International Quarterly of Foreign Relations

International Quarterly of Foreign Relations

A Typology of the Behavior of Nuclear Weapon States in relation to Deterrence, with an emphasis on Israel's Deterrence Strategies against Islamic Republic of Iran

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Elham Rasooli
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Political Science and history, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran
10.22034/fr.2025.492762.1611
Abstract
Introduction: "Nuclear deterrence" as a technical and political reality is a product of the Cold War era, that has different conceptual and theoretical dimensions. It is based on these theoretical dimensions that the behavior of nuclear-weapon states in relation to nuclear deterrence can be analyzed. So, the main aim of this research is to examine the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons on the security of the international system, through considering a typology of nuclear-weapon states behavior and their tendency to aggression or self-restraint.
The main question: the main question of this paper is: do nuclear weapons deter conflicts by making states feel more secure? Or do they trigger more conflicts by enabling states to take greater risks in interstate disputes? In other words, what effect do nuclear weapons and their related capabilities have on the tendency of states possessing these weapons to seek war against their rivals?
Conceptual framework: The conceptual framework of this research is nuclear deterrence. Deterrence is an exquisite example of strategy because it is intended to alter an opponent’s political preferences without fighting in an effort to preserve the status quo, guarantee the peace, or ensure that diplomacy, not war, is the method of change in international affair. The goal of deterrence is to prevent war or the occurrence of some unwanted fait accompli. The onset of war constitutes the failure of deterrence and a total and potentially catastrophic failure of deterrence as a strategy.
Results and Discussion: In response to this question, the hypothesis of this research is that nuclear weapons are not inherently instruments of aggression or conflict deterrents, but rather the meaning given to these weapons by leaders is important. Therefore, in assessing the nature of the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons, one must simultaneously pay attention to two semantic factors: the risk-taking or “zero” risk tolerance of decision-makers in the face of a crisis, as well as the importance of the credibility and reputation of the nuclear-weapon state. Thus, the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, whether through nuclear balance or nuclear superiority, is influenced by these two semantic factors.
Methods: This research is a qualitative and explanatory research that examines the relationship between two main variables, namely international security as the dependent variable and the existence of nuclear weapons as the independent variable. Based on the hypothesis in the research, we will examine the role of the moderating variable in explaining the relationship between these two variables. In analyzing the data, we will also use a case study (Israel's Deterrence Strategies against Islamic Republic of Iran). Data collection is also through a review of existing literature related to the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons on international security, as well as a review of theories related to nuclear deterrence.
Conclusion: Based on the research hypothesis, if we want to examine how Israel confronts the Iranian regime, it is necessary to pay attention to two semantic elements. The first element is the level of risk-taking and risk-aversion of Israeli leaders in the face of Iranian threats. In this view, depending on the severity of the risk-taking of Israeli leaders, there is a possibility of war breaking out. Regarding the second semantic element, namely, "the importance of prestige and prestige for nuclear-weapon states," one should refer to Israel's past actions and practices in the face of threats. In this regard, it should be added that Iran's defensive capabilities are also very important in the face of Israeli deterrence, meaning that if Israel, as an aggressor state, assesses that Iran does not have an acceptable defense situation, it will consider the probability of success high and launch an attack.
Keywords
Iran
Israel
Deterrence
nuclear weapons
Security dilemma
Subjects
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