Given the increasing complexity of hydropolitical interactions in shared and transboundary watersheds, water issues have become increasingly significant in Iran’s relations with the countries surrounding the Aras River. Using the framework of hydropolitical self-organization, this study employs a dynamic approach to explain how the actions, unilateral decisions, and institutional mechanisms of upstream countries (Turkey and Armenia) reproduce patterns of conflict, competition, or cooperation within this basin, and how Iran’s water diplomacy can play an effective role in this self-organizing system. The research method is descriptive-analytical, based on official documents, reports from the Majlis Research Center, and data from the Ministry of Energy. The findings indicate that the quantitative and qualitative reduction of water, alterations to the river’s natural course, numerous dam constructions, and extensive upstream exploitation have acted as “self-organized drivers,” fostering competition-oriented patterns in the basin. A historical review of interactions also reveals that since 2016, Iran’s water diplomacy has lacked sufficient initiative, exacerbating conflictual self-organizing forces in the basin. Consequently, As a result, activating Iran's water diplomacy in the areas of fair distribution, water quality management, and regulation of upstream interventions is an urgent necessity; otherwise, the self-organized hydropolitical structure of the Aras Basin will move towards further hydropolitical tensions and challenges.
Keywords: Interaction and Conflict Patterns, Iran and Its Neighbors, Transboundary Aras Basin, Water Diplomacy, Hydropolitical Self-Organization

Extended Abstract
Introduction
Transboundary water becomes a strategic and political issue as it crosses national borders, and upstream countries’ unilateral actions can generate significant tensions. In Asia-and in Iran in particular-limited water resources and unbalanced exploitation have made the management of shared rivers increasingly complex. The Aras Basin, where Iran lies mostly downstream, is especially vulnerable due to expanding dam construction in upstream states. This article, using a hydro-political self-organization approach, analyzes the dynamics of conflict and cooperation in the Aras Basin and assesses Iran’s water diplomacy capacities.
Research Question
How do the interactions, unilateral decisions, and institutional mechanisms of upstream countries in the Aras Basin reproduce patterns of conflict, competition, or cooperation, and how can Iran’s water diplomacy effectively operate within a self-organizing hydropolitical structure to manage these dynamics?
Research Hypothesis
It appears that the unilateral decisions, extensive dam construction, and intensive upstream water exploitation by Turkey and Armenia-acting as self-organizing drivers-have reinforced conflict-oriented patterns in the Aras Basin. The lack of sufficient initiative in Iran’s water diplomacy since 2016 has further intensified these dynamics. Therefore, activating Iran’s water diplomacy in areas such as equitable water allocation, water quality management, and regulation of upstream interventions can redirect the basin’s self-organizing hydropolitical structure from conflict toward cooperation.
Methodology (and Theoretical Framework if there are)
The conceptual framework of this study is based on the “hydropolitical self-organization” approach, which views transboundary basins as dynamic, non-centralized systems that reproduce patterns of cooperation, competition, or conflict through the interaction of structural, institutional, and actor-based drivers. In the Aras Basin, upstream dam construction, weak joint institutions, and unilateral actions by riparian states have pushed the system toward competitive and conflict-oriented patterns. Alongside this perspective, the concepts of hydro-hegemony and water diplomacy further clarify how power asymmetries, institutional arrangements, and discursive dynamics shape inter-state water relations. The research employs a descriptive-analytical method and relies on documentary and library data. Using qualitative content analysis, the study reconstructs hydropolitical dynamics and evaluates the role of Iran’s water diplomacy in the basin.
Results and discussion
The Aras Basin, due to its transboundary structure, inherently generates self-organizing patterns of hydropolitical conflict driven by upstream dam construction, flow alteration, and pollution by Turkey and Armenia. Weak institutional frameworks and outdated treaties—ranging from the 1828 Turkmenchay Treaty to late-Soviet and post-2014 agreements—lack adaptive, data-driven, and enforceable mechanisms to regulate new structural pressures. The partial inactivity of joint commissions, poor data exchange, and the absence of continuous monitoring have reduced the basin’s institutional resilience. Since the mid-2010s, Iran’s decline in active water diplomacy has removed a key stabilizing force in negotiations, monitoring, and operational coordination. This passivity has allowed upstream actors to unilaterally reshape flow regimes and redefine water-use narratives without Iranian counter-balancing. Consequently, the basin’s hydropolitical system self-organizes toward instability, reinforcing competition, asymmetry, and downstream vulnerability.
Conclusion
The analysis of the Aras Basin shows that upstream unilateral actions and dam construction by Turkey and Armenia—combined with weak institutional mechanisms—have reinforced conflict-oriented dynamics and placed Iran in a passive position. Reduced river flow, increasing pollution, and the absence of joint monitoring have further intensified environmental and competitive pressures. However, revitalizing institutional cooperation—such as reactivating the Aras Joint Commission, establishing a monitoring system, and engaging Iran more actively in upstream negotiations—can help curb these tensions. Strengthening water diplomacy and joint mechanisms is essential for shifting the basin from conflict toward sustainable cooperation.