The collapse of the Syrian political system on December 8, 2024 and the inauguration of Donald J. Trump at the White House on January 20, 2025 will have profound impacts on the West Asian region. The primary objective of this research is to examine the new discursive formation and, consequently, analyze the discursive articulations, as well as the security-military practices, of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the three discourses of the Western, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafi-Takfiri in West Asia(Middle East) region. Thus, this study seeks to answer the central research question: "In the discursive formation of West Asia following the collapse of the Syrian political system in December 2024 and the inauguration of Donald J. Trump in January 2025, what will be the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s security-military discourse?" The proposed hypothesis is as follows: Beginning in January 2025, the discursive field in West Asia region will witness the presence of four security-military discourses, none of which will hold a hegemonic status: 1) The 'Resistance' discourse'', whose primary enunciator is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its discursive 'Others' are Israel, the United States, and Salafi-Takfiri forces, while its chain of equivalence includes the Islamic Republic of Iran, resistance groups in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, as well as adherents of revolutionary Islam and segments of the population hostile to Israel and the U.S. in the region. 2) The 'Western' security-military discourse, whose primary enunciator is the U.S. under Trump, encompassing several sub-discourses. Its discursive 'Other' consists of forces opposing Western values, while its chain of equivalence includes Israel, so-called moderate Arab states, and populations adhering to Western lifestyles and values in the region. 3) The 'Muslim Brotherhood' discourse, which gains discursive strength following the fall of the Syrian political system, with Turkey as its primary enunciator. Its discursive 'Others' are forces opposing the revival of the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurdish sub-discourse, while its chain of equivalence comprises Turkey, Qatar, Syria, and adherents of a non-revolutionary interpretation of Islam (Muslim Brotherhood-style secular Islam). 4) ''The 'Salafi-Takfiri' discourse'', whose primary enunciator shifted from Saudi Arabia to ISIS after June 21, 2017, when Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Crown Prince. Its discursive 'Others' are Shiites and forces opposing Salafi-Takfiri Islam (including Western-oriented groups), while its chain of equivalence includes Salafi-Takfiri groups in the region and adherents of Salafi Islam (neither revolutionary nor Muslim Brotherhood interpretations)." Additionally, this study seeks to answer the following sub-question: "Based on the new discursive formation in West Asia, what security-military practices will each of the four discourses pursue?"
Keywords: Resistance Discourse, Western Discourse, Muslim Brotherhood Discourse, Salafi-Takfiri Discourse

Extended Abstract
The collapse of the Syrian political system on December 8, 2024 and the inauguration of Donald J. Trump at the White House on January 20, 2025 will have profound impacts on the West Asian region. The primary objective of this research is to examine the new discursive formation and, consequently, analyze the discursive articulations, as well as the security-military practices, of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the three discourses of the Western, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafi-Takfiri in West Asia(Middle East) region. Thus, this study seeks to answer the central research question: "In the discursive formation of West Asia following the collapse of the Syrian political system in December 2024 and the inauguration of Donald J. Trump in January 2025, what will be the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s security-military discourse?" The proposed hypothesis is as follows: Beginning in January 2025, the discursive field in West Asia will witness the presence of four security-military discourses, none of which will hold a hegemonic status: 1) ''The 'Resistance' discourse'', whose primary enunciator is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its discursive 'Others' are Israel, the United States, and Salafi-Takfiri forces, while its chain of equivalence includes the Islamic Republic of Iran, resistance groups in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, as well as adherents of revolutionary Islam and segments of the population hostile to Israel and the U.S. in the region. 2) The 'Western' security-military discourse, whose primary enunciator is the U.S. under Trump, encompassing several sub-discourses. Its discursive 'Other' consists of forces opposing Western values, while its chain of equivalence includes Israel, so-called moderate Arab states, and populations adhering to Western lifestyles and values in the region. 3) ''The 'Muslim Brotherhood' discourse'', which gains discursive strength following the fall of the Syrian political system, with Turkey as its primary enunciator. Its discursive 'Others' are forces opposing the revival of the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurdish sub-discourse, while its chain of equivalence comprises Turkey, Qatar, Syria, and adherents of a non-revolutionary interpretation of Islam ('Muslim Brotherhood-style secular Islam). 4) ''The 'Salafi-Takfiri' discourse'', whose primary enunciator shifted from Saudi Arabia to ISIS after June 21, 2017, when Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Crown Prince. Its discursive 'Others' are Shiites and forces opposing Salafi-Takfiri Islam (including Western-oriented groups), while its chain of equivalence includes Salafi-Takfiri groups in the region and adherents of Salafi Islam (neither revolutionary nor Muslim Brotherhood interpretations)." Additionally, this study seeks to answer the following sub-question: "Based on the new discursive formation in West Asia, what security-military practices will each of the four discourses pursue?" The following sub-hypotheses are proposed:
a) The 'Resistance' discourse (articulated primarily by the Islamic Republic of Iran):
1. It will maintain an antagonistic relationship with the Western and Salafi-Takfiri discourses.
2. It will avoid establishing an antagonistic relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood discourse.
3. Since the Resistance discourse frames Israel as the "primary enemy of the region's people," it will counter Western discursive attempts to destabilize the signifier "Israel" within its discourse, making Israel a key site of discursive conflict with the West.
4. Tensions with the U.S. across the region will decrease until the nuclear issue is resolved.
5. A purely nuclear agreement with the U.S. (in the absence of maximum pressure) will be pursued, but no negotiations will be authorized if the U.S. enforces maximum pressure.
6. The agreement with Saudi Arabia will be maintained.
7. Tensions with neighboring countries will be managed.
8. Military drills, exercises, and the strengthening of Iran’s security-military capabilities will continue.
9. Covert enhancement of the security-military capabilities of Resistance Axis groups will intensify, avoiding media exposure.
b) The 'Western' discourse (articulated primarily by the U.S. under Trump):**
1. It will maintain an antagonistic relationship with the Resistance and Salafi-Takfiri discourses.
2. It will avoid antagonizing the Muslim Brotherhood discourse.
3. It will seek to fix the signifier "Israel" within its discourse as a strategic partner and ally, supporting Israel through settlement expansions and arms sales.
4. Efforts to expand the Abraham Accords to other regional countries (especially Saudi Arabia) will continue.
5. Pressure on Arab states to increase investments and arms purchases from the U.S. will intensify.
6. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons will remain a key signifier, sustaining a "carrot-and-stick" policy. Negotiations with Iran under maximum pressure will be prioritized.
7. Extreme Iranophobic rhetoric (e.g., regime change advocacy) will moderate (but not cease) pending the nuclear issue’s resolution. The binary of "non-nuclear Iran as prosperous vs. nuclear Iran as destitute" will be emphasized.
8. The Trump administration will seek military-security gains in West Asia through rhetoric and threats, particularly against Yemen’s Houthis (designated as an FTO).
9. Pressure on Iraq and Lebanon to marginalize Resistance groups and fully align them with the Western discourse will increase.
10. The discourse’s weak "metaphorical power" will be exacerbated by Trump’s linguistic patterns, failing to offer a clear future vision or present itself as the sole crisis solution, leading to a partial erosion of its chain of equivalence.
11. U.S. military presence in the region will persist.
c) The 'Muslim Brotherhood' discourse (articulated primarily by Turkey):**
1. It will not establish an antagonistic relationship with the other three discourses.
2. It will attempt to incorporate Egypt into its chain of equivalence.
3. Despite Syria’s inclusion in its chain of equivalence post-December 8, 2024, the Muslim Brotherhood discourse will not articulate the "liberation of Jerusalem," leading to limited Turkish responses to Israeli military actions in Syria.
4. Its primary 'Other' will be the Kurdish sub-discourse (under the Western discourse), sustaining hard/soft security confrontations with groups like the PYD/YPG and PKK.
5. It will deploy all security-military and economic resources to stabilize Syria’s new political system.
6. Efforts to persuade wealthy Arab states (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait) to invest in Syria will increase.
d) The 'Salafi-Takfiri' discourse (articulated primarily by ISIS):
1. It will maintain an antagonistic relationship with the Western and Resistance discourses.
2. It will avoid antagonizing the Muslim Brotherhood discourse.
3. It will strive to revive its chain of equivalence in the region.
4. Efforts to incorporate Syria and Iraq into its chain of equivalence will intensify.
5. The group’s terrorist operations will escalate.
Methodology
This research is an analytical-descriptive study with a methodology based on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis method. The data was collected from library and web-based sources (official and credible websites).
Findings and Discussion
Findings of the present study confirm both the primary and secondary hypotheses, demonstrating that the four security-military discourses of "Resistance," "the Western," "Muslim Brotherhood," and "Salafi-Takfiri" — each derived from their own discursive articulations — will pursue a set of security-related practices in the near future, at least until these four discourses undergo rearticulation. This has been thoroughly examined in the study. In this context, the reasons behind the Resistance security-military discourse's failure to achieve hegemonic status, despite its extensive chain of equivalence, were discussed. Based on credible survey results, it was demonstrated that Operation Al-Aqsa Storm and the Zionist regime’s crimes in the region have positively impacted the chain of equivalence of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s discourse (Resistance discourse). Thus, a series of measures must be taken to prevent the erosion of Iran’s position as the primary enunciator of the Resistance security-military discourse. Another key issue analyzed through the lens of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory was why the Muslim Brotherhood’s security-military discourse has not attained hegemonic status. It was noted that while this discourse has simultaneously incorporated the two elements of "ethnicity" and "religion (Muslim Brotherhood-style Islam)," its avoidance of establishing an antagonistic relationship with the other three discourses in the region has significantly diluted its logic of difference without expanding its chain of equivalence. Furthermore, employing the concept of "hegemonic intervention," the study highlighted that with the exception of a few security-military cases in West Asia (such as Syria and Libya), Turkey has no substantial presence or influence in other regional security-military issues. As long as the Muslim Brotherhood security-military discourse fails to externalize "Israel" as the primary threat to the Arab world and does not articulate the "liberation of Jerusalem" within its discourse, achieving hegemonic status will remain unlikely. Finally, the study discussed six key issues that could become focal points of new discursive conflicts, potentially completely reshaping discursive formations in West Asia and leading to divergent security actions and practices: Iran’s nuclear dossier and U.S. engagement with it. Israel, The future of Syria’s political system, The resurgence of ISIS in the region, The Kurdish issue, The future of Resistance groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria.