The transition in the international order represents one of the most significant transformations influencing the behavior, interests, and power dynamics of countries across the globe. This shift is not merely a change in political leadership or economic policy; it signifies a fundamental reconfiguration of how states interact, prioritize their objectives, and assert their influence on the world stage. Among the various factors contributing to this transition, two key elements stand out: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concurrent rise of China as a global power. Together, these events mark what is arguably the most pivotal turning point in international politics since the end of World War II.
This research focuses on examining the multifaceted impact of these significant changes on Iran. As a country with rich historical and cultural significance, and situated in a region often described as a geopolitical fault line, Iran's response to the shifting dynamics of international power is critical for understanding broader regional stability and global interactions. This study will delve into how Iran navigates its relationships with great powers, adapts its foreign policy in response to the rise of China, and contends with the implications of a potentially multipolar world where its interests may align or clash with those of other nations.
By analyzing Iran's position within this transformed international order, the research aims to shed light on not only the challenges the country faces but also the opportunities that may arise from its engagement in a rapidly changing global landscape. Through this exploration, it seeks to contribute to the broader discourse on international relations and the evolving nature of power in the 21st century.
Research Question: "What scenarios will the competition between China and the United States create for the future foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran??"
Research Hypothesis: The process and outcome of U.S.-China competition will open strategic arenas before the Islamic Republic of Iran. This, in turn, will create distinct scenarios for Iran, among which choices must be made. These choices will determine the capacities and possibilities of Iran's foreign policy.
Methodology: This study aims to explore this hypothesis through the lens of power transition theory and future studies models. In this theoretical framework, the international order arises from the interaction of power dynamics, interests, and the satisfaction of actors, which create a hierarchical structure. At the top of this system are major powers that derive the most satisfaction from the current situation. Following them are emerging powers, which, with the rapid growth of their power indicators, seek to increase their share and influence in the global order. In this context, the stability of this system is based not only on the number of satisfied countries but also on the overall power and interests of all actors within this order. Therefore, when one of the emerging great powers reaches a level of capability and growth comparable to that of the dominant power and is dissatisfied with the status quo, the likelihood of conflict and challenges with the dominant power will increase. In such circumstances, the risk tolerance of both sides in maintaining or changing the existing order will determine future trends.
Understanding future perspectives requires the use of scenario writing in future studies to incorporate changes in the structure of the international system and the dynamics of actors' actions into a dynamic depiction of potential futures. By employing this method and drawing on theoretical data from power transition theory, three scenarios for the future of the international order are outlined:
Continuation of the existing order.
Confrontation between the two powers leading to a decisive war.
Change of the dominant power and the establishment of a new order.
Results and discussion: While these three potential futures present three different forms of relations among great powers, there is a fundamental commonality among them: contrary to perspectives based on the external appearances of order—such as norms, customs, and formal and informal institutions—the fundamental rule of "unequal and hierarchical distribution of power among countries" is a common element in all three scenarios. It is also clear that the two scenarios of the continuation of the existing order and its change depict simple and understandable forms of the future. However, the second scenario, involving a confrontation in a decisive war, is the most complex situation, yet it is not a stable situation and will ultimately lead to a pathway for either transformation or the continuation of the international order. This is the context within which Iran's foreign policy must align itself in its future outlook.
In this context, Iran faces two general choices. First, it can engage as an actor in the international order, adjusting its relations with great powers by accepting the established rules. Second, as a revolutionary state that views this order as unjust—seeing it as a hierarchical structure based on power—Iran can oppose the prevailing logic, rules, and practices both implicitly and explicitly. While the second choice is straightforward, it carries significant costs. Ultimately, this approach may prevent Iran from leveraging the opportunities presented by the transitional period, leaving it vulnerable to challenges from the dominant power in the order, whether that be the U.S. or China.
If Iran opts to participate in the international order, its choices and policymaking will influence its position in either of these futures, as well as the benefits and drawbacks it may encounter. From a policymaking perspective, three behavioral models can be envisioned for Iran's role during this transitional period: first, participation in the U.S. plan; second, indecision or neutrality; and third, participation in the Chinese plan. These approaches, combined with potential future scenarios, will shape Iran's strategic choices in this period, ultimately defining the framework for its strategic decisions.
Among Iran's strategic options, two are identified as potential losses or mistakes. The first is engaging with the Chinese plan without a thorough assessment of the international system, particularly when conditions are not conducive to a hegemonic shift. The second is aligning with the U.S. plan at a time when U.S. hegemony is in decline.
Additionally, two similar options arise from Iran's inaction during this transitional period. In both scenarios, Iran's lack of decisive action leads to a continuation of its strategic isolation, albeit with slight variations. In the first case, adopting a neutral stance (or, more accurately, a non-responsive position) regarding the renewal of U.S. hegemony will perpetuate this isolation. However, this does not imply that the costs of opposing the U.S. will diminish.
Among the options related to the change or continuation of the international order, two choices stand out: forming an alliance with the U.S. in a scenario where it retains hegemony, or aligning with China in a future where it ascends to dominance. While these options differ fundamentally in execution, they may yield similar outcomes in practice. By leveraging a structural relationship with the prevailing order and the dominant hegemon, Iran could evolve from being a regional actor to one positioned between regional and international power. However, the feasibility and prerequisites for implementing these two strategies will differ significantly.
The most challenging scenario for action arises when the prospect of conflict, confrontation, or decisive war between the U.S. and China emerges, with the caveat that Iran is not a party in this conflict. This historical moment presents pivotal opportunities and significant risks in foreign policy for regional powers like Iran. Aligning with either of these powers places Iran on opposing sides, and the defeat of the chosen power would result in a strategic loss for Iran. Conversely, adopting a stance of neutrality and patience would lead to a lack of benefits from the evolving international order.
In addition to these strategic choices, a darker scenario could emerge for Iran. Here, Iran's role "in and around" the order becomes closely tied to the potential for a decisive war affecting the international system. This shift indicates that international conditions may evolve such that Iran becomes a battleground for rival powers. This situation stems from the unique nature of Iran's foreign policy, which is shaped by its geopolitical context and the systemic pressures of the existing international order. Such pressures suggest that if any of the outlined scenarios occur—regardless of the conflict's origins—a systemic war could ensue, with consequences that extend beyond Iran and take on international dimensions. This represents a tempestuous situation where the onset of regional conflict transforms the landscape of the international order.
Examining the array of potential futures reveals the complexity of these conditions. It is anticipated that, for at least the next decade and a half, the United States will remain the dominant power in the international order, facing no serious challenge from China. This implies that Iran will continue to engage with the U.S. for a minimum of 10 to 15 more years. If the foundational elements of Iran’s foreign policy remain unchanged during this period, a shift in Iran's stance toward the U.S. is unlikely. Consequently, Iran will persist in its challenge against the U.S., facing ongoing pressures to conform to the behavioral expectations set by the U.S. within its defined rules.
The prospects for the next decade, coupled with China’s emergence as a stronger player (though not a challenger to the U.S.), will create a context for aligning the interests of both nations. However, it would be a mistake to assume that China and Iran will form a strategic alliance or coalition against the U.S. China is unlikely to engage in any relationship that might provoke tension with the U.S. until it has clear assurance of victory in its competition with America.
Nonetheless, Iran's actions against the U.S. and the establishment of a controlled level of tension between the two countries may be tolerated, as this could redirect U.S. strategic attention toward China. Such conditions could facilitate a systemic shift in favor of China in the years following 2030.
Conclusion: Given these circumstances, it is important to recognize that Iran cannot indefinitely maintain its role as a player within the current international order. Therefore, it must strategically position itself for a long-term coalition with either the architect of the international order or the eventual victor in the U.S.-China competition. This path must be chosen carefully, with continuous evaluations of potential futures to ensure alignment with Iran's national interests.