International Quarterly of Foreign Relations

International Quarterly of Foreign Relations

The Naturalization of Hegemony in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Discourse Analysis of Democratic and Republican Narratives in the Post-Cold War Era

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Hossein Salimi 1
Seyed Reza Taghavinejad 2
1 Professor, International Relations , Allameh Tabataba’I University, Tehran, Iran.
2 PhD Student, International Relations, University of Allameh Tabataba’I, Tehran, Iran.
10.22034/fr.2026.560454.1733
Abstract
This article examines how U.S. hegemony in the post-Cold War era has been discursively naturalized across Democratic and Republican foreign policy narratives. Drawing on Neo-Gramscian theory and Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis, the study analyzes National Security Strategies and selected presidential speeches from the Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. It argues that U.S. hegemonic discourse operates through three interrelated pillars: liberalism/globalization, American exceptionalism, and threat/enemy construction. These pillars respectively naturalize the structure of U.S.-led order, the actor of hegemony, and the actions taken in its name. The findings show that partisan differences do not necessarily indicate a rupture in the hegemonic project; rather, they represent tactical variations in its reproduction. Democrats tend to emphasize multilateralism, institutional legitimacy, and shared responsibility, while Republicans more often stress moral clarity, strength, and sovereignty. Despite these differences, both narratives contribute to presenting U.S. leadership as necessary, legitimate, and self-evident.
Key Words: Naturalization, Hegemony, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), U.S. Foreign Policy, Ideology, Discursive Mechanisms, Norman Fairclough, Neo-Gramscian.

Extended Abstract
Introduction:
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union placed the United States in an unprecedented position of global dominance. Mainstream International Relations theories have often explained this moment through material factors such as military superiority, economic capacity, institutional influence, and technological advantage. Although these elements are essential, they do not fully explain how the U.S.-led order has remained legitimate, adaptable, and widely accepted across different administrations and changing global conditions.
This article addresses the problem of consent in the reproduction of hegemony. Material power can explain coercion, but it cannot sufficiently explain why a hierarchical international order is presented and accepted as normal, necessary, or beneficial. From a Gramscian perspective, hegemony is not merely domination; it is a form of leadership that becomes embedded in common sense. Accordingly, this study examines how U.S. foreign policy discourse transforms historically contingent political choices into apparently natural realities. The central analytical focus is naturalization, understood through Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis as the ideological process through which power relations are depoliticized and represented as neutral, inevitable, and self-evident.
Research Question
The main research question is: How do ideological-discursive mechanisms function to naturalize U.S. hegemonic foreign policy in the post-Cold War era?
This question is examined through two subsidiary questions:

What are the core ideological pillars of U.S. hegemonic discourse, and how do they contribute to the naturalization of U.S. dominance?
How do Democratic and Republican administrations articulate these pillars differently while reproducing the same broader hegemonic project?

Research Hypothesis
The article argues that U.S. hegemony is naturalized through three interrelated ideological-discursive pillars: liberalism/globalization, American exceptionalism, and threat/enemy construction. These pillars respectively naturalize the structure of hegemony, the actor of hegemony, and the actions of hegemony. Liberalism and globalization present the U.S.-led international order as universal and inevitable; American exceptionalism presents U.S. leadership as indispensable; and threat construction presents coercive policies as necessary responses to danger. The article further hypothesizes that partisan differences between Democratic and Republican administrations do not indicate the collapse of hegemony, but rather demonstrate its adaptation through competing discursive strategies.
Methodology and Theoretical Framework
This study employs a qualitative, theory-driven thematic analysis. The theoretical framework combines Neo-Gramscian theory with Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis. The Neo-Gramscian approach, especially the works of Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, is used to conceptualize hegemony as a combination of material capabilities, institutions, and ideas. It also helps identify the ideological content of U.S. hegemony, particularly liberal internationalism, market-oriented globalization, American exceptionalism, and security-centered narratives of threat.
Fairclough’s CDA provides the analytical lens for examining how these ideological contents operate discursively. In this framework, ideology is understood as meaning in the service of power, and hegemony is viewed as an unstable and contested equilibrium. The concept of naturalization is central because it explains how political projects are transformed into common sense.
The data corpus consists mainly of the National Security Strategies of post-Cold War U.S. administrations—Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden—supplemented by selected presidential speeches and official foreign policy statements. The analysis identifies the textual manifestations of the three ideological pillars and examines how they contribute to the normalization of U.S. global leadership.
Results and Discussion
The findings indicate that the three ideological pillars operate together to naturalize different dimensions of U.S. hegemony.
First, liberalism and globalization naturalize the structure of the U.S.-led order. Across different administrations, institutions and arrangements such as the WTO, IMF, NATO, and the “rules-based international order” are represented not as historically specific political projects, but as neutral and universal mechanisms for peace, prosperity, and stability. Democratic administrations often articulate this discourse through multilateralism, cooperation, interdependence, and democracy promotion. Republican administrations more frequently connect it to freedom, market openness, security, and strategic leadership. Despite these differences, both versions present the U.S.-led order as the natural framework of global stability and thereby depoliticize its power relations.
Second, American exceptionalism naturalizes the actor of hegemony. U.S. leadership is rarely represented as the interest of one state among others; rather, it is framed as a responsibility, mission, or necessity derived from America’s unique identity. Democratic administrations tend to emphasize reluctant leadership, international responsibility, and the defense of universal values. Republican administrations, particularly under George W. Bush, articulate exceptionalism through moral clarity, freedom, and the transformative role of American power. Trump’s discourse modifies this pattern by stressing sovereignty, strength, and national advantage, yet it still presupposes a privileged U.S. position in defining legitimate order. Thus, different versions of exceptionalism continue to make U.S. leadership appear necessary and distinctive.
Third, threat and enemy construction naturalizes the actions of hegemony. Policies such as military intervention, sanctions, containment, deterrence, and alliance expansion are framed as defensive responses to danger rather than as political choices. In the Clinton era, threats were constructed around rogue states, weapons proliferation, and transnational instability. Under George W. Bush, threat discourse was moralized through terrorism, the “axis of evil,” and the struggle between freedom and tyranny. Obama’s discourse shifted toward failed states, terrorist networks, and targeted security governance. Under Biden, China and Russia are increasingly represented as systemic and strategic challengers to the international order. These changing threat narratives adapt U.S. security discourse to new contexts while preserving the assumption that American action is necessary, defensive, and stabilizing.
The comparison of Democratic and Republican narratives shows that partisan differences should not be understood simply as contradictions. Rather, they represent different articulations of the same hegemonic project. Democrats tend to naturalize hegemony through multilateralism, legal-institutional language, and shared responsibility, while Republicans more often rely on moral binaries, military strength, sovereignty, and national resolve. Yet both reproduce the assumption that U.S. leadership is indispensable to global order.
Conclusion
This article concludes that the persistence of U.S. hegemony in the post-Cold War era is not only a result of material power, but also a discursive achievement. Liberalism/globalization, American exceptionalism, and threat construction work together to naturalize the structure, actor, and actions of U.S. hegemony. They present the U.S.-led order as universal, American leadership as necessary, and coercive policies as unavoidable responses to danger.
By bridging Neo-Gramscian theory and Faircloughian CDA, the study shows how hegemonic ideology operates not only through explicit justification but also through the production of common sense. The discursive differences between Democratic and Republican administrations are therefore best understood as tactical variations within a broader hegemonic continuity. In this sense, discursive struggle does not necessarily indicate hegemonic decline; it can also function as a mechanism through which hegemony adapts, renews itself, and maintains legitimacy.
Keywords
Naturalization
U.S. Foreign Policy
Ideology
Discursive Mechanisms
Norman Fairclough
Neo-Gramscian
Subjects
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