On May 8, 2018, the United States ended its participation in JCPOA less than three years after it was signed, the US president claimed that the agreement was incomplete and failed to achieve its goals.
Adopting the "maximum pressure" policy, the Republican Administration claimed that it was looking for a comprehensive agreement that would deal with Iran's other activities, including the missile program, and proposed unreasonable conditions for negotiations.
In response, Iran began to gradually reduce its obligations according to the JCPOA one year later and refused to negotiate a new agreement according to the conditions of the American government. With the inauguration of the new government in the United States and the announcement of its intention to return to the original agreement, negotiations were held to revive the JCPOA, which, of course, did not come to fruition, The question is why, after the withdrawal of US, the new Administration is negotiating to revive the JCPOA? The hypothesis is that the United States, through a learning process, seeks to take advantage of the international non-proliferation regime to help the policy of "regime change" and weaken Iran's power in the region, reorganize its role in West Asia, and prevent the increase in influence of its global rivals, including China and Russia in the region. In this research, by adopting the game theory as a theoretical framework and designing a three-level model, it is concluded that the United States in the JCPOA game pursues goals far beyond maintaining the non-proliferation regime.