primary enunciator is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its discursive 'Others' are Israel, the United States, and Salafi-Takfiri forces, while its chain of equivalence includes the Islamic Republic of Iran, resistance groups in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, as well as adherents of revolutionary Islam and segments of the population hostile to Israel and the U.S. in the region. 2) The 'Western' security-military discourse, whose primary enunciator is the U.S. under Trump, encompassing several sub-discourses. Its discursive 'Other' consists of forces opposing Western values, while its chain of equivalence includes Israel, so-called moderate Arab states, and populations adhering to Western lifestyles and values in the region. 3) The 'Muslim Brotherhood' discourse, which gains discursive strength following the fall of the Syrian political system, with Turkey as its primary enunciator. Its discursive 'Others' are forces opposing the revival of the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurdish sub-discourse, while its chain of equivalence comprises Turkey, Qatar, Syria, and adherents of a non-revolutionary interpretation of Islam (Muslim Brotherhood-style secular Islam). 4) ''The 'Salafi-Takfiri' discourse'', whose primary enunciator shifted from Saudi Arabia to ISIS after June 21, 2017, when Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Crown Prince. Its discursive 'Others' are Shiites and forces opposing Salafi-Takfiri Islam (including Western-oriented groups), while its chain of equivalence includes Salafi-Takfiri groups in the region and adherents of Salafi Islam (neither revolutionary nor Muslim Brotherhood interpretations)." Additionally, this study seeks to answer the following sub-question: "Based on the new discursive formation in West Asia, what security-military practices will each of the four discourses pursue?"<br><strong>Keywords</strong>: Resistance Discourse, Western Discourse, Muslim Brotherhood Discourse, Salafi-Takfiri Discourse<br> <br><strong>Extended Abstract</strong><br>The collapse of the Syrian political system on December 8, 2024 and the inauguration of Donald J. Trump at the White House on January 20, 2025 will have profound impacts on the West Asian region. The primary objective of this research is to examine the new discursive formation and, consequently, analyze the discursive articulations, as well as the security-military practices, of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the three discourses of the Western, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafi-Takfiri in West Asia(Middle East) region. Thus, this study seeks to answer the central research question: "In the discursive formation of West Asia following the collapse of the Syrian political system in December 2024 and the inauguration of Donald J. Trump in January 2025, what will be the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s security-military discourse?" The proposed hypothesis is as follows: Beginning in January 2025, the discursive field in West Asia will witness the presence of four security-military discourses, none of which will hold a hegemonic status: 1) ''The 'Resistance' discourse'', whose primary enunciator is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its discursive 'Others' are Israel, the United States, and Salafi-Takfiri forces, while its chain of equivalence includes the Islamic Republic of Iran, resistance groups in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, as well as adherents of revolutionary Islam and segments of the population hostile to Israel and the U.S. in the region. 2) The 'Western' security-military discourse, whose primary enunciator is the U.S. under Trump, encompassing several sub-discourses. Its discursive 'Other' consists of forces opposing Western values, while its chain of equivalence includes Israel, so-called moderate Arab states, and populations adhering to Western lifestyles and values in the region. 3) ''The 'Muslim Brotherhood' discourse'', which gains discursive strength following the fall of the Syrian political system, with Turkey as its primary enunciator. Its discursive 'Others' are forces opposing the revival of the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurdish sub-discourse, while its chain of equivalence comprises Turkey, Qatar, Syria, and adherents of a non-revolutionary interpretation of Islam ('Muslim Brotherhood-style secular Islam). 4) ''The 'Salafi-Takfiri' discourse'', whose primary enunciator shifted from Saudi Arabia to ISIS after June 21, 2017, when Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Crown Prince. Its discursive 'Others' are Shiites and forces opposing Salafi-Takfiri Islam (including Western-oriented groups), while its chain of equivalence includes Salafi-Takfiri groups in the region and adherents of Salafi Islam (neither revolutionary nor Muslim Brotherhood interpretations)." Additionally, this study seeks to answer the following sub-question: "Based on the new discursive formation in West Asia, what security-military practices will each of the four discourses pursue?" The following sub-hypotheses are proposed:<br> a) The 'Resistance' discourse (articulated primarily by the Islamic Republic of Iran):<br>1. It will maintain an antagonistic relationship with the Western and Salafi-Takfiri discourses.<br>2. It will avoid establishing an antagonistic relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood discourse.<br>3. Since the Resistance discourse frames Israel as the "primary enemy of the region's people," it will counter Western discursive attempts to destabilize the signifier "Israel" within its discourse, making Israel a key site of discursive conflict with the West.<br>4. Tensions with the U.S. across the region will decrease until the nuclear issue is resolved.<br>5. A purely nuclear agreement with the U.S. (in the absence of maximum pressure) will be pursued, but no negotiations will be authorized if the U.S. enforces maximum pressure.<br>6. The agreement with Saudi Arabia will be maintained.<br>7. Tensions with neighboring countries will be managed.<br>8. Military drills, exercises, and the strengthening of Iran’s security-military capabilities will continue.<br>9. Covert enhancement of the security-military capabilities of Resistance Axis groups will intensify, avoiding media exposure.<br>b) The 'Western' discourse (articulated primarily by the U.S. under Trump):**<br>1. It will maintain an antagonistic relationship with the Resistance and Salafi-Takfiri discourses.<br>2. It will avoid antagonizing the Muslim Brotherhood discourse.<br>3. It will seek to fix the signifier "Israel" within its discourse as a strategic partner and ally, supporting Israel through settlement expansions and arms sales.<br>4. Efforts to expand the Abraham Accords to other regional countries (especially Saudi Arabia) will continue.<br>5. Pressure on Arab states to increase investments and arms purchases from the U.S. will intensify.<br>6. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons will remain a key signifier, sustaining a "carrot-and-stick" policy. Negotiations with Iran under maximum pressure will be prioritized.<br>7. Extreme Iranophobic rhetoric (e.g., regime change advocacy) will moderate (but not cease) pending the nuclear issue’s resolution. The binary of "non-nuclear Iran as prosperous vs. nuclear Iran as destitute" will be emphasized.<br>8. The Trump administration will seek military-security gains in West Asia through rhetoric and threats, particularly against Yemen’s Houthis (designated as an FTO).<br>9. Pressure on Iraq and Lebanon to marginalize Resistance groups and fully align them with the Western discourse will increase.<br>10. The discourse’s weak "metaphorical power" will be exacerbated by Trump’s linguistic patterns, failing to offer a clear future vision or present itself as the sole crisis solution, leading to a partial erosion of its chain of equivalence.<br>11. U.S. military presence in the region will persist.<br>c) The 'Muslim Brotherhood' discourse (articulated primarily by Turkey):**<br>1. It will not establish an antagonistic relationship with the other three discourses.<br>2. It will attempt to incorporate Egypt into its chain of equivalence.<br>3. Despite Syria’s inclusion in its chain of equivalence post-December 8, 2024, the Muslim Brotherhood discourse will not articulate the "liberation of Jerusalem," leading to limited Turkish responses to Israeli military actions in Syria.<br>4. Its primary 'Other' will be the Kurdish sub-discourse (under the Western discourse), sustaining hard/soft security confrontations with groups like the PYD/YPG and PKK.<br>5. It will deploy all security-military and economic resources to stabilize Syria’s new political system.<br>6. Efforts to persuade wealthy Arab states (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait) to invest in Syria will increase.<br>d) The 'Salafi-Takfiri' discourse (articulated primarily by ISIS):<br>1. It will maintain an antagonistic relationship with the Western and Resistance discourses.<br>2. It will avoid antagonizing the Muslim Brotherhood discourse.<br>3. It will strive to revive its chain of equivalence in the region.<br>4. Efforts to incorporate Syria and Iraq into its chain of equivalence will intensify.<br>5. The group’s terrorist operations will escalate.<br>Methodology<br>This research is an analytical-descriptive study with a methodology based on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis method. The data was collected from library and web-based sources (official and credible websites).<br>Findings and Discussion<br>Findings of the present study confirm both the primary and secondary hypotheses, demonstrating that the four security-military discourses of "Resistance," "the Western," "Muslim Brotherhood," and "Salafi-Takfiri" — each derived from their own discursive articulations — will pursue a set of security-related practices in the near future, at least until these four discourses undergo rearticulation. This has been thoroughly examined in the study. In this context, the reasons behind the Resistance security-military discourse's failure to achieve hegemonic status, despite its extensive chain of equivalence, were discussed. Based on credible survey results, it was demonstrated that Operation Al-Aqsa Storm and the Zionist regime’s crimes in the region have positively impacted the chain of equivalence of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s discourse (Resistance discourse). Thus, a series of measures must be taken to prevent the erosion of Iran’s position as the primary enunciator of the Resistance security-military discourse. Another key issue analyzed through the lens of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory was why the Muslim Brotherhood’s security-military discourse has not attained hegemonic status. It was noted that while this discourse has simultaneously incorporated the two elements of "ethnicity" and "religion (Muslim Brotherhood-style Islam)," its avoidance of establishing an antagonistic relationship with the other three discourses in the region has significantly diluted its logic of difference without expanding its chain of equivalence. Furthermore, employing the concept of "hegemonic intervention," the study highlighted that with the exception of a few security-military cases in West Asia (such as Syria and Libya), Turkey has no substantial presence or influence in other regional security-military issues. As long as the Muslim Brotherhood security-military discourse fails to externalize "Israel" as the primary threat to the Arab world and does not articulate the "liberation of Jerusalem" within its discourse, achieving hegemonic status will remain unlikely. Finally, the study discussed six key issues that could become focal points of new discursive conflicts, potentially completely reshaping discursive formations in West Asia and leading to divergent security actions and practices: Iran’s nuclear dossier and U.S. engagement with it. Israel, The future of Syria’s political system, The resurgence of ISIS in the region, The Kurdish issue, The future of Resistance groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria.پژوهش حاضر در پی پاسخ به این پرسش اصلی که «در صورتبندی گفتمانی در منطقه غرب آسیا پس از سقوط نظام سیاسی سوریه در دسامبر 2024 و استقرار دانلد جی. ترامپ در کاخ سفید در ژانویه 2025، موقعیت گفتمان امنیتی-نظامی جمهوری اسلامی ایران چگونه خواهد بود؟»، این فرضیه را ارائه میدهد که «از ژانویه 2025، میدان گفتمانی در منطقه غرب آسیا شاهد حضور چهار گفتمان امنیتی-نظامی میباشد که هیچیک دارای منزلت هژمونیک نیستند: 1)گفتمان «مقاومت» که بیانکننده(اداکننده) اصلی آن جمهوری اسلامی ایران میباشد. دگرهای گفتمانی آن اسراییل، ایالات متحده و نیروهای سلفی-تکفیری و زنجیره همارزی آن شامل جمهوری اسلامی ایران و گروههای مقاومت در یمن، لبنان، عراق، فلسطین، سوریه و مردم معتقد به اسلام انقلابی و بخشی از مردم متنفر از اسراییل و ایالات متحده در منطقه میباشد؛ 2)گفتمان امنیتی-نظامی «غرب» که بیانکننده اصلی آن ایالات متحده دوران ترامپ میباشد و دارای چندین خرده گفتمان است. دگر یا غیرخودی گفتمانی آن نیروهای مخالف ارزشهای غربی و زنجیره همارزی آن شامل اسراییل، دولتهای موسوم به عرب میانهرو و مردم معتقد به سبک زندگی و ارزشهای غربی در منطقه است؛ 3)گفتمان «اخوانالمسلمین» که پس از سقوط نظام سیاسی سوریه نوعی قوت گفتمانی پیدا کرده و بیانکننده اصلی آن ترکیه میباشد. دگرهای گفتمانی آن نیروهای مخالف احیای امپراطوری عثمانی و خرده گفتمان کردها و زنجیره همارزی آن شامل ترکیه، قطر، سوریه و مردم معتقد به قرائت غیرانقلابی از اسلام(اسلام سکولار اخوانی) میباشد؛ 4)گفتمان «سلفی-تکفیری» که از 21 ژوئن 2017 که محمد بنسلمان بهعنوان ولیعهد عربستان سعودی انتخاب گردید بیانکننده اصلی آن از عربستان سعودی به داعش منتقل شده است. دگرهای گفتمانی آن شیعه و نیروهای مخالف اسلام سلفی-تکفیری(از جمله غربگرایان) و زنجیره همارزی آن شامل گروههای سلفی-تکفیری در منطقه و مردم معتقد به اسلام سلفی(نه قرائت انقلابی و نه قرائت اخوانی از اسلام) میباشد.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_220788_6956ec0343a65d935d50604fa4867886.pdfپژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122The Balance of China and Iran Against the Western International System; A Case Study of BRICSموازنه چین و ایران در برابر نظام بینالملل غربی؛ مطالعه موردی بریکس20122823525410.22034/fr.2025.528853.1677FAمریمنظری لاریدانشآموخته کارشناسی ارشد روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران0000-0002-6136-6781میثمبلباسیاستادیار گرایش انقلاب اسلامی، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران0000-0002-6136-6781Journal Article20250607The expansion of China’s multilateral engagements with Iran, followed by Tehran’s admission as a permanent member of BRICS in 2021, can be interpreted as a step toward closer alignment between the two states in an effort to balance against the legitimacy of Western unilateralism—foremost that of the United States. The continuation of bilateral interactions has been largely shaped by the interests each state has articulated based on its domestic imperatives. These interests determine their respective patterns of balancing vis-à-vis the hegemon and inform their behavior within BRICS. Accordingly, this study seeks, through the lens of the Balance of Interests theory and using a qualitative analytical–comparative method, to examine the nature of China’s and Iran’s balancing strategies against the Western-led international order through the BRICS institution. The central argument is that China—benefiting from the advantages of the hegemonic system, possessing a peace-seeking strategic culture, and embracing pluralism in its external relations and development models—is revisionist yet inclined toward delegated balancing and calibrated accommodation through a strategy of “regulated resistance.” In contrast, Iran—due to structural pressures, a justice-oriented strategic culture, and a moralized approach to external engagement—tends toward a strategy of full balancing. The manifestation of this divergence within BRICS appears in differences concerning the depth of de-dollarization, relative advantages sought, and the very definition of the group’s identity and purpose. These dynamics have subsequently shaped the trajectory of multilateral cooperation within BRICS.
<strong>Keywords</strong>: Balance of Interests, Unilateralism, BRICS, Western Institutions, Multilateralism
<strong>Extended Abstract</strong>
Introduction: This study addresses the evolving geopolitical landscape and the relative decline of Western hegemony, particularly that of the United States, by analyzing the strategic positioning of China and Iran vis-à-vis the Western-led international order. The increasing convergence between these two nations through multilateral frameworks such as the BRICS group is interpreted as a reactive strategy to the West’s unilateralism in economic, political, and cultural spheres. While the United States continues to employ instruments such as the dollar and Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank) to reinforce its hegemonic influence, emerging powers like Iran and China aim to redefine global governance through institutional innovation and regional cooperation. Iran’s permanent membership in BRICS and China's growing role in alternative institutional development serve as clear indicators of this strategic shift.
Research Hypothesis: Employing the analytical framework of neoclassical realism—specifically Schweller’s theory of “Balance of Interests”—this research proposes a central hypothesis: China, due to its domestic structure, strategic culture, and systemic benefits from the existing international order, tends toward soft balancing through accommodation, delegation, and cautious reformism. Iran, by contrast, faced with existential threats and shaped by revolutionary ideology and economic sanctions, predominantly adopts a hard balancing strategy based on resistance and deterrence. The analysis is structured around four key domestic-level variables influencing foreign policy behavior: (1) Elite consensus on perceived threats; (2) Societal perception of threats; (3) Legitimacy of the governing regime; (4) Strategic coherence among decision-makers. These variables explain the diverging behavioral patterns of China and Iran in their engagement with the Western-led global system and multilateral mechanisms such as BRICS.
Results and Discussion: (1) Domestic-Level Drivers of Foreign Policy; In China, a centralized political system, Confucian strategic culture, and prioritization of economic development have led to a foreign policy marked by legalist caution and incremental reform. The Chinese leadership, particularly under Xi Jinping, simultaneously recognizes the utility of cooperating with Western institutions while criticizing their hegemonic tendencies, especially in matters such as human rights and regional sovereignty (e.g., Taiwan, the South China Sea). As a result, China seeks to amend, rather than replace, the liberal order—favoring multilateralism as a tool for gradually diluting Western dominance. In contrast, Iran’s strategic culture, shaped by the Islamic Revolution, eight years of imposed war, and a defensive ideological narrative, promotes a more assertive posture. The Iranian elite largely perceives the Western order as inherently exploitative and threatening to its independence. This perception, amplified by extensive sanctions and international isolation, compels Iran to pursue a policy of strategic autonomy and resistance, epitomized in its "Look to the East" doctrine and alignment with like-minded states. (2) Modes of Balancing Toward the Western System; China, owing to its substantial economic entanglement with the West and its preference for strategic prudence, engages in “soft balancing” via mechanisms such as BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These efforts aim to incrementally erode U.S. dominance while avoiding direct confrontation. China’s balancing strategy is described as a “legalized resistance,” utilizing international law and institutional participation to challenge unilateralism without provoking systemic backlash. Iran, by contrast, derives little benefit from the Western system due to its exclusion from global markets and financial networks. Consequently, its balancing strategy is more radical and confrontational, seeking a complete overhaul or replacement of the existing order. For Tehran, institutions like BRICS are not supplementary but alternative avenues to circumvent Western control, achieve economic resilience, and reaffirm its sovereign right to independent development. (3) BRICS Engagement: A Comparative Perspective; The study further analyzes the strategic behavior of China and Iran within BRICS across four key domains:
•Monetary Reform and De-Dollarization: Iran aggressively promotes de-dollarization and views BRICS as a platform to undermine U.S. financial hegemony. China, while exploring digital currency alternatives and regional payment systems, approaches dollar replacement with caution due to its large dollar reserves and economic interdependence with the U.S.
•Democratization of Financial Institutions: China views BRICS as a complementary instrument for gradual reform of existing institutions such as the WTO and IMF. Iran, on the other hand, envisions BRICS as a revolutionary space to bypass Western-imposed financial constraints. Tehran's inability to access loans from BRICS financial arms, however, highlights the limitations of this vision and China's reticence to jeopardize its global economic standing.
•Energy Security and Transition: As a major hydrocarbon producer, Iran seeks to leverage its BRICS membership to stabilize global energy markets and attract investment in its oil and gas infrastructure. China, the group’s largest energy consumer, prefers bilateral agreements and emphasizes investments in renewable energy technologies where it enjoys a competitive edge. This asymmetry limits deep collaboration in fossil fuel-based energy security.
•Sustainable Development and Anti-Interventionism: Both countries converge in rejecting Western definitions of development and human rights, advocating instead for non-intervention and sovereign-based development models. China promotes its “Beijing Consensus” as a counter-narrative to the “Washington Consensus,” while Iran has proposed establishing a BRICS security commission to address terrorism, extremism, and digital threats multilaterally.
Conclusion: By applying the theory of balance of interests, the study concludes that both China and Iran are revisionist states, albeit with divergent strategies. China’s behavior reflects a measured, long-term approach to revising global governance, preserving its systemic advantages while avoiding open conflict. Iran, facing existential threats and systemic exclusion, adopts a maximalist position that prioritizes resistance over accommodation.
This divergence explains the differing expectations and outcomes within BRICS. China, as the group’s economic anchor, directs its engagement with institutional conservatism, while Iran hopes for rapid systemic change and strategic support. Despite their shared opposition to Western hegemony, the gap in their respective balancing strategies—soft versus hard—constrains the full realization of Iran’s goals within BRICS. Ultimately, Iran’s ability to extract meaningful benefits from BRICS hinges on two critical factors: (1) Alignment with the pragmatic tempo of other members (especially China and India). (2) A calibrated strategy that blends ideological conviction with geopolitical realism. This nuanced understanding of China–Iran relations within multilateralism helps illuminate the broader dynamics of global power transition in a post-unipolar world.گسترش مراودات چندجانبه چین با ایران و متعاقب آن پذیرش عضویت دائم تهران در گروه بریکس طی سال ۲۰۲۱ را میتوان گامی در راستای نزدیک شدن دو کشور جهت موازنه علیه مشروعیت یکجانبهگرایی غرب و در رأس همه، ایالاتمتحده، قلمداد کرد. ادامه تعاملات دو کشور تا حد زیادی متأثر از منافعی بوده که هر یک، مبتنی بر مقتضیات داخلی برای خود تعریف و بر پایه آن، ضمن ترسیم نوع موازنه با هژمون، رفتاری را در گروه بریکس اتخاذ میکنند. به همین منظور، پژوهش حاضر تلاش دارد تا با تأکید بر نظریه «موازنه منافع» و در چهارچوب روش کیفی تحلیلی–تطبیقی، چیستی نوع موازنه منافع چین و ایران در برابر نظام بینالملل غربی از طریق نهاد بریکس را ریشهیابی نماید. فرض اصلی این است که چین، بهموجب بهرهمندی از مواهب هژمون، فرهنگ راهبردی مسالمتجو، پذیرش تکثر در روابط و الگوهای توسعه، اگرچه تجدیدنظرطلب بوده، اما با راهبرد مقاومت قانونمند گرایش به احاله و مماشات دارد؛ درحالیکه ایران، به دلیل فشارهای ساختاری، فرهنگ راهبردی عدالتمحور و نگرش اخلاقی به برونسپاری، به رویکرد موازنه کامل تمایل یافته است. بازتاب این امر در نهاد بریکس بهصورت تفاوت در کیفیت دلارزدایی، مزیت نسبی، تعریف ماهیت وجودی و هدف گروه جلوهگر شده و توسعه تعاملات چندجانبه را تحت تأثیر قرار داده است.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_235254_b8d65d903b7696f67e561e82f9233c3c.pdfپژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122Presenting a strategic foresight model to face the strategic latent technology of Saudi Arabiaارائه الگوی آینده نگاری راهبردی جهت مواجهه با نهفتگی راهبردی فناوری عربستان سعودی22926022558010.22034/fr.2025.465282.1566FAحسنبیک محمدلوعضو هیئت علمی پژوهشکده تحقیقات راهبردی و پژوهشگر حوزه آینده پژوهی، تهران، ایران0009-0002-6848-805Xمصطفیرضوانی اصیلدانشجوی دکترای روابط بینالملل، تهران، ایرانمهدیقلیزاده زاوشتیدانشآموخته دکتری و پژوهشگر حوزه آیندهپژوهی، تهران، ایرانJournal Article20240810Saudi Arabia formulated Vision 2030 with the hope of diversifying its economy and changing its nature from oil dependence to a production-oriented economy, and has considered the role of technology to be key to achieving this vision. Given Saudi Arabia’s position as Iran’s main competitor in Vision 1404, it is important to examine Saudi Arabia’s strategic technological latency and potential threats against Iran. Therefore, the main goal of this research is to present a strategic foresight model for confronting Saudi Arabia’s technological latency, which was conducted using a data-driven method. The data collection tool is field studies and structured and semi-structured in-depth interviews with 15 managers and academic elites. Based on the research findings, the central category is “Confronting the strategic technological latency in Saudi Arabia.” Causal conditions have four dimensions: technological, business, and macroeconomic and political variables. The strategies in question include: the growth of entrepreneurship in the field of technology and job creation in Iran, the priority of the digital economy as the driving force of Iran's economic growth, the growth of technology in Iran's military, monitoring the programs of the Musk Foundation, monitoring the programs and research of Saudi universities, monitoring the development projects of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, monitoring social developments and cyberspace (especially social networks), and monitoring Saudi technology. The background conditions also include: infrastructure conditions and institutional and legal conditions. Intervening conditions also affect strategies through political challenges and the structure of the workforce and knowledge, which will ultimately lead to the consequences of preventing Iran from changing the balance of Saudi economic or military power in the region, preventing Saudi Arabia from using technology latent in a destructive way, Iran's countermeasures in competition with the growth of technology in Saudi Arabia, information about the latest state of technology in Saudi Arabia, awareness of the latest state of technology latent in a way that is appropriate to Saudi policies in the region.
<strong>Keywords</strong>: Strategic Technology Embeddedness, Grounded Theory, Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030
<strong>Extended Abstract</strong>
Introduction and Problem Statement
Saudi Arabia has undertaken an ambitious transformation plan through its Vision 2030, aiming to shift from an oil-based economy to a knowledge-based, technologically driven one. This initiative positions technology not just as a growth enabler but also as a strategic asset that could alter regional power dynamics. In light of Saudi Arabia’s technological acceleration and geopolitical rivalry with Iran—particularly within the framework of Iran’s 1404 national vision—understanding the concept of “strategic technological latency” becomes critical. This research addresses how Iran can proactively develop strategic foresight mechanisms to monitor, anticipate, and respond to the latent technological capabilities of Saudi Arabia. The key research question is: how can Iran formulate a model to confront the
potential threats posed by the strategic latency of Saudi Arabian technology?
Methodology
The research adopts a qualitative approach grounded in the grounded theory methodology, focusing on the extraction of a conceptual model. Data collection was conducted via in-depth, structured, and semi-structured interviews with 15 experts, including policy-makers, military officials, and academic elites. The analysis proceeded through the open, axial, and selective coding phases. In the open coding stage, 156 primary concepts were identified. These were categorized into 43 sub-categories and 9 main categories during the axial coding process. The final selective coding stage resulted in a paradigm model highlighting the relationships between causal conditions, contextual and intervening factors, strategic responses, and their consequences.
Findings and Results
The core category identified is “Confronting the Strategic Latency of Technology in Saudi Arabia.”
Causal conditions fall into four categories:
1. Technological Factors – including the intrinsic capability and exponential development of technologies.
2. Business Environment – shaped by increased globalization and competitive shifts.
3. Macroeconomic Factors – reflecting Saudi Arabia’s push for economic diversification and digital economy development.
4. Political Factors – rooted in ideological and regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The contextual conditions include infrastructural and institutional aspects, such as:
v The establishment of the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST),
v The National Cybersecurity Authority,
v The launch of NEOM smart city,
v Legal reforms and the introduction of a Green Card system to attract foreign talent.
v Intervening conditions influence the strategy through:
v Political constraints within Saudi Arabia (e.g., the resistance of conservative elites),
v Economic vulnerabilities (e.g., dependence on foreign investment),
v Labor market issues (e.g., a weak private sector, skill shortages, high public sector reliance).
v Strategic Responses Proposed for Iran include:
v Enhancing entrepreneurship in high-tech sectors,
v Prioritizing the digital economy as a driver of national growth,
v Developing military technological capabilities,
v Monitoring Saudi initiatives such as the Misk Foundation and Vision 2030 projects,
v Tracking scientific research and academic outputs from institutions like Al-Madina University,
v Observing social media trends and virtual spaces to detect signs of technological policy shifts.
v Consequences of implementing these strategies would include:
v Preventing Saudi Arabia from altering regional military or economic balances,
v Dissuading the use of disruptive or dual-use technologies against Iranian interests,
v Equipping Iran with updated knowledge of Saudi’s technological advancements,
v Facilitating proactive and informed counterstrategies, especially in fields like drone warfare, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence.
The model emphasizes that technological latency often lies dormant until external conditions activate its strategic potential.
If Iran does not develop anticipatory strategies, it risks falling behind in regional tech-driven power equations.
Discussion and Conclusion
The research provides a paradigm model illustrating how Iran can systematically address and anticipate the implications of Saudi Arabia’s strategic technological growth. The significance of this study lies in highlighting the concept of “strategic technological latency” as a driver of regional imbalance if left unmonitored. While Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 offers a roadmap for economic diversification, its technological dimension—ranging from satellite programs and AI investments to smart cities—poses potential geopolitical risks.
Iran’s response must be multifaceted: investing in digital infrastructure, fostering innovation, and establishing institutional mechanisms for technological intelligence. Policymakers should recognize that the line between civilian and military technology is increasingly blurred. Thus, strategic foresight must encompass both domains. Moreover, Iran must engage more actively in international technology partnerships to reduce vulnerability to regional adversaries.
Recommendations for future research include exploring how international actors (e.g., the U.S., China) indirectly influence regional technological latency and assessing the resilience of Iran’s domestic innovation ecosystem in response to external technological disruptions.عربستان سعودی، چشمانداز ۲۰۳۰ را با امید تنوعبخشی به اقتصاد و تغییر ماهیت آن از وابستگی به نفت به اقتصاد تولیدمحور تدوین نمود و برای نیل به این چشمانداز، نقش فناوری را کلیدی برشمرده است. با توجه به جایگاه عربستان بهعنوان رقیب اصلی ایران در چشمانداز 1404، بررسی نهفتگی راهبردی فناوری و تهدیدات احتمالی عربستان علیه ایران حائز اهمیت است. بنابراین هدف اصلی این پژوهش، ارائه الگوی آیندهنگاری راهبردی مواجهه با نهفتگی فناوری عربستان است که با روش دادهبنیاد انجام شده است. ابزار گردآوری اطلاعات، مطالعات میدانی و مصاحبه عمیق ساختیافته و نیمهساختیافته با 15 نفر از مدیران و نخبگان دانشگاهی است. براساس یافتههای پژوهش، مقوله محوری «مواجهه با نهفتگی راهبردی فناوری در عربستان» است. شرایط علی دارای چهار بُعد متغیرهای فناوری، کسبوکار و اقتصاد کلان و سیاسی است. راهبردهای مورد نظر عبارت است از: رشد کارآفرینی در حوزه فناوری و اشتغالزایی ایران، اولویت اقتصاد دیجیتال بهعنوان موتور محرکه رشد اقتصادی ایران، رشد فناوری در حوزه نظامی ایران، رصد برنامههای بنیاد مسک، رصد برنامهها و پژوهشهای دانشگاههای عربستان، رصد پروژههای توسعهای چشمانداز 2030 عربستان، رصد تحولات اجتماعی و فضای مجازی (بهویژه شبکههای اجتماعی) و رصد فناوری عربستان. شرایط زمینهای نیز عبارت است از: شرایط زیرساختی و شرایط نهادی و قانونی. شرایط مداخلهگر نیز از طریق چالشهای سیاسی و ساختار نیروی کار و دانش بر راهبردها تأثیر میگذارند که در نهایت به پیامدهای جلوگیری ایران از تغییر در توازن قدرت اقتصادی یا نظامی عربستان در منطقه، جلوگیری از استفاده مخرب عربستان از نهفتگی فناوری، اقدام متقابل ایران در رقابت با رشد فناوری در عربستان، اطلاع از آخرین وضعیت فناوری در عربستان، آگاهی از آخرین وضعیت نهفتگی فناوری و کنشگری متناسب با سیاستهای عربستان در منطقه منجر خواهد شد.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_225580_0d1485c41e50f58aa3f29d82741c61b8.pdfپژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122A description and critique of Mearsheimer's theory of strategic rationality and its lessons for the political elites of the Islamic Republic of Iranشرح و نقدی بر نظریه عقلانیت استراتژیک مرشایمر و درسگفتارهای آن برای نخبگان سیاسی جمهوریاسلامی ایران26129021720810.22034/fr.2025.496314.1618FAامیررهامشجاعیکاندیدای دکتری روابط بینالملل، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان، رشت، ایران0009-0001-8788-2522رضاسیمبراستاد گروه علوم سیاسی و روابط بینالملل، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان، رشت، ایران0000-0001-5111-1075Journal Article20241230The concept of strategic rationality, which Mearsheimer proposed in her latest work, is an approach to better understand the context, limita-tions, and how governments make decisions in the field of foreign policy. Mearsheimer, by introducing this concept, moves beyond general definitions that view rationality merely through cost-benefit calculations, and instead emphasizes its socially embedded and deliberative nature as well as its theoretically grounded foundation. By redefining and elaborating upon this key notion in the study of international relations and international politics, he aims to provide a new theoretical framework for better understanding foreign policy and the decision-making processes of state leaders in the external arena. One of the most important goals of this article is to introduce this theory in Iran by adopting a critical and, of course, practical approach. Accordingly, the main questions are: in what aspects and to what extent is this approach new, independent, and practical, and what lessons does it bring for Iran's political elite? To address these questions, adopting a critical ap-proach, particularly from a psychological perspective and drawing upon concepts such as the “political paradigm” introduced by certain neoclassical realist theorists and “strategic culture” in constructivism, we propose the hypothesis that Mearsheimer’s theory of strategic ration-ality, despite its practical relevance, shares significant similarities with other theoretical approaches including neoclassical realism and con-structivism, and therefore cannot be regarded as entirely innovative. Nevertheless, this theory offers essential and valuable insights for politi-cal elites of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The research method employed is analytical-explanatory, and the nature of the study is fundamental and theoretical.<br><strong>Keywords</strong>: International political psychology, neoclassical realism, strategic rationality, Mearsheimer<br> <br><strong>Extended Abstract</strong><br>Introduction<br>Decision-making is a central component in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Over the years, various theoretical perspectives, including realism, constructivism, and psychological theories, have attempted to explain how foreign policy decisions are made. In this context, the concept of strategic rationality, introduced by John Mearsheimer in his latest work, offers a novel approach to understanding the conditions, constraints, and reasoning processes that shape state behavior.<br>By advancing this concept, Mearsheimer moves beyond traditional notions of rationality that emphasize cost-benefit analysis, highlighting instead the importance of deliberative processes and the theoretical grounding of rational decisions. His theory presents a new conceptual framework aimed at deepening our understanding of how states operate in the complex arena of international relations.<br>Mearsheimer’s concept has sparked fresh debate among international relations theorists by proposing a coherent and applicable understanding of rationality. One of the primary objectives of this article is to introduce and critically evaluate this theory within the Iranian academic context. Specifically, the article asks: To what extent is Mearsheimer’s approach genuinely novel, independent, and practical? And what insights can it offer to Iran’s political elites and decision-makers?<br>To address these questions, we adopt a critical and comparative perspective, particularly through psychological lenses and by referencing related concepts such as policy paradigms in neoclassical realism and strategic culture in constructivist theory. Our hypothesis is that although Mearsheimer’s theory is pragmatic and analytically valuable, it shares significant similarities with pre-existing theories and cannot be considered entirely innovative. Nevertheless, the theory provides essential and timely lessons.This study employs an analytical-explanatory methodology, and its nature is fundamentally theoretical.<br>Research Questions<br>This research is guided by two central questions:<br><br>1. To what extent is Mearsheimer’s theory of strategic rationality innovative, independent, and applicable in practice?<br><br>2. What lessons can this theoretical approach offer to the political elites and decision-makers of the Islamic Republic of Iran?<br>Research Hypothesis<br>Drawing from psychological approaches and related concepts—such as the policy paradigm in neoclassical realism and strategic culture in constructivism—we hypothesize that while Mearsheimer’s theory of strategic rationality is practical and theoretically sound, it closely parallels other existing theories. Therefore, it cannot be considered entirely new. Nevertheless, it contains valuable and relevant lessons for Iran’s political leadership, especially given the country’s unique geopolitical and strategic conditions.<br>Methodology<br>This study adopts an analytical-explanatory approach and is fundamentally theoretical in nature. By employing key concepts from constructivism and psychology, the research aims to illuminate the similarities between Mearsheimer’s theory and other theoretical frameworks. In the final analysis, the study highlights the strengths of Mearsheimer’s theory and extracts its practical implications for Iran’s political elites.<br>Results and Discussion<br>The notion of a policy paradigm, broadly defined, refers not only to the semantic structure of political concepts but also to the decision-making mechanisms grounded in established and collective rationality. Within this framework, Mearsheimer’s concept of strategic rationality can be more clearly understood—particularly when viewed through the lens of theories like neoclassical realism, which are closely associated with foreign policy analysis.<br>Constructivism, too, shares much with this concept, especially through ideas such as strategic culture. From within these perspectives, two key features emerge that resonate strongly with Mearsheimer’s model: a deliberative (argumentative) approach to decision-making and reliance on theoretically grounded ideas. In constructivist thought, this includes factors such as the culture shaping actor relations, learned behavioral patterns, and the intersubjective construction of identities and interests. Although Mearsheimer’s theory does not represent a completely original or groundbreaking approach, it has been the subject of legitimate criticism. Nonetheless, from a practical standpoint, it makes a significant contribution to foreign policy and security studies. Specifically, it offers substantial insights for Iran’s political leadership.<br>The most important contribution of Mearsheimer’s concept of strategic rationality lies in its emphasis on understanding the rationale behind various foreign policy strategies adopted by states. It underlines the notion that what may seem irrational from one state's perspective may appear entirely rational to another, based on differing strategic contexts. This awareness can help political leaders avoid misinterpretations and respond more effectively to international developments. Moreover, the theory highlights the risks of policymaking without deliberation or grounding in sound theory. Without these elements, foreign policy is likely to deviate from rational pathways, thereby weakening a state's capacity to protect and advance its national interests within the global power structure. For Iranian political elites, the theory of strategic rationality offers several key lessons:<br><br>1. Redefining National Interests and Enhancing Cognitive Flexibility<br><br>2. Recognizing the Fluid Nature of Alliances<br><br>3. Maximizing the Role of Academic Expertise<br> <br>Conclusion<br>This article aimed to introduce and critically assess Mearsheimer and Rosato’s theory of strategic rationality. While highlighting its analytical strengths, we also raised psychological and conceptual critiques, particularly focusing on its similarities with other theoretical traditions such as neoclassical realism and constructivism. Although the theory aspires to offer a new framework that downplays internal factors like identity, ideology, emotion, and culture, we argue that it ultimately does not fully succeed in this regard. In practice, the theory reflects significant overlap with existing approaches. Nonetheless, Mearsheimer's framework remains a valuable contribution to the study of foreign policy and rational decision-making. Given Iran's complex position in the international system and the multifaceted threats it faces, scientific and well-informed approaches to foreign policy are essential. Strategic rationality, when properly understood and applied, can serve as a useful tool for Iranian leaders to recalibrate national interests, strengthen decision-making processes, and engage more constructively with the international community.مفهوم عقلانیت استراتژیک که مرشایمر در آخرین اثر خود آن را مطرح کرده، یک رویکرد برای فهم بهتر زمینهها، محدودیتها و همچنین چگونگی تصمیمگیری دولتها در حوزه سیاست خارجی است. مرشایمر با طرح این مفهوم، با گذر از تعاریفِ عام که عقلانیت را در چهارچوب مفاهیمی مانند هزینه-فایده در نظر میگیرند، بر زمینهمندی اجتماعی-مشورتی و مبنای معتبر تئوریک عقلانیت تأکید داشته و با ارائه تعریف و شرح مفهوم جدیدی از این دال مهم در مطالعات روابط و سیاست بینالملل، سعی در ارائه یک چهارچوب تئوریکِ جدید برای درک بهتر سیاست خارجی و تصمیمات دولتمردان در عرصه خارجی داشته است. یکی از مهمترین اهداف این مقاله معرفی این نظریه در ایران با اتخاذ یک رویکرد انتقادی و البته کاربردی است. برهمیناساس، پرسشهای اصلی این هستند که این رویکرد در چه جنبهها و تا چه میزان جدید، مستقل و کاربردی است و چه درسهایی برای نخبگان سیاسی ایران بههمراه دارد؟ برای پاسخ به این پرسشها، با یک رویکرد انتقادی بهویژه از منظر روانشناختی و طرح مفاهیمی مانند پارادایم سیاسی که برخی نظریهپردازان نئوکلاسیک آن را مطرح کردهاند، فرهنگ استراتژیک در سازهانگاری، این فرضیه را مطرح میسازیم که نظریه عقلانیت استراتژیک مرشایمر، علیرغم کاربردی بودن، شباهتهای بسیاری به سایر نظریات ازجمله رئالیسم نئوکلاسیک و سازهانگاری دارد و کاملاً نوآورانه قلمداد نمیشود، با این حال این نظریه حاوی درسگفتارهای مهم و اساسی برای نخبگان سیاسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران است. روش انجام پژوهش تحلیلی-تبیینی و ماهیت آن نیز بنیادی-نظری است.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_217208_8bd94af21c884e70f1fed1fac2649d51.pdfپژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی
مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـامفصلنامه روابط خارجی2008-541917320251122Constraints of the current Islamic Republic of Iran’s Asian Policy in the Indian Subcontinentمحدودیتهای سیاست معاصر آسیایی جمهوری اسلامی ایران در محیط شبه قاره هند29131223171110.22034/fr.2025.495878.1616FAمازیارمظفری فلارتیاستادیار مطالعات هند، گروه مطالعات جنوب و شرق آسیا و اقیانوسیه، دانشکده مطالعات جهان، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0000-0001-5305-8589امیرمحسنشاه شرقیدانشجوی دکتری مطالعات هند، گروه مطالعات جنوب و شرق آسیا و اقیانوسیه، دانشکده مطالعات جهان، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0009-0007-3389-2622Journal Article20241225The Asian policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has attracted the attention of many researchers in recent years as a fundamental part of the country's foreign policy. However, most of the related research on this subject has focused more on Iran's relations with China and Russia as two eastern powers, and the issue of Iran's failure to develop its interactions with other environments, including the Indian subcontinent, has rarely been considered. Given the special position of the Indian subcontinent in the "Asian" environment, the central question of the present study is which limiting variables affect the advancement of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Asian policy in the Indian subcontinent environment? The hypothesis that is tested in the course of the research is that in order to evaluate the limiting variables of Iran's Asian policy in the Indian subcontinent environment, attention should be paid to two levels of limiting variables, based on neoclassical realists. At the first level, there are structural elements of the international system such as the Iran-US rivalry and emerging regional dynamics that have limited the overall framework of the country's foreign policy choices in this environment. At the second level, there are non-structural elements such as an inaccurate perception of existing equations, an overestimation of the maneuvering power among Asian actors, and a low capacity of bureaucratic mechanisms that prevent the optimization of achievements in this limited environment of choices. In this study, a qualitative research method, an analytical-descriptive approach, and library resources have been utilized.
<strong>Keywords</strong>: Asian Policy, Islamic Republic of Iran, Look East Policy, Indian Subcontinent. Balanced Diplomacy, Neighborhood Policy
<strong>Extended Abstract</strong>
Iran’s “Asian Policy” is to be considered an evolution of a former policy approach widely known as the “Look East Policy”. Initially seen as a strategic counterbalance to Euro-American influence, this approach aimed to strengthen Iran’s ties with non-Western powers, especially China and Russia. However, when these countries backed UN sanctions against Iran, the strategy lost traction. In later years, Tehran explored alternative alignments, including South–South cooperation with Latin American and African countries.(Bagheri Dolatabadi & Shafiee Seifabadi, 2021) The 2010s brought a more nuanced understanding: Iran’s eastward focus was no longer just about confronting the West but also about capitalizing on the growing influence of Asia in the international system. Particularly, after the adoption of JCPOA and initial détente with U.S., Iran’s “Look East Policy” was translated as a balanced approach to engage and exploit evolving relations with Asian powers in economic, political, and security domains. While most attention in Iranian scholarly studies has focused on the role and position of China and Russia in Iran’s “Look East Policy” and “Asian Policy”, other significant Asian regions—particularly the Indian subcontinent—remain underexplored.
Research Question
Acknowledging the fact that Iran’s “Asian Policy” has fallen short in the Indian subcontinent in comparison to China and Russia, this article addresses the existing gap in the literature by asking: What are the main constraints that have prevented Iran from effectively implementation of its Asian Policy agenda in the Indian subcontinent?
Research Hypothesis
Drawing on the analytical lens of neoclassical realism, the study examines this hypothesis: Iran’s initiatives in the Indian subcontinentin its “Asian Policy” has been plagued not only by the structural constraints, but also by internal constraints that prevent the maximal performance of the policy in the given structural environment.
Theoretical Framework
The article employs neoclassical realism to assess Iran’s underperforming foreign policy agenda in the Indian subcontinent. Unlike structural realism, which focuses exclusively on international system constraints, neoclassical realism introduces domestic-level variables—particularly elite perceptions and state capacity—as mediators between systemic pressures and foreign policy outcomes. As theorized by Gideon Rose, states albeit face structural constraints, but their ability to respond depends on how national elites interpret those conditions and whether state institutions can mobilize resources effectively. Therefore, the same structural environment may lead to different outcomes depending on internal decision-making dynamics.(Rose, 1998)
Iran’s Initiatives in the Indian Subcontinent
Iran’s “Asia Policy” initiatives in the Indian subcontinent mostly include four main areas. First area would be trade and energy in which despite historical ties, trade volumes with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka remained stagnant. Importantly, Iran’s oil exports—once a cornerstone of economic ties—have ceased completely since the imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions during first Trump administration’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign.
Second, are the Large-Scale Economic Projects namely “The Peace Pipeline” with India and Pakistan, “Farzad-B gas field” cooperation with India, “Uma Oya Hydroelectric Project” in Sri Lanka and “Electricity Export Line” to Pakistan. Most of these large-scale projects have faced delays or cancellations due to sanctions and financial constraints. Third area of cooperation would be Connectivity Projects and Corridors like the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) initiative and the development of Chabahar Port with India, and the ITI railway project with Pakistan. These connectivity projects have shown much higher strategic potential despite western sanctions, yet still they suffered from execution delays, funding gaps, and legal disputes. Last area of cooperation would be Security and Multilateral Engagements. Iran had minimal military engagement with India, Pakistan and the others, and the security cooperation was inconsistent. Particularly in relations with Pakistan, Iran has faced complicated border insecurities such as terrorism and smuggling, which from time to time has led to minimal confrontations between Iran and Pakistan. At last, Iran is a joint member in forums like SCO and BRICS with these South Asian nations which offers diplomatic potentials but so far has had few tangible outcomes.
Major Constraints of Iran’s Asian Policy in the Indian Subcontinent
The foremost external constraint is the persistent antagonism between Iran and the United States. Through secondary sanctions and dollar hegemony, Washington has effectively deterred the countries of the Indian subcontinent from meaningful economic engagement with Iran. Even where cooperation is beneficial—such as India importing Iranian oil—U.S. pressure prevails. In other words, Iran is unable to use its relative national power and resources in its relationship with the above-mentioned nations due to U.S. hegemony in global financial system. This factor has been powerful enough to stop the smaller countries -Sri Lanka and Bangladesh- from any meaningful economic interaction with Iran. Additionally, the rising U.S.–China rivalry has reshaped the regional dynamics in Asia. India aligns more closely with the U.S., while Pakistan deepens ties with China. In another level, India aligns with Israel and U.A.E (named Indo-Abrahamic Alliance) in order to contain both Iran and China, while substituting U.S. direct presence in West Asia.(Mozaffari Falarti, Shahsharghi, & Meraji, 2025) In such structural circumstances, Iran’s India-centric initiatives seem less viable, while resulting in a strategic ambiguity toward the existing great power rivalries.
In fact, much of this ambiguity is the practical outcome of what the Neoclassical realists would call the intervening variables. It seems that Iranian elite suffers from misperceptions and miscalculations with regard to great power rivalries and the regional dynamics. Considering Iran’s major antagonism with Washington, it seems that the overemphasized neutrality between Beijing, Delhi and Islamabad does not maximize Iran’s policy outcomes. India’s inclusion in Chabahar Port for example, was highly in line with U.S. containment policy against China in Afghanistan and Central Asia, while Iran viewed it as a balanced move to include India in its political toolkit.(Haji Yousefi & Naroee, 2021) Yet it seems that Iran’s elite perception of its ability to maneuvers between different Asian powers was relatively overestimated. In other words, Iran have received marginal benefits from India’s presence in Chabahar, while China and Pakistan have developed major concern from that presence. Building upon another notion in the Neoclassical Realist approach, it is to be noted that Iran’s marginal benefit from India’s presence in Chabahar was not necessarily an outcome of the structural constraints, but an indirect outcome of the bureaucratic weakness and underperformance in mobilization of resources. Since the port was exempt from U.S. sanctions for years, yet the finalization of the long-time contract took years, due to a single legal clause disagreement.(Shukla, 2024) Delayed for more than a decade, the stalled railway development of Chabahar is yet another case of institutional underperformance. Also, in the case of Pakistan’s electricity export contract, the fact that Iran does not have failed to develop a stable excess capacity in summer peak, is yet another example. (Otaghe Iran Online, 2023)
Conclusion
Iran’s Asian Policy in the Indian subcontinent has underperformed relative to its ambitions and strategic potential. While U.S. sanctions and emerging dynamics represent significant external constraints, Iran’s internal constraints—including misperceptions, overestimation of relative power and ability, and bureaucratic dysfunction—have played an equally critical role in its limited success. Regardless of the outlook that exist in removal of the structural factors, mostly sanctions, Iran must recalibrate its expectations, improve its internal policy capacity, and align its initiatives more realistically with regional dynamics. Without such reforms, Tehran would not succeed in its “Asian Policy”’ objectives in the Indian subcontinent.سیاست آسیایی جمهوری اسلامی ایران در سالهای اخیر بهعنوان بخشی اساسی از سیاست خارجی کشور، توجه بسیاری از پژوهشگران را جلب کرده است. بااینحال، عمده پژوهشهای مرتبط در این موضوع، بیشتر بر روابط ایران با چین و روسیه بهعنوان دو قدرت شرقی تمرکز داشتهاند و مسئله عدم توفیق ایران در توسعه تعاملات خود با سایر محیطها، اعم از شبهقاره هند، بهندرت مورد توجه قرار گرفته است. با توجه به جایگاه ویژه شبهقاره هند در محیط «آسیا»، پرسش محوری پژوهش حاضر این است که پیشبرد سیاست آسیایی جمهوری اسلامی ایران در محیط شبهقاره هند از کدام متغیرهای محدودکننده تأثیر میپذیرد؟ فرضیهای که در جریان پژوهش مورد آزمون قرار میگیرد این است که برای ارزیابی متغیرهای محدودکننده سیاست آسیایی ایران در محیط شبهقاره هند باید، به تأسی از واقعگرایان نوکلاسیک، به دو سطح از متغیرهای محدودکننده توجه داشت. در سطح اول، عناصر ساختاری نظام بینالملل همچون تخاصم ایران و ایالات متحده و پویاییهای نوظهور منطقهای قرار دارند که چهارچوب کلی انتخابهای سیاست خارجی کشور در این محیط را محدود نمودهاند. در سطح دوم، عناصری غیرساختاری همچون ادراک غیردقیق از معادلات موجود، بیشبرآوردی قدرت مانور در میان بازیگران آسیایی و ظرفیت پایین سازوبرگهای بوروکراتیک قرار دارند که مانع بهینهسازی دستاوردها در همین محیط محدود انتخابها میشوند. در این پژوهش از روش تحقیق کیفی، رویکرد تحلیلی-توصیفی و منابع کتابخانهای بهرهبرداری شده است.https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_231711_1afb2c375f0f5d66263968ff59a04e0c.pdf