پژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـام فصلنامه روابط خارجی 2008-5419 18 1 2026 05 22 The Naturalization of Hegemony in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Discourse Analysis of Democratic and Republican Narratives in the Post-Cold War Era طبیعی‌سازی هژمونی در سیاست خارجی ایالات‌متحده: تحلیل گفتمان روایت‌های دموکرات و جمهوری‌خواه پس از جنگ سرد 7 36 246613 10.22034/fr.2026.560454.1733 FA حسین سلیمی استاد گروه روابط بین الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی تهران، ایران 0000-0002-9330-4606 سیدر رضا تقوی نژاد دانشجوی دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران 0009-0006-1753-2857 Journal Article 2025 11 17 This article examines how U.S. hegemony in the post-Cold War era has been discursively naturalized across Democratic and Republican foreign policy narratives. Drawing on Neo-Gramscian theory and Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis, the study analyzes National Security Strategies and selected presidential speeches from the Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. It argues that U.S. hegemonic discourse operates through three interrelated pillars: liberalism/globalization, American exceptionalism, and threat/enemy construction. These pillars respectively naturalize the structure of U.S.-led order, the actor of hegemony, and the actions taken in its name. The findings show that partisan differences do not necessarily indicate a rupture in the hegemonic project; rather, they represent tactical variations in its reproduction. Democrats tend to emphasize multilateralism, institutional legitimacy, and shared responsibility, while Republicans more often stress moral clarity, strength, and sovereignty. Despite these differences, both narratives contribute to presenting U.S. leadership as necessary, legitimate, and self-evident. Extended Abstract Introduction The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union placed the United States in an unprecedented position of global dominance. Mainstream International Relations theories have often explained this moment through material factors such as military superiority, economic capacity, institutional influence, and technological advantage. Although these elements are essential, they do not fully explain how the U.S.-led order has remained legitimate, adaptable, and widely accepted across different administrations and changing global conditions. This article addresses the problem of consent in the reproduction of hegemony. Material power can explain coercion, but it cannot sufficiently explain why a hierarchical international order is presented and accepted as normal, necessary, or beneficial. From a Gramscian perspective, hegemony is not merely domination; it is a form of leadership that becomes embedded in common sense. Accordingly, this study examines how U.S. foreign policy discourse transforms historically contingent political choices into apparently natural realities. The central analytical focus is naturalization, understood through Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis as the ideological process through which power relations are depoliticized and represented as neutral, inevitable, and self-evident. Research Question The main research question is: How do ideological-discursive mechanisms function to naturalize U.S. hegemonic foreign policy in the post-Cold War era? This question is examined through two subsidiary questions: 1. What are the core ideological pillars of U.S. hegemonic discourse, and how do they contribute to the naturalization of U.S. dominance? 2. How do Democratic and Republican administrations articulate these pillars differently while reproducing the same broader hegemonic project? Research Hypothesis The article argues that U.S. hegemony is naturalized through three interrelated ideological-discursive pillars: liberalism/globalization, American exceptionalism, and threat/enemy construction. These pillars respectively naturalize the structure of hegemony, the actor of hegemony, and the actions of hegemony. Liberalism and globalization present the U.S.-led international order as universal and inevitable; American exceptionalism presents U.S. leadership as indispensable; and threat construction presents coercive policies as necessary responses to danger. The article further hypothesizes that partisan differences between Democratic and Republican administrations do not indicate the collapse of hegemony, but rather demonstrate its adaptation through competing discursive strategies. Methodology and Theoretical Framework This study employs a qualitative, theory-driven thematic analysis. The theoretical framework combines Neo-Gramscian theory with Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis. The Neo-Gramscian approach, especially the works of Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, is used to conceptualize hegemony as a combination of material capabilities, institutions, and ideas. It also helps identify the ideological content of U.S. hegemony, particularly liberal internationalism, market-oriented globalization, American exceptionalism, and security-centered narratives of threat. Fairclough’s CDA provides the analytical lens for examining how these ideological contents operate discursively. In this framework, ideology is understood as meaning in the service of power, and hegemony is viewed as an unstable and contested equilibrium. The concept of naturalization is central because it explains how political projects are transformed into common sense. The data corpus consists mainly of the National Security Strategies of post-Cold War U.S. administrations—Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden—supplemented by selected presidential speeches and official foreign policy statements. The analysis identifies the textual manifestations of the three ideological pillars and examines how they contribute to the normalization of U.S. global leadership. Results and Discussion The findings indicate that the three ideological pillars operate together to naturalize different dimensions of U.S. hegemony. First, liberalism and globalization naturalize the structure of the U.S.-led order. Across different administrations, institutions and arrangements such as the WTO, IMF, NATO, and the “rules-based international order” are represented not as historically specific political projects, but as neutral and universal mechanisms for peace, prosperity, and stability. Democratic administrations often articulate this discourse through multilateralism, cooperation, interdependence, and democracy promotion. Republican administrations more frequently connect it to freedom, market openness, security, and strategic leadership. Despite these differences, both versions present the U.S.-led order as the natural framework of global stability and thereby depoliticize its power relations. Second, American exceptionalism naturalizes the actor of hegemony. U.S. leadership is rarely represented as the interest of one state among others; rather, it is framed as a responsibility, mission, or necessity derived from America’s unique identity. Democratic administrations tend to emphasize reluctant leadership, international responsibility, and the defense of universal values. Republican administrations, particularly under George W. Bush, articulate exceptionalism through moral clarity, freedom, and the transformative role of American power. Trump’s discourse modifies this pattern by stressing sovereignty, strength, and national advantage, yet it still presupposes a privileged U.S. position in defining legitimate order. Thus, different versions of exceptionalism continue to make U.S. leadership appear necessary and distinctive. Third, threat and enemy construction naturalizes the actions of hegemony. Policies such as military intervention, sanctions, containment, deterrence, and alliance expansion are framed as defensive responses to danger rather than as political choices. In the Clinton era, threats were constructed around rogue states, weapons proliferation, and transnational instability. Under George W. Bush, threat discourse was moralized through terrorism, the “axis of evil,” and the struggle between freedom and tyranny. Obama’s discourse shifted toward failed states, terrorist networks, and targeted security governance. Under Biden, China and Russia are increasingly represented as systemic and strategic challengers to the international order. These changing threat narratives adapt U.S. security discourse to new contexts while preserving the assumption that American action is necessary, defensive, and stabilizing. The comparison of Democratic and Republican narratives shows that partisan differences should not be understood simply as contradictions. Rather, they represent different articulations of the same hegemonic project. Democrats tend to naturalize hegemony through multilateralism, legal-institutional language, and shared responsibility, while Republicans more often rely on moral binaries, military strength, sovereignty, and national resolve. Yet both reproduce the assumption that U.S. leadership is indispensable to global order. Conclusion This article concludes that the persistence of U.S. hegemony in the post-Cold War era is not only a result of material power, but also a discursive achievement. Liberalism/globalization, American exceptionalism, and threat construction work together to naturalize the structure, actor, and actions of U.S. hegemony. They present the U.S.-led order as universal, American leadership as necessary, and coercive policies as unavoidable responses to danger. By bridging Neo-Gramscian theory and Faircloughian CDA, the study shows how hegemonic ideology operates not only through explicit justification but also through the production of common sense. The discursive differences between Democratic and Republican administrations are therefore best understood as tactical variations within a broader hegemonic continuity. In this sense, discursive struggle does not necessarily indicate hegemonic decline; it can also function as a mechanism through which hegemony adapts, renews itself, and maintains legitimacy. پژوهش حاضر به بررسی چگونگی طبیعی‌سازی هژمونی در گفتمان سیاست خارجی ایالات‌متحده در دوره پس از جنگ سرد می‌پردازد. ازهمین‌رو، پژوهش با بهره‌گیری از چهارچوبی تلفیقیِ ساختار-گفتمان، از یک‌سو ابعاد ایدئولوژیک هژمونی آمریکا را در سه محور «لیبرالیسم و جهانی‌سازی»، «استثناگرایی آمریکایی» و «تهدید و دشمن‌سازی» شناسایی می‌کند و از سوی دیگر، کارکرد این مضامین را در متون منتخب بررسی می‌نماید. داده‌های پژوهش شامل نسخه‌های مختلف راهبرد امنیت ملی ایالات‌متحده و منتخبی از سخنرانی‌های رؤسای جمهور آمریکا در دوره پس از جنگ سرد است که با استفاده از رویکرد نئوگرامشی، تحلیل گفتمان انتقادی نورمن فرکلاف و روش تحلیل مضمون نظریه‌محور مطالعه شده‌اند. یافته‌ها حاکی از آن است که در متون بررسی‌شده، گفتمان لیبرالیسم و جهانی‌سازی در جهت طبیعی‌سازی نظم هژمونیک، گفتمان استثناگرایی در جهت اعطای مشروعیت اخلاقی به نقش آمریکا و گفتمان تهدید و دشمن‌سازی در جهت توجیه اقدامات قهری در قالب واکنشی ضروری و دفاعی عمل می‌کنند. درمجموع، این سازوکارهای گفتمانی در متون مورد بررسی، به طبیعی‌سازی رهبری آمریکا و به حاشیه راندن بدیل‌ها یاری می‌رسانند و از این رهگذر، به بازتولید هژمونی در سطح گفتمانی کمک می‌کنند.

https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_246613_225592024d0c6ddc2168fa50c37332c5.pdf

پژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـام فصلنامه روابط خارجی 2008-5419 18 1 2026 05 22 Implications of a Potential Russian Victory in the Ukraine War for Eurasia and Iran: A Critical Scenario-Based Analysis پیامدهای پیروزی احتمالی روسیه در جنگ اوکراین بر اوراسیا و ایران؛ آسیب‌شناسی با رویکرد نظریه سناریوها 37 62 232711 10.22034/fr.2025.544794.1705 FA پرویز دلیرپور استادیارگروه علوم سیاسی،دانشگاه پیام نور،تهران،ایران 0000-0002-0701-6457 محسن نصراصفهانی استادیار،گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه پیام نور،تهران ، ایران Journal Article 2025 09 02 The Ukrainian conflict, as one of the decisive geopolitical developments of the last decade, has far-reaching consequences on the security, economic, and institutional architecture of Eurasia. The main issue of this research is to examine the effects of Russia's possible victory in this war on regional structures and the position of middle powers, especially Iran. The aim of the study is to analyze possible future paths and assess the opportunities and threats arising from it for Iran's foreign policy. The research method is a qualitative-analytical scenario writing that, using the framework of scenario theory and within the framework of neorealism and complex interdependence approaches, key variables and crisis-causing factors were identified and four distinct scenarios were drawn: "Expansion of Russian hegemony and isolation of the West", "Structural confrontation and multipolar game", "Russia-China convergence and the path to Central Asia's liberation", and "Sudden fall and collapse of central control". The findings indicate that the first two scenarios will have the highest probability of realization, since they are consistent with the logic of power and the mutual reaction of the main actors; The third scenario is conceivable as a complementary trend in the context of continued Western pressure on Moscow, and the fourth scenario, although unlikely, has the greatest destabilizing potential. The results of the study indicate that the common consequences of all scenarios include the reconfiguration of the Eurasian security architecture, the redefinition of energy and transit routes, and the enhancement of the role of middle powers. From a policy perspective, it is suggested that the West should focus on maintaining deterrence and reducing energy dependence on Russia; China should manage cooperation with Moscow by respecting the sovereignty of host countries and diversifying trade routes; and Iran should adopt a smart balancing strategy to preserve its strategic independence by taking advantage of transit opportunities and economic diplomacy. Extended Abstract Introduction Eurasia occupies a unique geopolitical position as the connective tissue between Europe and Asia, encompassing diverse political systems, economic networks, and security arrangements. Russia’s role has historically been decisive, both as a regional hegemon and as a counterweight to Western influence. The ongoing war in Ukraine has become a defining moment for Eurasia’s future, with the potential to reshape the region’s security architecture, economic corridors, and institutional frameworks. This study examines the hypothetical scenario of a Russian victory in Ukraine—defined as Moscow achieving its core strategic objectives, consolidating territorial gains, and securing recognition or de facto acceptance of its expanded sphere of influence. Using scenario theory, the research identifies and evaluates plausible future pathways for Eurasia and their implications for regional actors, including Iran. Research Question What are the likely security, economic, and institutional consequences of a potential Russian victory in Ukraine for Eurasia, and how might these outcomes reshape the balance of power, governance structures, and the strategic opportunities and risks for middle powers such as Iran? Hypothesis A Russian victory would reconfigure Eurasia’s strategic landscape, leading to: A shift toward a more multipolar order with Russia as a central security guarantor. A redefinition of energy and transit routes, enhancing Moscow’s leverage. The emergence of new institutional alignments that weaken Western influence while amplifying the role of middle powers such as Iran, Turkey, and Kazakhstan. The trajectory of these changes would depend on Russia’s strategic choices, the responses of China and the West, and the agency of smaller Eurasian states. Methodology and Theoretical Framework The research employs a qualitative–analytical scenario building method: Identifying key variables and uncertainties through scholarly and policy sources. Mapping drivers of change in security, economic, and institutional domains. Constructing four scenarios using scenario theory, which emphasizes the interaction of predetermined trends and high-impact uncertainties. The theoretical foundation combines Scenario Theory with Neorealism (to explain state behavior under shifting power distributions) and Complex Interdependence Theory (to account for economic and institutional linkages). Results and discussion Scenario 1: Expansion of Russian Hegemony and Western Isolation A decisive Russian victory consolidates Moscow’s influence over Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Sanctions persist but fail to reverse gains. Security: Strengthening of CSTO and bilateral defense agreements. Economics: Energy exports reoriented toward Asia; Russia controls key transit chokepoints. Institutions: Marginalization of Western-led initiatives; rise of Russia-centric forums. Implications for Iran: Iran could benefit from expanded transit corridors such as the North–South Corridor, increased energy cooperation, and participation in Russia-led institutions. Yet overdependence on Moscow risks limiting Tehran’s strategic flexibility. Scenario 2: Structural Confrontation and Multipolar Game Russia’s victory entrenches a long-term standoff with the West, producing a multipolar arena where Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, and the EU compete. Security: Militarization of borders; localized conflicts as tools of influence. Economics: Diversification of trade and energy routes to avoid overdependence. Institutions: Fragmented governance with overlapping frameworks. Implications for Iran: This scenario offers Tehran opportunities to act as a balancing actor, leveraging its geography to mediate between blocs. However, intensified competition could also heighten regional instability, particularly in the Caucasus. Scenario 3: Russia–China Convergence and Central Asia’s Path to Autonomy Sustained Western pressure pushes Russia into deeper alignment with China. Central Asian states exploit this to negotiate greater autonomy. Security: Joint Russia–China security initiatives in Central Asia. Economics: Integration of EAEU with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Institutions: Hybrid governance blending Russian and Chinese norms. Implications for Iran: Tehran could integrate more deeply into BRI-linked projects, enhancing its role as a transit hub. Yet the dominance of Sino-Russian frameworks may constrain Iran’s autonomy and reduce its bargaining power. Scenario 4: Sudden Collapse and Breakdown of Centralized Control The least likely but most destabilizing scenario involves internal crises in Russia after victory, leading to fragmentation of authority. Security: Weakening of Russian commitments abroad; power vacuums. Economics: Disruption of energy supplies and transit routes. Institutions: Collapse of Russia-led regional bodies. Implications for Iran: While instability could open space for Iran to expand influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, it would also generate severe security risks along its northern borders and disrupt trade and energy flows. Comparative Assessment of Scenarios Scenarios 1 and 2 are the most probable, aligning with the logic of power politics and reciprocal reactions of major actors. Scenario 3 is plausible as a nested trend, especially if sanctions persist and Sino-Russian cooperation deepens. Scenario 4, though unlikely, carries the highest destabilizing potential. Common consequences across all scenarios include: Transformation of Eurasia’s Security Architecture: Alliances and defense postures recalibrated. Redefinition of Energy and Transit Routes: Pipelines, railways, and ports become central levers of influence. Rising Role of Middle Powers: Iran, Turkey, and Kazakhstan gain importance as connectors, mediators, or alternative hubs. The divergence lies fundamentally in direction and systemic impact: Scenario 1 consolidates Russian dominance, reinforcing hierarchical order under Moscow’s leadership; Scenario 2 diffuses power into a competitive multipolar arena; Scenario 3 embeds Russia within a Sino‑centric framework that limits its autonomy; and Scenario 4 produces instability, fragmentation, and unpredictable vacuums of authority across Eurasia. Each trajectory reshapes security alignments, economic corridors, and institutional legitimacy in distinct ways, thereby redefining the strategic environment for regional middle powers such as Iran. Conclusion A Russian victory in Ukraine would not produce a single predetermined outcome but rather a spectrum of futures shaped by power politics, economic interdependence, and institutional adaptation. The most plausible trajectories—Russian hegemony or multipolar competition—would both entail profound shifts in security alignments, global economic flows, and governance structures, reshaping the balance of influence across Eurasia and beyond. For Iran, each scenario carries both opportunities and risks. Tehran could strengthen its role as a strategic transit hub, expand energy diplomacy, deepen regional connectivity, and position itself as a balancing actor in a fragmented order. Yet the dangers of overdependence on Russia and China, heightened exposure to regional instability, and the erosion of strategic autonomy remain pressing challenges that could constrain long‑term flexibility. Policy Implications For the West: Maintain deterrence and cohesion, reduce energy dependence on Russia, and invest in alternative connectivity projects. For China: Manage cooperation with Russia, respect host country sovereignty, and diversify trade routes. For Iran: Capitalize on transit opportunities, strengthen economic diplomacy, and pursue smart balancing to avoid overreliance on any single bloc while safeguarding sovereignty. منازعه اوکراین به‌مثابۀ یکی از تحولات ژئوپلیتیکی سرنوشت‌ساز دهه اخیر، پیامدهای گسترده‌ای بر معماری امنیتی، اقتصادی و نهادی اوراسیا دارد. مسئله اصلی این پژوهش بررسی آثار پیروزی احتمالی روسیه در این جنگ بر ساختار‌های منطقه‌ای و جایگاه قدرت‌های میانی به‌ویژه ایران است. هدف مطالعه، تحلیل مسیرهای محتمل آینده و ارزیابی فرصت‌ها و تهدید‌های ناشی از آن برای سیاست خارجی ایران است. روش تحقیق سناریونویسی کیفی–تحلیلی بوده که با بهره‌گیری از چهارچوب نظریه سناریو و در چهارچوب رهیافت‌های نئورئالیسم و وابستگی متقابل پیچیده، متغیر‌های کلیدی و عوامل بحران‌زا شناسایی و چهار سناریوی متمایز ترسیم گردید: «گسترش هژمونی روسیه و انزوای غرب»، «تقابل ساختاری و بازی چندقطبی»، «هم‌گرایی روسیه–چین و مسیر رهایی آسیای مرکزی» و «سقوط ناگهانی و فروپاشی کنترل مرکزی». یافته‌ها حاکی است دو سناریوی نخست ازآن‌رو که با منطق قدرت و واکنش متقابل بازیگران اصلی هم‌خوانی دارند، بیشترین احتمال تحقق را در بر خواهند داشت؛ سناریوی سوم به‌عنوان روندی مکمل در شرایط تداوم فشار غرب بر مسکو قابل تصور است و سناریوی چهارم، هرچند کم‌احتمال، بیشترین ظرفیت بی‌ثبات‌کننده را داراست. نتایج پژوهش بیانگر آن است که پیامدهای مشترک همه سناریوها شامل بازتنظیم معماری امنیتی اوراسیا، بازتعریف مسیرهای انرژی و ترانزیت و ارتقای نقش قدرت‌های متوسط است. از دیدگاه سیاست‌گذاری، پیشنهاد شده است که غرب باید بر حفظ بازدارندگی و کاهش وابستگی انرژی به روسیه تمرکز کند؛ چین همکاری با مسکو را با احترام به حاکمیت کشورهای میزبان و تنوع‌بخشی مسیرهای تجاری مدیریت نماید و ایران با بهره‌گیری از فرصت‌های ترانزیتی و دیپلماسی اقتصادی، راهبرد موازنه‌گرایی هوشمندانه را برای صیانت از استقلال راهبردی خود در پیش گیرد.

https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_232711_16fad23f22576182bceabc783803ed9f.pdf

پژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـام فصلنامه روابط خارجی 2008-5419 18 1 2026 05 22 Strategic Analysis of the Digitalization of Public Diplomacy: A Comparative Study of the United States' Virtual Embassy and Twitter Diplomacy toward Iran and Implications for Islamic Republic of Iran واکاوی راهبردی دیجیتالی‌سازی دیپلماسی عمومی؛ تحلیل تطبیقی سفارت‌خانه مجازی و دیپلماسی توییتری ایالات‌متحده در قبال ایران و الزامات آن برای جمهوری اسلامی ایران 63 90 247216 10.22034/fr.2026.524148.1665 FA حسین زینلیان بروجنی دانشجوی دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران 0009-0007-1314-7326 محمدعلی بصیری دانشیار روابط بین‌الملل، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران 0000-0001-5186-0682 فاطمه شایان دانشیار روابط بین‌الملل، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران 0000-0001-9219-871X Journal Article 2025 05 17 The digitalization of public diplomacy constitutes one of the most significant transformations in contemporary foreign policy. The United States, as a pioneer in this field, has employed diverse instruments such as virtual embassies and Twitter diplomacy to influence Iranian public opinion. Employing a qualitative approach and thematic analysis with data triangulation strategy, this study conducts a comparative analysis of public diplomacy digitalization strategies in the U.S. Virtual Embassy in Tehran and the tweets of U.S. leaders concerning Iran. Findings reveal that the Virtual Embassy operates at a strategic level, aiming for sustained engagement, narrative production, and trust-building, whereas Twitter diplomacy functions at a tactical level, focusing on agenda-setting and real-time public opinion management. These two instruments complement each other within a unified ecosystem. Based on the findings, five strategic imperatives for developing the Islamic Republic of Iran's digital public diplomacy are extracted, including national digital governance, development of virtual embassies, digital cultural diplomacy, data-driven diplomacy, and training digital diplomats. Extended Abstract Introduction The rapid expansion of information and communication technologies has transformed diplomacy from a predominantly state-centered and one-way communication process into a dynamic, interactive, and networked practice. Digital diplomacy has emerged as an essential component of contemporary foreign policy, enabling governments to influence international public opinion beyond conventional diplomatic institutions. Among leading adopters of this transformation, the United States has integrated digital platforms into its public diplomacy toward Iran, particularly through the U.S. Virtual Embassy and Twitter diplomacy. Examining these complementary instruments provides valuable insight into the strategic evolution of contemporary digital public diplomacy. Research Question How can the strategic functions of the U.S. Virtual Embassy and Twitter diplomacy toward Iran be interpreted within the framework of New Public Diplomacy, and what strategic implications do they provide for developing the digital public diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran? Research Hypothesis The U.S. Virtual Embassy and Twitter diplomacy represent complementary components of an integrated digital public diplomacy strategy in which long-term institutional engagement, interactive communication, and real-time narrative management collectively enhance strategic influence, strengthen soft power, and shape foreign public perceptions toward Iran-related issues. Methodology (and Theoretical Framework) This study employs a qualitative comparative methodology using thematic analysis to identify and interpret strategic patterns embedded in the United States' digital public diplomacy toward Iran. Documentary sources, official governmental publications, Virtual Embassy materials, official statements, and social media content constitute the primary research data. Data triangulation enhances the credibility and reliability of the findings through the integration of multiple evidence sources. The theoretical framework combines the concepts of New Public Diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy, Twiplomacy, and Hybrid Diplomacy to explain the transformation of diplomatic communication from hierarchical state-centered practices toward interactive, digitally mediated, and network-oriented communication. Results and Discussion The comparative analysis demonstrates that the United States has developed a coherent digital public diplomacy ecosystem in which the Virtual Embassy and Twitter diplomacy perform complementary rather than competing functions. Although both instruments pursue the broader objective of influencing perceptions and strengthening American strategic communication, they differ considerably in communication logic, operational priorities, temporal orientation, and target audiences. The U.S. Virtual Embassy primarily functions as a long-term institutional platform designed to compensate for the absence of formal diplomatic representation in Iran. Its communication strategy emphasizes continuity, credibility, and sustained interaction through the dissemination of official information, educational opportunities, consular guidance, cultural initiatives, and policy explanations. Rather than serving solely as an informational website, the platform contributes to strategic narrative construction, relationship building, and the projection of American soft power among Iranian audiences over an extended period. Twitter diplomacy, in contrast, represents a flexible and highly responsive communication mechanism capable of influencing public debate in real time. The findings indicate that American political leaders employ Twitter not merely to distribute official statements but to shape media agendas, frame political events, respond rapidly to crises, and compete over strategic narratives concerning Iran. This form of communication enables simultaneous engagement with domestic audiences, Iranian citizens, and the broader international community while reducing dependence on conventional diplomatic channels. The findings further indicate that digital diplomacy has evolved from technological innovation into an institutional transformation of diplomatic practice. Communication increasingly relies upon interaction, audience participation, networked communication, and strategic storytelling rather than unilateral information dissemination. Consequently, the United States integrates institutional digital platforms with social media communication to maximize political influence across multiple communication environments. The comparative evidence also suggests that successful digital public diplomacy depends not only on technological infrastructure but also on coherent strategic planning, institutional coordination, professional digital communication, and continuous adaptation to rapidly changing information environments. Based on these findings, the study identifies several strategic implications for the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the formulation of a comprehensive national digital public diplomacy strategy, the expansion of virtual diplomatic platforms, greater investment in digital cultural diplomacy, systematic analysis of digital public opinion, enhanced utilization of big data in foreign policy decision-making, and the professional training of digitally competent diplomats capable of effectively managing communication within contemporary digital ecosystems. Conclusion The study concludes that the U.S. Virtual Embassy and Twitter diplomacy constitute complementary pillars of an integrated digital public diplomacy strategy rather than isolated communication tools. Their combined operation demonstrates that effective digital diplomacy requires strategic coordination, institutional innovation, and interactive communication. The findings provide a practical framework for strengthening the Islamic Republic of Iran's digital public diplomacy through integrated governance, digital capacity-building, data-informed policymaking, and sustained international engagement in the evolving digital communication environment. دیجیتالی‌سازی دیپلماسی عمومی، یکی از مهم‌ترین تحولات در عرصه سیاست خارجی معاصر به شمار می‌رود و ایالات‌متحده آمریکا به‌عنوان یکی از پیشگامان این حوزه، از ابزار‌های متنوعی نظیر سفارت‌خانه مجازی و دیپلماسی توییتری برای تأثیرگذاری بر افکار عمومی مردم ایران بهره گرفته است. این پژوهش با رویکرد کیفی و روش تحلیل مضمون و با استفاده از راهبرد مثلث‌سازی داده‌ها، به مطالعه تطبیقی راهبردهای دیجیتالی‌سازی دیپلماسی عمومی در سفارت مجازی آمریکا در تهران و توییت‌های رهبران این کشور در قبال ایران پرداخته است. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که سفارت مجازی در سطح راهبردی و با هدف ارتباط پایدار، تولید روایت و اعتمادسازی عمل می‌کند درصورتی‌که دیپلماسی توییتری در سطح تاکتیکی و با هدف روایت‌سازی و مدیریت لحظه‌ای افکار عمومی فعالیت می‌نماید. این دو ابزار در قالب یک اکوسیستم واحد، مکمل یکدیگر هستند. براساس یافته‌های پژوهش پنج الزام راهبردی برای توسعۀ دیپلماسی عمومی دیجیتال جمهوری اسلامی ایران شامل حکمرانی ملی دیجیتال، توسعه سفارت‌خانه‌های مجازی، دیپلماسی فرهنگی دیجیتال، دیپلماسی داده محور و تربیت دیپلمات‌های دیجیتال نیز استخراج گردید.

https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_247216_d0448e3599bd5438f90abe896b45ae34.pdf

پژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـام فصلنامه روابط خارجی 2008-5419 18 1 2026 05 22 Strategic Innovation as an Imperative for an Adaptive Foreign Policy in the Context of a Complex Geoeconomic System نوآوری راهبردی الزام سیاست خارجی انطباقی در سامانه ژئواکونومیکی پیچیده 91 126 241494 10.22034/fr.2026.480591.1583 FA محمدرضا فرجی استادیار روابط بین‌الملل، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم انسانی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه اردکان، اردکان، ایران 0000-0002-9631-0534 Journal Article 2024 09 27 One of the fundamental issues in the complex international environment is the economic strategies of actors within the complex geoeconomic system. In the complex geoeconomic system, actors’ strategies are shaped by the environment and economic conditions, and the variable of power plays a significant role in this process. Therefore, geoeconomics, as the geostrategic utilization of economic power, is one of the key features of the strategic behavior of actors—particularly economic poles—within the complex international system. The study, based on the assumption of complexity in the international system and the dominance of ambiguity and uncertainty in actors’ strategic environments, attempt to respond to the strategic requirement of foreign policy of actors in a complex geoeconomic system? The findings of the research, with a descriptive-analytical approach and a qualitative method, suggest that in an environment of international uncertainty, strategic innovation, with a view to the ecosystem and the changing environmental context and conditions, is a requirement for the strategies of actors in a complex geoeconomic system, and this innovation is designed according to the capabilities and capacities of actors in the complex geoeconomic system and includes innovation in production, services, processes, and systems. In general, the causal variable of strategic innovation is environmental uncertainty. Extended Abstract Introduction In principle, an innovative phenomenon is something that is considered both new and valuable. over time, Our perceptions of innovation and the idea of innovation have changed greatly. Innovation is not a new phenomenon and is probably as old as humanity itself. Social innovation is based on social needs rather than technology. In the current complex system, actions can be taken strategically and systemically that align with the actors interests under current conditions. In other words, innovation is a necessity and imperative for complex adaptive systems. Based on this, the research seeks to explain the requirements and conditions of economic strategies within a complex geo-economic system. The research question is: What imperatives does the complex geo-economic system impose upon international actors in formulating economic strategies? In response to this question, and considering the premise of the increasing complexity of the international system and the adherence of all systemic elements to the logic of complexity, and postulating the sovereignty of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) over international phenomena, it is hypothesized that actors in the complex geo-economic system formulate their strategies based on the principles and foundations of this system. Furthermore, considering the regional ecosystem and the model of Resilience or Panarchy, Innovation is imposed as a fundamental principle upon the strategies of these actors within the complex geo-economic system. Depending on the dominant technology of the system, an actor’s systemic position within the economic structure and regional framework dictates that this innovation must encompass innovation in production, in services, in process, and in the system itself. The term geo-economics was coined by Edward Luttwak in 1990, which refers to the changes in the nature of power and the increasing importance of economic variables alongside political and military-security variables in the international system. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the conclusion of the Cold War catalyzed the development of Democratic Peace Theory and fostered international cooperation. Consequently, contemporary International Relations has established the conditions for a revival of Realist principles, which involves the analysis of ‘what is’ over ‘what ought to be. Geo-economics has emerged within this context, predicated on the transformation of power concepts. Geo-economics is hereby posited as an analytical framework emphasizing how the competition for relative power guides actor behavior within the international system. Therefore, similar to geopolitics, geo-economics is fundamentally predicated on Realist assumptions, particularly the existence of a competitive and conflictual environment in international relations. Nevertheless, the fragility of Liberal concepts is only one of the causes contributing to the resurgence of geo-economics. Another significant factor in recent decades has been the modern and notable ascent of China. Here, geo-economics refers to the strategic application of economic tools to realize geostrategic objectives or to leverage economic power for geostrategic advantage. In this complex environment, geo-economic scholars analyze the application of geo-economic power as an additional tool within the geostrategic toolkit, employed alongside traditional geopolitical instruments. These authors situate geo-economics close to geopolitics, emphasizing the shift in strategic instruments from military to economic means, and noting the absence of overt violence. Given the underlying assumption of environmental uncertainty and the presence of power diversity within the complex international system, Complex Geo-economics has emerged both as an explanatory framework and as a domain of strategic action focused on economic power. Furthermore, considering the inherently complex and turbulent international environment characterized by pervasive unknowns, strategic innovation is proposed as its most crucial mechanism for responding to potential environmental threats. Thus, Complex Geo-economics builds upon the principles of classical geo-economics while integrating them with geopolitical axioms and drawing upon the logic of complex systems. To ensure the persistence of actors in this complex milieu, it adds the dimension of strategic innovation, a hallmark of non-linear complex environments. In this manner, creativity and innovation become the two pivotal wings of Complex Geo-economics, upon which the survival and advancement of actors in the complex international system fundamentally depend. For instance, Luttwak addressed the role of capital in modern diplomacy, equating capital with the firepower of weaponry. It is noteworthy here that significant distinctions exist between Complex and Classical Geo-economics; overlooking these differences renders geo-economic strategies ineffective in the complex international environment. Classically, geo-economics reduced the economy to the level of instruments used, situated within geopolitical problems. In contrast, Complex Geo-economics, assuming various dimensions of power in international politics, posits the maintenance and elevation of the economic standing of actors within the international system as a primary foreign policy objective. Consequently, Complex Geo-economics adopts a broader concept of geo-economics, viewing it as both a foreign policy strategy and an analytical framework, centering on states as key actors in international relations and foreign policy. Another differentiation lies in problem explanation: classical thinkers fundamentally adopt a linear approach, whereas scholars of complexity engage with issues through a non-linear lens. Accordingly, classical geo-economic scholars posit a temporal distinction between geopolitics and geo-economics, viewing them as successive stages of geostrategy. With a linear perspective, they believe that geopolitical rules have been supplanted by geo-economic rules. Their simplistic understanding of the shift from geopolitical to geo-economic instruments implies not only the cessation of military interventions but also the end of political pressures or alliances, an aspiration not found in contemporary international relations. Contemporary thinkers, conversely, assert that geo-economics does not replace geopolitics, and these two domains are not entirely antithetical in their historical evolution or spatial/geographical application. Furthermore, unlike its classical counterpart, Complex Geo-economics incorporates political and non-economic tools. This concept broadens the scope of Complex Geo-economics to include the utilization of all non-violent political instruments, such as political pressure, conditionality, and intervention. Based on this, Complex Geo-economics can be regarded either as the geopolitical ramifications of economic phenomena or as the consequences of economic trends on geopolitics and national power. Generally, in the complex international system, geo-economics is presented as a domain of foreign policy action for actors, alongside other issues. All these environments, despite their distinctions, are interconnected and critically tied to the survival of actors in the competitive international arena. It is worth noting that the evolution from hard military issues to economic and cultural ones has not led to a transformation in the anarchic nature of the system; rather, it has complicated anarchy, leaving actors facing a complex anarchic environment whose defining characteristic is competition. Complex Geo-economics adopts a networked-relational perspective on issues and believes that states design geo-economic policies that simultaneously advance multiple interests—military, security, economic, etc. Accordingly, it can be stated that economic and political objectives are intertwined within the concept of Complex Geo-economics. Furthermore, Complex Geo-economics, as a domain of action, refers to the employment of a state’s economic and political tools with the aim of achieving desired geopolitical and economic goals. Therefore, the change in methods from military and political to economic has in no way reduced the imbalance of power; rather, the methods of power projection have simply changed. The terminology of Panarchy was coined due to a lack of theoretical mastery regarding the hierarchical nature of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), alongside the interdisciplinary nature and dynamics of the underlying theory. The goal of Panarchy is to facilitate the understanding of the source and role of change in complex adaptive systems. Therefore, it strives to explain both the evolution of the system and its internal and external interactions. Fundamentally, Panarchy represents a framework of natural laws that points to the creative role of nature in affairs and views the role of humans as an external, destructive agent. In the context of a Complex Geo-economic system, Panarchy describes four basic phases: Exploitation, Conservation, Release, and Reorganization. v The Exploitation phase is one of rapid development, occurring when an actor finds itself in a favorable and suitable position for growth. v The Conservation phase is one where emphasis is placed on the slow accumulation and storage of materials and energy; in other words, it is when a dominant regime becomes prominent. v Release happens rapidly when the initial influence declines due to the presence of a competitor, changing conditions, or creative destruction. v The Reorganization phase is established after Release, creating new regimes through a process. Separate from these four fundamental phases, three systemic issues are raised: Potential, Connectivity, and Resilience. These have a fundamental impact on the strategies of actors in the complex geo-economic system. Considering two key concepts from spatial economics and technological history, the idea of relationality on one hand, and Path Dependence on the other, are beneficial. The Ecosystem Model demonstrates how one can act around phenomena in the absence of complete knowledge. یکی از مسائل اساسی در محیط پیچیده بین‌الملل، راهبردهای اقتصادی بازیگران در سامانه ژئواکونومیکی پیچیده است. اصولاً، در سامانه ژئواکونومیکی پیچیده، راهبردهای بازیگران تحت تأثیر محیط و شرایط اقتصادی ترسیم و متغیر قدرت بسیار در آن دخیل است. بنابراین، ژئواکونومیک به‌عنوان بهره بردن ژئواستراتژیکی از قدرت اقتصادی، یکی از ویژگی‌های مهم رفتار استراتژیک بازیگران به‌ویژه قطب‌های اقتصادی در سامانه پیچیده بین‌الملل است. پژوهش با مفروض پیچیدگی در سامانه بین‌الملل و فرض نظری حاکمیت اصل ابهام و عدم‌قطعیت بر محیط راهبردی بازیگران سعی در پاسخ به الزام راهبردی سیاست خارجی بازیگران در سامانه ژئواکونومیکی پیچیده دارد؟ یافته‌های پژوهش با رویکرد توصیفی- تحلیلی و روش کیفی بیانگر این است که در محیط سرشار از عدم‌قطعیت بین‌الملل، نوآوری راهبردی با نگاه به زیست‌بوم و بستر و شرایط متغیر محیطی الزام راهبردهای بازیگران در سامانه ژئواکونومیکی پیچیده، است و این نوآوری با توجه به قابلیت و ظرفیت بازیگران در سامانه ژئواکونومیکی پیچیده طرح و شامل نوآوری در تولید در خدمات در فرایند و در سامانه می‌شود.

https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_241494_2bdda295629cb7629c3cf44e5de0f8f3.pdf

پژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـام فصلنامه روابط خارجی 2008-5419 18 1 2026 05 22 Armenia as an Arena for Regional Competition: An Analysis of the Conflicting Interests of Iran and Azerbaijan with an Emphasis on the Balance of Threat ارمنستان به‌عنوان عرصه‌ای برای رقابت منطقه‌ای: تحلیلی بر منافع متعارض ایران و آذربایجان با تکیه بر موازنه تهدید 127 162 241481 10.22034/fr.2026.537501.1692 FA امید عزیزیان استادیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم اجتماعی و انسانی، دانشگاه کردستان، سنندج، ایران. 0009-0003-5707-0042 بهرام نصرالهی زاده استادیار گروه جغرافیا، گرایش جغرافیای سیاسی، دانشکده منابع طبیعی،دانشگاه کردستان ، سنندج، ایران 0000-0003-2844-8504 Journal Article 2025 07 28 The geopolitical developments of the South Caucasus following the Second Nagorno Karabakh War, particularly those centered on Armenia’s position in initiatives such as the Zangezur Corridor, have intensified the conflict of interests between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan. This study seeks to explain the causes and dimensions of this confrontation by examining the role of Armenia as an effective geopolitical variable in the strategic competition between the two actors. The main research question is how Armenia operates within the structure of conflicting interests between Iran and Azerbaijan and through what mechanisms it has become an influential factor in the regional balance of threat. The research hypothesis argues that the Islamic Republic of Iran, by maintaining its geopolitical linkage with Armenia, opposing territorial and border changes, and making use of Armenia’s diplomatic and geoeconomic capacities, pursues indirect balancing against security threats arising from the deepening cooperation of Azerbaijan with Israel and Turkey. In this context, Armenia functions not merely as a neighboring state, but as a structural instrument in Iran’s strategy to contain and manage surrounding threats. The theoretical framework of the study is based on Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory, which emphasizes the role of threat perception in shaping the foreign policy behavior of states. Within this framework, the geopolitical and security alignment of Azerbaijan with Israel and Turkey, along with efforts to establish a transnational corridor through Armenian territory, are analyzed as threat generating variables for Iran. The research adopts a qualitative methodology based on documentary analysis, examination of official statements, and monitoring of the diplomatic activities of relevant actors during the period from 2020 to 2024. Extended Abstract Introduction The geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus following the "Second Nagorno-Karabakh War," particularly regarding Armenia's role in regional initiatives such as the "Zangezur Corridor," have led to a divergence of interests between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan. This study aims to explain the causes and dimensions of this confrontation by examining Armenia's role as a geographical arena for the strategic rivalry between these two actors. The main research question is: What role does Armenia play in the conflict of interests between Iran and Azerbaijan, and how has it become a key factor in the regional balance of threat? The central hypothesis posits that, under current circumstances, Armenia serves as a balancing tool for Iran against the security threats posed by Azerbaijan’s growing alliances with Israel and Turkey. The theoretical framework of the study is based on Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory, which emphasizes the role of threat perception in shaping states’ foreign policy behavior. In this context, Azerbaijan’s increasing proximity to Israel and Turkey, along with its efforts to establish a transit corridor through Armenian territory, are analyzed as threat-inducing factors for Iran. The research methodology is qualitative, relying on document analysis, official statements, and diplomatic movements during the "2020 to 2024" period. Findings indicate that Armenia has not only become embedded in the Iran–Azerbaijan strategic confrontation but also emerged as a pivotal factor in Iran’s regional balancing strategy. This dynamic has strengthened Tehran–Yerevan ties and signals the persistence of geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus in the near future. Introduction competition and tensions among regional and extra-regional powers over the past decades. This region, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the newly established republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, has become one of the main axes of geopolitical conflicts. Iran, as the southern neighbor of both countries, has historically sought to maintain a balance of power in this area and prevent the presence and influence of extra-regional actors. The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to Armenia’s unique geopolitical position, places special importance on this country; a matter that has made Tehran sensitive to any changes in the regional geopolitical balance. In this regard, Azerbaijan’s attempts to create a corridor through Armenian territory aimed at accessing Nakhchivan have involuntarily involved Iran in the geopolitical dimensions of the conflict between the two countries. Currently, Armenia holds a different and more complex position in the regional geopolitical structure than in the past. Research Question The main research question is: What role does Armenia play in the confrontation of interests between Iran and Azerbaijan, and how has it become a key factor in the regional threat balance? Research Hypothesis The research hypothesis posits that the Islamic Republic of Iran, by maintaining its geopolitical linkage with Armenia, opposing territorial changes, and leveraging Armenia’s diplomatic and geo-economic capacities, seeks to engage in indirect balancing against the security threats arising from Azerbaijan’s deepening cooperation with Israel and Turkey. In this framework, Armenia functions not merely as a neighboring state but as a structural instrument in Iran’s strategy to contain and manage surrounding threats. Methodology (and Theoretical Framework if there are) In this study, the Threat Balance Theory is specifically employed to analyze the competition between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan in Armenia. This theory provides an analytical framework to examine the security, political, and economic threats that Iran and Azerbaijan face in the South Caucasus region. Results and discussion An analysis of Iran’s foreign policy pattern in the South Caucasus, based on the theoretical framework of Threat Balance, indicates that Tehran’s approach to developments in this region is driven less by traditional power balancing and more by the perception and management of threats arising from the aggressive intentions and potential capacities of rival actors. The Islamic Republic of Iran, with a profound understanding of the strategic linkages between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Israel, is adopting a multidimensional approach aimed at neutralizing security, geopolitical, and geoeconomic threats in its surrounding environment. Within this framework, Armenia has emerged as a potential partner for creating a balance against rival power axes. Strengthening political and cultural ties with Yerevan, supporting the existing border status, and actively opposing initiatives such as the Zangezur Corridor all reflect Iran’s orientation toward a threat-balancing strategy. Iran’s foreign policy behavior in recent years indicates that the perception of threats, rather than the material power of actors, has been the primary driver of its security and regional decision-making. Iran perceives Azerbaijan not merely due to its military capabilities, but primarily because of its strategic partnerships with actors opposing Iran’s national interests. The combination of these threats has pushed Iran’s foreign policy toward adopting deterrent, defensive, and balanced positions. In this regard, emphasizing the principle of “border stability” as a national security red line, conducting military drills near its northwestern borders, and issuing explicit diplomatic statements against new transit projects all signal Iran’s high level of strategic sensitivity to developments in the South Caucasus. This deterrence-oriented approach toward threatening alliances reflects an active strategy to counter unwanted geopolitical changes. An analysis of current geopolitical trends in the South Caucasus outlines three possible scenarios for the future of Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia: v Continuation of Iran’s balancing policy: If current trends persist, Iran will continue its threat-balancing policy and, by deepening its relations with Armenia, will seek to limit the influence of the Turkey–Azerbaijan–Israel axis. This approach will aim to prevent structural changes in the regional order. v Escalation of geopolitical tensions: If Azerbaijan and its allies continue unilateral efforts to alter geopolitical borders and establish new transit routes, the likelihood of political or even security confrontations will increase. In this scenario, Iran may move toward forming new regional alliances to counter these developments. v Possibility of relative de-escalation and adjustment of relations: If threatening variables such as the presence of extra-regional actors or attempts to change borders—are contained, the possibility of Iran and Azerbaijan entering a regional security dialogue will rise. Although this scenario faces significant obstacles under current conditions, it cannot be entirely ruled out in the long term. In summary, Iran’s approach to developments in the South Caucasus is rooted in a realistic and threat-based strategy, which seeks to prevent the emergence of geopolitical changes contrary to its strategic interests by leveraging regional instruments in a calculated and proactive manner. Conclusion The geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, especially the structural changes in the power relations and the formation of new axes of regional cooperation and competition, have posed a complex and multidimensional challenge for the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this context, Iran, which shares direct borders and security concerns related to regional developments, requires a deep and comprehensive understanding of composite and perceptual threats that go beyond mere military and economic power indicators. Therefore, analyzing Iran’s behavior toward these developments without employing the theoretical framework of threat balance which considers threat perception, actors’ intentions, and alliance linkages would be incomplete. تحولات ژئوپلیتیکی قفقاز جنوبی پس از جنگ دوم قره‌باغ، به‌ویژه با محوریت جایگاه ارمنستان در طرح‌هایی نظیر کریدور زنگزور، موجب تشدید تعارض منافع میان جمهوری اسلامی ایران و جمهوری آذربایجان شده است. این پژوهش با هدف تبیین علل و ابعاد این تقابل، به بررسی نقش ارمنستان به‌عنوان یک متغیر ژئوپلیتیکی مؤثر در رقابت راهبردی دو بازیگر می‌پردازد. پرسش اصلی پژوهش آن است که ارمنستان چگونه در ساختار تقابل منافع ایران و آذربایجان ایفای نقش می‌کند و از چه طریقی به عاملی اثرگذار در موازنه تهدید منطقه‌ای بدل شده است؟ فرضیه پژوهش براین‌اساس استوار است که جمهوری اسلامی ایران از طریق حفظ پیوند ژئوپلیتیکی با ارمنستان، مخالفت با تغییرات مرزی و بهره‌گیری از ظرفیت‌های دیپلماتیک و ژئواقتصادی این کشور، در پیِ موازنه‌سازی غیرمستقیم در برابر تهدیدات امنیتی ناشی از تعمیق همکاری‌های آذربایجان با اسرائیل و ترکیه است؛ به‌گونه‌ای که ارمنستان نه صرفاً یک همسایه، بلکه به‌عنوان یک ابزار ساختاری در راهبرد مهار تهدیدات پیرامونی ایران عمل می‌کند. چهارچوب نظری پژوهش مبتنی بر نظریه «موازنه تهدید» استفن والت است که بر نقش ادراک تهدید در شکل‌دِهی به رفتار سیاست خارجی کشورها تأکید دارد. در این چهارچوب، نزدیکی ژئوپلیتیکی و امنیتی آذربایجان به اسرائیل و ترکیه و تلاش برای ایجاد گذرگاه فرامرزی از طریق خاک ارمنستان، به‌عنوان متغیر‌های تهدیدزا برای ایران تحلیل می‌شوند. روش تحقیق کیفی و مبتنی بر تحلیل اسنادی، بررسی بیانیه‌های رسمی و رصد تحرکات دیپلماتیک بازیگران در بازۀ زمانی ۲۰۲۰ تا ۲۰۲۴ است.

https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_241481_15a91c562dfb42cd71c07d66a4969f4e.pdf

پژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـام فصلنامه روابط خارجی 2008-5419 18 1 2026 05 22 Discursive and Identity-Based Analysis of the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of the 1404 Vision Document واکاوی گفتمانی و هویتی سیاست خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران در پرتو سند چشم‌انداز 1404 163 192 241330 10.22034/fr.2026.538473.1694 FA زهرا کرانی استادیار علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران ، ایران 0000-0001-6535-8917 Journal Article 2025 08 01 This article examines one of the fundamental challenges of macro-policymaking in the Islamic Republic of Iran: the conflict between the development-oriented goals of the 2025 Vision Document and the security-confrontational approach of its foreign policy over the past two decades. Contrary to mainstream international relations approaches (realism and liberalism), which attribute this contradiction to the prioritization of short-term security interests over long-term economic benefits, this study employs the theoretical framework of constructivism to demonstrate that the issue is rooted in identity and discursive conflicts. The main question of the article is why Iran's foreign policy has practically come into conflict with the development-oriented goals of the 2025 Vision Document. The findings indicate that two competing "national identities" have been constructed and reproduced within Iran's socio-political structure: 1. A developmental-interactive identity, emerging from the discourse of global engagement and cooperation; 2. A revolutionary-resistance identity, shaped by historical experiences and the ideological perspective of the system. Using an interpretive-analytical method and examining key case studies, this article shows that the reality of Iran's foreign policy is not an objective given but a socio-normative construct formed through the interaction of competing identities and discourses. Policies based on economic development and a resistance economy impose different requirements on policymaking institutions, making the simultaneous pursuit of development and resistance impossible. In the process of successive shifts and inconsistent orientations, identity, ideological, and normative indicators undergo constant redefinition, to the extent that one can no longer speak of a fixed path or a stable identity. It appears that an integrated approach, encompassing the requirements of both spectrums and establishing a consensus on central and floating signifiers, could help create a balance between development and security. Extended Abstract Introduction The “Vision 2025 Document of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” issued in 2003, was designed as a high-level strategic roadmap outlining a twenty-year plan for transforming Iran into the leading economic, scientific, and technological power in the region. The document emphasized constructive engagement with the international community, achieving an average annual economic growth rate of 8 percent, attracting foreign investment, expanding infrastructure, and transitioning from an oil-dependent economy to a knowledge-based and competitive one. However, as the country reached the end of the Vision 2025 period, the practical outcomes diverged significantly from the document’s aspirations. Not only were the core economic and technological goals left unfulfilled, but Iran’s foreign policy also shifted away from the envisioned development-oriented trajectory. Instead, it became increasingly shaped by a security-driven and confrontational paradigm, prioritizing strategic depth, military capability, support for the “Axis of Resistance,” and the expansion of deterrence power. This discrepancy raises a central research puzzle: Why did Iran’s foreign policy diverge from the development-oriented goals of the Vision 2025 document, despite its consensus-based adoption among political elites? Materialist theories such as neorealism and liberalism fail to fully explain this contradiction. Neorealism focuses on structural threats and power distribution, while liberalism emphasizes economic cooperation—yet neither can account for the persistent subordination of economic interests to security considerations. This article therefore moves beyond material and behavioral analyses and examines the issue at the level of identity and discourse, arguing that the contradiction reflects a deep identity-based divide among Iran’s ruling elites. Research Objectives The primary objective of this study is to explain the identity-based and discursive roots of the contradiction between the development-oriented goals of Vision 2025 and Iran’s security-oriented foreign policy. Specifically, the study aims to: v Demonstrate that Iran’s foreign policy is not merely the outcome of rational or material calculations but is fundamentally a socially and normatively constructed phenomenon. v Show that two competing national identities—the interactive developmental identity and the revolutionary–resistance identity—offer divergent interpretations of national interests. v Reveal how this identity competition imposes conflicting priorities on foreign policy, thereby obstructing the realization of Vision 2025. v Highlight the necessity of analyzing discourse and identity to understand the roots of Iran’s developmental deadlock. Methodology This research employs an interpretive–analytical method, consistent with the epistemological foundations of constructivism. Constructivism posits that identities, interests, and even international structures are socially constructed through discourse, interaction, and shared meanings. Therefore, the methodology focuses on uncovering and interpreting the meanings, norms, and identity narratives that shape foreign policy choices, rather than measuring material variables. To illustrate how identity competition produces contradictory policy outcomes, the study uses key case studies as “critical tests” that reveal the clash between the two identity logics—developmental interaction versus revolutionary resistance. Discourse analysis is also used to examine the central signifiers, linguistic patterns, and normative frameworks that reproduce each identity. Discussion and Findings Constructivism and the Role of Identity in Foreign Policy Constructivism challenges the rigid separation between “objective reality” and “social construction,” arguing that political behavior is shaped by shared meanings, norms, and identity-based interpretations. From this perspective: v Concepts such as anarchy, threat, and security are not fixed material realities but social constructs. v A state’s identity is the primary source of its interests. v Discourses shape identities and legitimize particular policy choices. v Competing discourses can lead to inconsistent or contradictory policy outcomes. Thus, foreign policy is not a stable, predetermined path but a dynamic process shaped by evolving identity narratives. Two Competing Identities in Iran’s Political Structure The study identifies two dominant and competing identities within Iran’s political–social structure: The Interactive Developmental Identity - Emphasizes constructive engagement with the world, economic cooperation, foreign investment, and stability. v Views economic development as the foundation of national security. v Centers its discourse on “development,” “interaction,” and “economic growth.” v The Revolutionary–Resistance Identity v Prioritizes independence, threat perception, strategic depth, deterrence, and resistance. v Considers security a prerequisite for development. v Centers its discourse on “security,” “independence,” “resistance,” and “deterrence.” v Advocates increased military spending, missile development, and support for regional allies. These identities impose divergent priorities on foreign policy. While the developmental identity seeks integration into global markets and reduced tensions, the resistance identity emphasizes confrontation, autonomy, and military empowerment. Consequences of Identity Competition for Vision 2025 The findings show that: v Iran’s foreign policy does not follow a stable or coherent trajectory but is shaped by identity shifts and discursive oscillations. v Normative and ideological indicators are continually redefined, preventing the formation of a consistent long-term strategy. v Development-oriented and resistance-oriented policies require fundamentally different—and often incompatible—institutional commitments. v This incompatibility has made it impossible to simultaneously pursue economic development and resistance-based security. v As a result, the key goals of Vision 2025—global economic integration, foreign investment, stable international relations, and sustained economic growth—have remained unrealized. Conclusion This study concludes that the contradiction between Vision 2025 and Iran’s foreign policy is rooted not in miscalculation or external constraints but in a deep identity-based and discursive divide within the political system. The two competing identities—interactive developmental and revolutionary–resistance—offer conflicting interpretations of national interests and impose inconsistent priorities on foreign policy. Given that foreign policy is a socially constructed and normatively driven process, resolving this contradiction requires addressing the underlying identity divide. The study suggests that a hybrid approach, capable of integrating the essential elements of both identities, may provide a viable path toward balancing development and security. Only through a redefinition of national identity that accommodates both interaction and security can Iran move toward achieving its long-term developmental goals. این مقاله به بررسی یکی از چالش‌های بنیادین سیاست‌گذاری کلان جمهوری اسلامی ایران می‌پردازد: تقابل میان اهداف توسعه‌محور سند چشم‌انداز ۱۴۰۴ و رویکرد امنیتی-تقابل‌محور سیاست خارجی در دو دهه اخیر. برخلاف رویکرد‌های جریان اصلی روابط بین‌الملل (رئالیسم و لیبرالیسم) که این تضاد را ناشی از ترجیح منافع امنیتی کوتاه‌مدت بر منافع اقتصادی بلندمدت می‌دانند، این پژوهش با بهره‌گیری از چهارچوب نظری سازه‌انگاری نشان می‌دهد که مسئله، ریشه در برخورد هویتی و گفتمانی دارد. پرسش اصلی مقاله آن است که چرا سیاست خارجی ایران عملاً با اهداف توسعه‌محور سند چشم‌انداز ۱۴۰۴ در تعارض قرار گرفته است؟ یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که دو «هویت ملی» رقیب در ساختار سیاسی-اجتماعی ایران ساخته و بازتولید شده‌اند: ۱. هویت توسعه‌گرای تعاملی، برآمده از گفتمان تعامل و همکاری جهانی؛ ۲. هویت انقلابی-مقاومتی، شکل‌گرفته در بستر تجربیات تاریخی و نگاه ایدئولوژیک. این مقاله با استفاده از روش تفسیری-تحلیلی و بررسی مطالعات موردی کلیدی، نشان می‌دهد که واقعیت سیاست خارجی ایران نه یک داده عینی، بلکه برساخته‌ای اجتماعی-هنجاری است که از تعامل میان هویت‌ها و گفتمان‌های رقیب شکل می‌گیرد. سیاست‌های مبتنی بر توسعۀ اقتصادی و اقتصاد مقاومتی الزامات متفاوتی را به نهادهای درگیر سیاست‌گذاری تحمیل می‌کنند که پیشبرد هم‌زمان توسعه و مقاومت را ناممکن ساخته است. در فرایند چرخش‌ها و جهت‌گیری‌های ناهمخوان، شاخص‌های هویتی-ایدئولوژیک و هنجاری دستخوش بازتعریف دائمی می‌شوند، به‌گونه‌ای که دیگر نمی‌توان از یک مسیر ثابت و هویت پایدار سخن گفت. بنابراین سیاست خارجی کشور در یک تعلیق گفتمانی میان آرمان توسعه و الزام مقاومت قرار گرفته است. به نظر می‌رسد رویکرد تلفیقی که الزامات هر دو طیف را پوشش دهد توافقی بر سر دال‌های مرکزی و شناور ایجاد کند، می‌تواند به ایجاد توازن بین توسعه و امنیت کمک کند.

https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_241330_2b46d0fba9be509d1347a3cb2264b73e.pdf

پژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـام فصلنامه روابط خارجی 2008-5419 18 1 2026 05 22 The Arab League: Continuity of Institutional Incompetence اتحادیه عرب؛ تداوم ناتوانی ساختاری 193 222 240971 10.22034/fr.2026.542183.1703 FA جواد شعرباف استادیار علوم سیاسی، گروه مطالعات غرب آسیا و آفریقا، دانشکده مطالعات جهان، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران 0000-0002-0776-4949 Journal Article 2025 08 19 The Arab League can be regarded as one of the most significant active regional organizations. In the eighth decade of its existence, this organization has endured a range of experiences in its efforts to foster unity among Arab countries. The emergence of this cohesive Arab axis in one of the world's most crisis-prone regions could have served as a powerful incentive for improving conditions in the regional states. The emergence of this relatively cohesive Arab institutional framework in one of the world’s most crisis-prone regions could have served as a strong incentive for improving regional conditions. The initial enthusiasm for Arab solidarity and unity, following the outbreak of the first major crises in the Arab world and the exposure of national–Arab contradictions, gave way to fragmentation and the prioritization of national interests over the illusory notion of collective Arab interests. The central concern of this article is to understand the process of the League’s emergence and its persistence and continuity after eight decades. The main research question addresses the reasons behind the durability and survival of the Arab League, as well as the interests derived from its continued existence. It also seeks to examine whether the League can continue along its current trajectory or whether its inherent and structural deficiencies prevent it from overcoming internal and external crises. Institutionalism has been employed as the theoretical framework for analysis in this article. Furthermore, the study hypothesizes that the structure designed based on Arab identity represents a political construct marked by internal contradictions. This structure is neither aligned nor compatible with the national interests of political systems possessing distinct and particularistic identities; consequently, it suffers from chronic inefficiency and ineffectiveness and has, in practice, failed to resolve the problems of the Arab world. The institutionalist approach has been utilized for theoretical analysis in this article. The research findings indicate that this structural ineffectiveness has persisted and has had no profound impact on alleviating Arab countries problems. Extended Abstract The present article aims to critically rethink the functioning and status of the Arab League, examining the reasons for the persistence of problems and crises in the Arab world even after the establishment of this union. The institutional inefficiency of this regional organization after nearly eight decades is the main topic of the article. The main issue of the research is not merely the occasional failures of the Union in managing intra-Arab crises, but rather the persistence and reproduction of this institution's structural inability over time. The article attempts to show that the Arab League, contrary to the goals stated in its charter, has failed to become an effective institution for political integration, conflict resolution, and regional crisis management. This situation is rooted in its institutional design and identity foundations, rather than a result of external conditions or temporary disagreements. The main question of the article is why the Arab League has continued to exist despite the lack of effective achievements and the continuation of intra-Arab crises, and whether this institution fundamentally has the capacity to overcome chronic inefficiency. The research hypothesis is based on the premise that the Arab League was founded from the beginning on a constructed political and elite identity of "Arabness" that is structurally incompatible with the pluralistic reality of member states and their national interests. As a result, rather than seeking to resolve crises, this institution has become a tool for the symbolic management of disputes, maintaining the status quo, and legitimizing the policies of dominant governments. In the introduction section, the article reviews the historical context of the establishment of the Arab League in 1945 and shows that the institution was formed in the context of the collapse of the Ottoman order, the end of World War II, and the geopolitical considerations of the colonial powers. Contrary to popular idealistic narratives, the Arab League was a product of the pan-Arab aspirations of political elites and the efforts of powers like Britain to organize and control the political space of the Arab world. The linkage between discursive unity and the preservation of fragile national sovereign states created a fundamental contradiction in the structure of the League from the beginning, one which was intensified over time. The article then shifts its focus from purely political or ideological disagreements between Arab states to the institutional capacity and decision-making mechanisms of the Arab League. The author shows that simply addressing ideological divisions, geopolitical rivalries, or conflicts of national interests without analyzing the institutional structure of the League would not be an accurate analysis. Therefore, the main focus of the article is to examine why the Arab League, even in circumstances where there has been relative political consensus, has been unable to translate decisions into effective action. In the research literature section, classical and contemporary works related to the Arab League are critically reviewed. This review shows that since the first years of its establishment, there have been serious doubts about the effectiveness of this institution. Many researchers have emphasized the lack of binding instruments, the lack of enforcement guarantees for approvals, the existence of authoritarian governments, the lack of democracy, and the dominance of the logic of national sovereignty over collective Arab cooperation. The current study differs from previous studies in that it analyzes the ineffectiveness of the Arab League not as an "accidental failure" but as a stable and reproducible institutional situation. The theoretical framework of the article is based on institutionalism, specifically liberal institutionalism. According to this framework, regional institutions are able to play an effective role when they have binding rules, a dispute resolution mechanism, a monitoring system, legitimacy, and tangible common interests that are superior to national interests. Relying solely on Arabism cannot be a suitable substitute for national interests. By applying these components to the structure of the Arab League, the article shows that this institution suffers from serious weaknesses in most institutional indicators. Principles such as absolute non-interference in domestic affairs, consensus-based decision-making, lack of executive guarantees, and lack of financial and human resources, as well as internal polarities, have effectively turned the Union into an ineffective and powerless institution. As for examining the League’s performance and achievements, the article acknowledges some of the Union's limited successes—including the establishment of diplomatic frameworks, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the establishment of specialized cultural and economic institutions—but emphasizes that these achievements have neither been stable nor have they been able to alleviate the structural crises of the Arab world. In contrast, the failure to manage crises such as intra-Arab wars, the Arab Spring, the Palestinian issue, and the Qatar crisis presents a clear picture of the Union's institutional incompetence. The article then analyzes a set of internal factors weakening the union, including ideological discords, competition for leadership in the Arab world, economic divides, religious disagreements, conflicting positions towards regional and trans-regional actors, and widespread dependence on external powers. The main argument is that these disputes become deadlocked when the Union lacks an effective institutional mechanism to manage them. The Qatar crisis is a prime example of how the Arab League has been unable to play an effective mediator role even when faced with a limited dispute between a few members. In the final section, the article concludes by proposing the concept of “formal Arab institutionalism” that the Arab League, rather than being an institution for achieving Arab unity, has become a symbolic framework for managing conflicts and a symbol of legitimizing the primacy of national interests. In this framework, Arab identity is a political construct that is easily discarded if it conflicts with the interests of states. The conclusion of the article emphasizes that the continued ineffectiveness of the Arab League is not due to the lack of the idea of unity, but rather the result of a structural incompatibility between the claimed identity and the political reality of the member states. Without fundamental reforms in institutional design, adjusting the principle of consensus, strengthening executive mechanisms, and redefining the relationship between national sovereignty and collective interests, the Arab League will remain an ineffective institution whose role is limited to issuing statements and symbolic crisis management. اتحادیه عرب را می‌توان یکی از مهم‌ترین نهادهای فعال منطقه محسوب کرد. این نهاد در دهۀ هشتم عمر خود، برای ایجاد وحدت در میان کشورهای عربی، تجارب بسیاری را پشت سر گذاشته است. پیدایش این محور عربی در یکی از بحرانی‌ترین مناطق جهان، می‌توانست انگیزه‌ای قوی برای بهبود اوضاع کشورهای منطقه باشد. امیدهای فراوان در تقابل عمیق منافع ملی و آرمان وحدت عربی به‌تدریج رنگ باخت و از میان رفت. شور و شوق اتحاد و وحدت عربی با وقوع نخستین بحران‌ها در دنیای عرب و آشکار شدن تعارضات ملی-عربی جای خود را به تفرد و ترجیح منافع ملی بر منافع موهوم عربی بخشید. مسئله این مقاله فهم چگونگی پیدایش و مهم‌تر از آن دوام و استمرار اتحادیه پس از هشت دهه است. سؤال اصلی پژوهش حاضر این است که، علت ماندگاری و بقای اتحادیه و این‌که اتحادیه می‌تواند به همین روند ادامه دهد یا ناتوانی‌های ذاتی و ساختاری، اجازه خروج آن از بحران‌های درونی و بیرونی را نمی‌دهد، چیست و فرضیه پژوهش حاضر، آن است که ساختار طراحی شده مبتنی بر هویت عربی، برساخته‌ای سیاسی است و تناقض درونی دارد و با منافع ملی نظام‌های سیاسی دارای هویت‌های هم‌سو و هم‌ساز نیست و در نتیجه از ناتوانی مزمن و ناکارآمدی رنج می‌برد و در عمل نتوانسته مشکلات جهان عرب را حل‌وفصل کند. از روش تحقیق نهادگرایی، برای تجزیه‌وتحلیل نظری در این مقاله استفاده شده است. یافته‌های تحقیق گواه آن است که این ناکارآمدی ساختاری دوام داشته و تأثیر عمیقی در کاهش مشکلات عربی نداشته است.

https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_240971_9b40b52078147ead4dab6466ae511e12.pdf

پژوهشـکده تحقیقـات راهبردی مجمـع تشخیـص مصلـحت نظـام فصلنامه روابط خارجی 2008-5419 18 1 2026 05 22 The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Balkans and Eastern Europe: A Constructivist Analysis of Soft Power and Geopolitical Opportunities سیاست خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران در بالکان و اروپای شرقی: تحلیل سازه‌انگارانه قدرت نرم و فرصت‌های ژئوپلیتیکی 223 256 241142 10.22034/fr.2026.537332.1691 FA محمد سمیعی دانشجوی دکتری مطالعات بریتانیا، دانشکده مطالعات جهان، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران 0009-0003-1191-4561 سعید سیدآقا بنی هاشمی استادیار دانشکده روابط بین‌الملل، وزارت امور خارجه، تهران، ایران 0009-0003-1191-4561 محمدهادی واعظ مهدوی دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد رشته دیپلماسی و سازمان های بین المللی، دانشکده روابط بین الملل وزارت امور خارجه، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2025 07 27 The research examines the geopolitical position and strategic importance of the Eastern European and Balkan region within the framework of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The central question of the article is why and how the Islamic Republic of Iran has prioritized this region in its foreign policy, particularly amid divergences from Western Europe and amid the geopolitical transformations of the new international order. This study, relying on a descriptive-analytical method and through the lens of constructivist theory and soft power, presents three main hypotheses: first, that this region, as a geopolitical corridor, provides a platform for diversifying Iran's external links and reducing the impact of Western sanctions; second, that the Islamic Republic seeks to activate its soft power components through historical and cultural commonalities, especially in countries with Muslim communities, creating a form of identity convergence with these societies; third, that the structural complexities of the region and the critical approach of some of its governments toward Western hegemony have created a favorable environment for advancing Iran's strategic goals. Analysis of case studies related to Iran's relations with Serbia and its interactions with Hungary supports the notion that the Islamic Republic's foreign policy in this region is a blend of geopolitical rationality, leveraging identity ties, and diplomatic opportunism. The research findings indicate that, despite achieving some positive results at the cultural and political levels, Iran's practical influence faces serious challenges due to structural limitations, geopolitical rivalries, and ongoing pressures from Western powers. Nevertheless, the Eastern European and Balkan region remains a key pillar of the Islamic Republic of Iran's multifaceted and resilient foreign policy strategy. Extended Abstract Introduction The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward Eastern Europe and the Balkans has, in recent years, been regarded as a key strategy for diversifying international relations and mitigating the impact of Western sanctions. This research employs an analytical-descriptive approach within the constructivist framework to examine the geopolitical position and strategic significance of this region in Iran's foreign policy. Research Question Why and how has Iran prioritized the Balkans and Eastern Europe in its foreign policy, particularly amid divergence from Western Europe and the evolving international order? Research Hypotheses The present study is based on three main hypotheses. First, the Balkans and Eastern Europe serve as a geopolitical corridor that facilitates the diversification of Iran's foreign relations and mitigates the impact of Western sanctions. Due to its unique geographical location, this region is considered a bridge between Iran and Central Europe. Second, through historical and cultural commonalities—particularly in countries with Muslim populations such as Bosnia and Albania—Iran leverages its soft power components to foster identity convergence. Third, the region's structural complexities and the criticism of Western hegemony by certain governments, such as those of Serbia and Hungary, have created a favorable environment for advancing Iran's strategic objectives. Research Methodology This research uses a qualitative analysis of secondary data, including official documents, foreign policy statements, analytical reports from research centers, and academic articles. Employing thematic analysis and interpretive discourse analysis, official texts and statements by officials have been examined within the framework of constructivist concepts such as identity, meaning, and soft power. Case studies of Iran's relations with Serbia and Hungary have been selected as prominent examples: the former representing political-strategic cooperation, and the latter illustrating economic-technical interactions. Result and Discussion Upon reviewing the research background, it is worth noting that although sporadic studies have been conducted on Iran's foreign policy in the Balkans, most have been limited to case reports. Some of these studies have examined Iran's bilateral relations with Hungary and Serbia. In contrast, others have highlighted Iran's cultural diplomacy and soft power in the region. Nevertheless, there is a serious gap in the provision of a structural and systematic analysis of this region's position in Iran's grand strategy. The present study seeks to fill this research gap by combining structural and discursive analyses and using the theoretical framework of constructivism. The research findings show that Iran has pursued three principal axes to advance its goals in the region. In the realm of cultural diplomacy and soft power, Iran has sought to present a positive image of itself as a supporter of Islamic-Iranian identity by emphasizing civilizational commonalities and by supporting Muslim communities, especially in Serbia and Bosnia. Programs such as the establishment of Persian language chairs in Hungarian universities, the holding of cultural weeks, and the awarding of scholarships are clear examples of this strategy. In the realm of official diplomacy, Iran's relations with Serbia on the sensitive issue of Kosovo, and its cooperation with Hungary in the economic and technological fields, indicate Tehran's efforts to establish strategic ties outside the West's framework. At the third level, Iran has created space for diplomatic maneuvering by exploiting gaps in the Euro-Atlantic order and focusing on countries such as Serbia and Hungary with more independent foreign policies. The case studies of Serbia and Hungary show Iran's strategic differences in dealing with the countries of the region. In Serbia, which has a bitter experience of NATO interventions, Iran emphasizes political convergence and a discourse of common resistance to the West. Meanwhile, Hungary, despite being a member of the European Union, has focused more on non-sensitive economic and cultural cooperation. This flexibility reflects Iran's multifaceted strategy in the region. The analysis of Iran's strategies in the Balkans shows that Tehran's approach combines geopolitical rationality, exploitation of structural opportunities, and identity-based diplomacy. However, this strategy faces serious challenges. The structural dependence of the region's countries on the West and their desire to converge with the European Union and NATO have constrained Iran's room for maneuver. On the other hand, the active presence of rival powers such as Turkey, with its neo-Ottoman discourse, Russia, with its emphasis on Orthodox Slavic identity, and China, with its robust economic tools, has reduced the possibility of Iran's independent influence. Resource constraints and weaknesses in sustainable institutional building are other obstacles to Iran's foreign policy in the region. The results of the research indicate that, although Iran's foreign policy in the Balkans has achieved symbolic and tactical gains in the short term, it has not led to lasting, profound outcomes due to structural limitations. All three hypotheses have been confirmed: the Balkans have served as a geopolitical corridor to reduce Iran's isolation, soft power tools have been effective in creating identity convergence, and structural gaps in the regional order have provided opportunities for Iran's activism. To sustain and strengthen this strategy, Iran should focus on several key axes. The development of scientific and technological diplomacy can be effective in attracting the region's young generation. Strengthening media narratives in local languages and building sustainable cultural networks is essential. Also, expanding economic cooperation in non-sensitive areas such as agriculture, health, and new technologies can reduce dependence on political developments. This research shows that Iran's foreign policy in the Balkans, rather than an alternative strategy, is a project of resistance and flexibility against the hegemonic order of the West, which requires continuous revision of tools and techniques. Conclusion According to this study's findings, the Balkan region and Eastern Europe hold a special place within Iran's grand strategy of foreign policy. This importance is not only due to the region's geopolitical position as a bridge of communication with Europe, but also to its cultural and historical capacities to foster convergence with the discourse of the Iranian Resistance. Recent developments in the international system, especially after the Ukraine war, have significantly increased Iran's importance in this region. The rifts within the European Union and the emergence of currents critical of Western liberalism in countries such as Hungary and Serbia have created new opportunities for Iran to expand its influence. From a future perspective, the success of Iran's foreign policy in the region will depend on several key factors. First, the need to adapt cultural and religious approaches to the needs of the region's young generation, who have been educated mainly under the influence of Western values. Second, the importance of developing economic relations through joint investment projects that can create lasting ties beyond political ties. Third, there is a need to be competent in managing relations with rival powers in the region, such as Turkey and Russia, so that common ground can be used to create temporary alliances. Finally, this study suggests that Iran's foreign policy in the Balkans should change from reactive to active and consolidate its presence in the region by designing long-term plans and cultural-economic institutionalization. پژوهش حاضر به واکاوی جایگاه ژئوپلیتیکی و اهمیت راهبردی منطقه اروپای شرقی و بالکان در چهارچوب سیاست خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران می‌پردازد. پرسش محوری مقاله آن است که جمهوری اسلامی ایران چرا و چگونه این منطقه را در اولویت سیاست خارجی خود به‌ویژه در زمینۀ واگرایی از اروپای غربی و در بستر تحولات ژئوپلیتیکی نظم نوین بین‌الملل قرار داده است. این مطالعه، با اتکا بر روش توصیفی-تحلیلی و در پرتو چهارچوب نظری سازه‌انگاری و قدرت نرم، سه فرضیه اصلی را مطرح می‌سازد: نخست آن‌که این منطقه، به‌منزله کریدوری ژئوپلیتیکی، بستر تنوع‌بخشی به پیوندهای خارجی ایران و کاهش اثرگذاری تحریم‌های غربی را فراهم می‌سازد؛ دوم، جمهوری اسلامی از طریق اشتراکات تاریخی و فرهنگی، به‌ویژه در کشورهایی با جوامع مسلمان، می‌کوشد مؤلفه‌های قدرت نرم خود را فعال نموده و نوعی هم‌گرایی هویتی با این جوامع ایجاد نماید؛ سوم، پیچیدگی‌های ساختاری منطقه و رویکرد انتقادی برخی دولت‌های آن نسبت به هژمونی غرب، فضای مساعدی برای پیشبرد اهداف راهبردی ایران فراهم کرده است. تحلیل مطالعات موردی مربوط به روابط ایران با صربستان و نیز تعاملات آن با مجارستان، مؤید آن است که سیاست خارجی جمهوری اسلامی در این منطقه، تلفیقی از عقلانیت ژئوپلیتیکی، بهره‌گیری از پیوندهای هویتی و فرصت‌طلبی دیپلماتیک است. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که علی‌رغم دستیابی به برخی نتایج مثبت در سطوح فرهنگی و سیاسی، نفوذ عملی ایران به‌دلیل موانعی چون محدودیت‌های ساختاری، رقابت‌های ژئوپلیتیکی و فشارهای مستمر قدرت‌های غربی با چالش‌های جدی روبه‌رو است. با این‌همه، منطقه اروپای شرقی و بالکان همچنان به‌عنوان یکی از تکیه‌گاه‌های کلیدی در راهبرد سیاست خارجی چندمسیره و مقاومتی جمهوری اسلامی ایران حفظ شده است.

https://frqjournal.csr.ir/article_241142_3e24049d60e6c7ac507904c5f9fa53df.pdf