International Quarterly of Foreign Relations

International Quarterly of Foreign Relations

The Emerging Architecture of the Geopolitics of Technology: A Comparative Analysis of the Balance of Technological Power between the United States and China

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Mostafa Esmaili 1
Amir abbas Rokni 2
1 Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, National Defense University, Tehran, Iran
2 PhD Candidate in National Security, National Defense University, Tehran, Iran
10.22034/fr.2026.560142.1732
Abstract
Technological rivalry between the United States and China has become one of the principal arenas for the redistribution of power in the international system. The central problem of this study concerns the relationship between this rivalry and the continuity or relative decline of American technological hegemony, and how it may affect the trajectory of transformation in the global balance of power. The research question is formulated as follows: has China’s technological rise been able to narrow the scope of the United States’ historical superiority in strategic domains of technology, and what implications does this transformation hold for the emerging global order? The article hypothesizes that the United States continues to retain an effective advantage in the foundational layers of innovation, including advanced semiconductor design, influential scientific production, venture capital, cloud infrastructure, and global rule making capacity. China, however, has developed independent capacities for generating technological power by relying on centralized industrial policy, the development of indigenous supply chains, the expansion of digital infrastructure, industrial applications of artificial intelligence, and data governance, thereby reducing part of its historical gap with the United States. The conceptual framework of the study is grounded in the interconnection between structural power, international political economy, and structural realism, and analyzes technology as a mechanism for producing, consolidating, and redistributing power. The research method is qualitative, descriptive, and analytical. Using a comparative case study approach, the study compares the positions of the two countries across four domains: semiconductors, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure and telecommunications standards, and data governance and the innovation ecosystem.The data are collected from official reports, policy documents, peer reviewed academic sources, data from international organizations, and patent databases. The findings indicate that the technological rivalry between the two countries has not resulted in the full replacement of one power by another, yet it has led to the relative erosion of certain American advantages and to the emergence of new centers of technological rule making, production, and dependency formation. The outcome of this transformation is the emergence of the geopolitics of technology. In this condition, control over supply chains, technical standards, data flows, digital infrastructure, and technological alliances becomes one of the most important mechanisms for the redistribution of power in the international system.

Extended Abstract
Introduction
Technological rivalry between the United States and China has become one of the principal arenas through which power is being redistributed in the contemporary international system. Over the twentieth century, the United States consolidated its technological hegemony through dominance in semiconductors, computing, the internet, aerospace, research universities, venture capital, and global standard setting. This accumulated technological advantage helped sustain American structural power across economic, military, institutional, and normative domains. China’s rise has introduced a new structural challenge to this configuration. Through long term industrial policy, large scale state investment, the mobilization of a vast domestic market, the expansion of digital infrastructure, and the development of indigenous innovation capacities, China has gradually narrowed parts of the technological gap with the United States. The resulting rivalry extends beyond market competition and industrial upgrading. It increasingly involves control over supply chains, access to critical technologies, data governance, technical standards, export controls, innovation ecosystems, and the institutional rules that shape the global circulation of technology. The article therefore examines technological competition as a structural process that affects the balance of power and the emerging architecture of global order.
Research Question
The central research question of the article is as follows: to what extent has China’s technological rise narrowed the historical technological superiority of the United States in strategic domains of technology, and what implications does this transformation hold for the emerging global order? This question is situated at the intersection of international political economy, security studies, and technology governance. It asks whether the United States is experiencing a relative decline in technological hegemony, whether China has developed independent sources of technological power, and how these developments affect the distribution of power in the international system. The article also investigates whether technological competition between the two powers should be understood as a simple replacement of one hegemon by another or as a more complex, gradual, and multidimensional redistribution of technological advantages across different layers of the global innovation system.
Research Hypothesis
The article advances the hypothesis that the United States continues to retain an effective advantage in the foundational layers of technological power, including advanced semiconductor design, high impact scientific production, venture capital networks, cloud infrastructure, platform based innovation, and global rule making capacity. At the same time, China has developed independent capacities for generating technological power by relying on centralized industrial policy, the localization of supply chains, the expansion of digital infrastructure, industrial applications of artificial intelligence, large scale data resources, and an increasingly active role in technical standard setting. The hypothesis therefore does not assume a complete displacement of American technological hegemony by China. It argues instead that the balance of technological power is being reconfigured through the relative erosion of certain American advantages, the rise of Chinese capacities in specific domains, and the emergence of new centers of technological production, rule making, dependency formation, and infrastructural control.
Methodology (and Theoretical Framework if there are)
The study adopts a qualitative, descriptive, and analytical methodology based on a comparative case study of the United States and China. The unit of analysis is the set of national technological policies, capabilities, institutional arrangements, and strategic achievements of the two countries between 2000 and 2025. The data are drawn from official reports, policy documents, peer reviewed academic literature, international organization datasets, patent repositories, and institutional studies on technology, economic security, innovation, and global governance. The comparative analysis focuses on four core domains: semiconductors and technology supply chains, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure and telecommunications standards, and data governance and the innovation ecosystem. These domains were selected because they represent different layers of technological power, from hardware and computing foundations to data regulation, infrastructural control, and institutionalized innovation.
The conceptual framework of the article is grounded in the interconnection between structural power, international political economy, and structural realism. From the perspective of structural power, technological dominance is not limited to the production of advanced tools. It becomes politically significant when a state can shape innovation pathways, intellectual property regimes, data infrastructures, technical standards, access rules, supply chains, and governance models. International political economy explains technology as part of the global structures of production, capital, trade, and knowledge. Structural realism clarifies why states treat sensitive technologies as strategic assets linked to relative power, military capability, economic security, industrial resilience, and deterrence. The article also draws on geoeconomics and economic statecraft to explain how export controls, investment restrictions, industrial subsidies, sanctions, intellectual property rules, and standard setting have become instruments of strategic competition. Within this framework, the geopolitics of technology is not treated as a prior assumption. It emerges as the analytical outcome of the comparative findings.
Results and discussion
The findings show that the United States retains significant advantages in the most foundational layers of technological power. In semiconductors, American firms and allied partners continue to dominate crucial parts of the value chain, including advanced chip design, electronic design automation software, high end manufacturing equipment, intellectual property, and the alliance networks that support the global semiconductor ecosystem. The United States has also used export controls and coordination with allies such as the Netherlands and Japan to restrict China’s access to advanced chips and manufacturing equipment. China, however, has responded by treating semiconductors as a central pillar of technological self reliance. It has expanded national funding mechanisms, supported domestic firms, pursued supply chain localization, and used its leverage over critical materials such as gallium and germanium as part of a broader strategy of technological resilience. The semiconductor sector therefore illustrates how supply chain chokepoints have become instruments of power.
In artificial intelligence, the United States remains the leader in frontier innovation, large language models, advanced computing infrastructure, venture capital, and globally influential platforms. American firms such as Google, Microsoft, OpenAI, Meta, and Nvidia occupy central positions in the ecosystem that supports advanced artificial intelligence. China’s strength lies in a different configuration of technological power. It benefits from large scale data resources, rapid deployment capacity, state supported industrial strategy, smart city applications, and the integration of artificial intelligence into manufacturing, governance, and security related domains. The main constraint on China remains its dependence on advanced chips and certain elements of the global software and research ecosystem. This makes artificial intelligence competition inseparable from semiconductor competition.
In digital infrastructure and telecommunications standards, the rivalry is centered on connectivity, data flows, technical standards, and long term infrastructural dependence. The United States has historically shaped the foundational architecture of the internet through its firms, universities, platforms, cloud infrastructure, satellite systems, and technical institutions. China has challenged parts of this dominance through telecommunications equipment, fifth generation mobile networks, smart cities, and future oriented infrastructure projects. Huawei’s rise and China’s large domestic deployment of fifth generation networks have strengthened Beijing’s position in global telecommunications markets and standard setting debates. The competition over sixth generation networks and satellite internet shows that the struggle over digital infrastructure increasingly extends from terrestrial networks to space based systems.
In data governance and innovation ecosystems, the United States and China represent two distinct models. The American model relies heavily on private sector leadership, platform capitalism, venture capital, open innovation networks, and relatively decentralized data governance. China’s model emphasizes state authority over data, cyber sovereignty, data localization, algorithmic governance, and the integration of digital infrastructure with national security and industrial strategy. The comparison shows that technological power is also produced through legal rules, regulatory authority, platform governance, and the ability to define how data are collected, stored, transferred, and used.
The article also finds that technological rivalry is not confined to the bilateral relationship between Washington and Beijing. The European Union, India, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and other specialized actors influence the direction of this rivalry. The European Union shapes the regulatory environment through data protection, platform regulation, digital market rules, and industrial initiatives such as the European Chips Act. India offers a distinct model of digital public infrastructure and seeks to benefit from supply chain reconfiguration while preserving strategic autonomy. South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan control crucial nodes in semiconductor production, materials, equipment, and manufacturing capacity. These actors make the emerging technological order more multicentric and asymmetric.
Conclusion
The article concludes that technological rivalry between the United States and China has become a structural mechanism of power redistribution in the international system. The findings do not support a simple narrative of American decline or Chinese replacement. They instead point to a more complex pattern in which the United States retains major advantages in foundational innovation, advanced computing, semiconductor design, venture capital, platforms, and global alliances, while China has strengthened its position in industrial scaling, digital infrastructure, data driven applications, supply chain localization, and state directed technological mobilization. The central theoretical contribution of the article is the formulation of the geopolitics of technology as an emergent condition in which control over supply chains, standards, data flows, digital infrastructure, innovation systems, and technological alliances becomes a key mechanism for shaping global power. The future of international order will therefore be shaped by the tension between interdependence and control, cooperation and rivalry, technological openness and strategic autonomy. Technology has moved from the margins of international political economy to the center of great power competition.
Keywords
Technological Hegemony
United States
China’s Rise
Geopolitics of Technology
Global Power Redistribution
Emerging World Order
Subjects
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