The expansion of China’s multilateral engagements with Iran, followed by Tehran’s admission as a permanent member of BRICS in 2021, can be interpreted as a step toward closer alignment between the two states in an effort to balance against the legitimacy of Western unilateralism—foremost that of the United States. The continuation of bilateral interactions has been largely shaped by the interests each state has articulated based on its domestic imperatives. These interests determine their respective patterns of balancing vis-à-vis the hegemon and inform their behavior within BRICS. Accordingly, this study seeks, through the lens of the Balance of Interests theory and using a qualitative analytical–comparative method, to examine the nature of China’s and Iran’s balancing strategies against the Western-led international order through the BRICS institution. The central argument is that China—benefiting from the advantages of the hegemonic system, possessing a peace-seeking strategic culture, and embracing pluralism in its external relations and development models—is revisionist yet inclined toward delegated balancing and calibrated accommodation through a strategy of “regulated resistance.” In contrast, Iran—due to structural pressures, a justice-oriented strategic culture, and a moralized approach to external engagement—tends toward a strategy of full balancing. The manifestation of this divergence within BRICS appears in differences concerning the depth of de-dollarization, relative advantages sought, and the very definition of the group’s identity and purpose. These dynamics have subsequently shaped the trajectory of multilateral cooperation within BRICS.
Keywords: Balance of Interests, Unilateralism, BRICS, Western Institutions, Multilateralism
 
Extended Abstract
Introduction: This study addresses the evolving geopolitical landscape and the relative decline of Western hegemony, particularly that of the United States, by analyzing the strategic positioning of China and Iran vis-à-vis the Western-led international order. The increasing convergence between these two nations through multilateral frameworks such as the BRICS group is interpreted as a reactive strategy to the West’s unilateralism in economic, political, and cultural spheres. While the United States continues to employ instruments such as the dollar and Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank) to reinforce its hegemonic influence, emerging powers like Iran and China aim to redefine global governance through institutional innovation and regional cooperation. Iran’s permanent membership in BRICS and China's growing role in alternative institutional development serve as clear indicators of this strategic shift.
Research Hypothesis: Employing the analytical framework of neoclassical realism—specifically Schweller’s theory of “Balance of Interests”—this research proposes a central hypothesis: China, due to its domestic structure, strategic culture, and systemic benefits from the existing international order, tends toward soft balancing through accommodation, delegation, and cautious reformism. Iran, by contrast, faced with existential threats and shaped by revolutionary ideology and economic sanctions, predominantly adopts a hard balancing strategy based on resistance and deterrence. The analysis is structured around four key domestic-level variables influencing foreign policy behavior: (1) Elite consensus on perceived threats; (2) Societal perception of threats; (3) Legitimacy of the governing regime; (4) Strategic coherence among decision-makers. These variables explain the diverging behavioral patterns of China and Iran in their engagement with the Western-led global system and multilateral mechanisms such as BRICS.
Results and Discussion: (1) Domestic-Level Drivers of Foreign Policy; In China, a centralized political system, Confucian strategic culture, and prioritization of economic development have led to a foreign policy marked by legalist caution and incremental reform. The Chinese leadership, particularly under Xi Jinping, simultaneously recognizes the utility of cooperating with Western institutions while criticizing their hegemonic tendencies, especially in matters such as human rights and regional sovereignty (e.g., Taiwan, the South China Sea). As a result, China seeks to amend, rather than replace, the liberal order—favoring multilateralism as a tool for gradually diluting Western dominance. In contrast, Iran’s strategic culture, shaped by the Islamic Revolution, eight years of imposed war, and a defensive ideological narrative, promotes a more assertive posture. The Iranian elite largely perceives the Western order as inherently exploitative and threatening to its independence. This perception, amplified by extensive sanctions and international isolation, compels Iran to pursue a policy of strategic autonomy and resistance, epitomized in its "Look to the East" doctrine and alignment with like-minded states. (2) Modes of Balancing Toward the Western System; China, owing to its substantial economic entanglement with the West and its preference for strategic prudence, engages in “soft balancing” via mechanisms such as BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These efforts aim to incrementally erode U.S. dominance while avoiding direct confrontation. China’s balancing strategy is described as a “legalized resistance,” utilizing international law and institutional participation to challenge unilateralism without provoking systemic backlash. Iran, by contrast, derives little benefit from the Western system due to its exclusion from global markets and financial networks. Consequently, its balancing strategy is more radical and confrontational, seeking a complete overhaul or replacement of the existing order. For Tehran, institutions like BRICS are not supplementary but alternative avenues to circumvent Western control, achieve economic resilience, and reaffirm its sovereign right to independent development. (3) BRICS Engagement: A Comparative Perspective; The study further analyzes the strategic behavior of China and Iran within BRICS across four key domains:
 •Monetary Reform and De-Dollarization: Iran aggressively promotes de-dollarization and views BRICS as a platform to undermine U.S. financial hegemony. China, while exploring digital currency alternatives and regional payment systems, approaches dollar replacement with caution due to its large dollar reserves and economic interdependence with the U.S.
 •Democratization of Financial Institutions: China views BRICS as a complementary instrument for gradual reform of existing institutions such as the WTO and IMF. Iran, on the other hand, envisions BRICS as a revolutionary space to bypass Western-imposed financial constraints. Tehran's inability to access loans from BRICS financial arms, however, highlights the limitations of this vision and China's reticence to jeopardize its global economic standing.
 •Energy Security and Transition: As a major hydrocarbon producer, Iran seeks to leverage its BRICS membership to stabilize global energy markets and attract investment in its oil and gas infrastructure. China, the group’s largest energy consumer, prefers bilateral agreements and emphasizes investments in renewable energy technologies where it enjoys a competitive edge. This asymmetry limits deep collaboration in fossil fuel-based energy security.
 •Sustainable Development and Anti-Interventionism: Both countries converge in rejecting Western definitions of development and human rights, advocating instead for non-intervention and sovereign-based development models. China promotes its “Beijing Consensus” as a counter-narrative to the “Washington Consensus,” while Iran has proposed establishing a BRICS security commission to address terrorism, extremism, and digital threats multilaterally.
Conclusion: By applying the theory of balance of interests, the study concludes that both China and Iran are revisionist states, albeit with divergent strategies. China’s behavior reflects a measured, long-term approach to revising global governance, preserving its systemic advantages while avoiding open conflict. Iran, facing existential threats and systemic exclusion, adopts a maximalist position that prioritizes resistance over accommodation.
This divergence explains the differing expectations and outcomes within BRICS. China, as the group’s economic anchor, directs its engagement with institutional conservatism, while Iran hopes for rapid systemic change and strategic support. Despite their shared opposition to Western hegemony, the gap in their respective balancing strategies—soft versus hard—constrains the full realization of Iran’s goals within BRICS. Ultimately, Iran’s ability to extract meaningful benefits from BRICS hinges on two critical factors: (1) Alignment with the pragmatic tempo of other members (especially China and India). (2) A calibrated strategy that blends ideological conviction with geopolitical realism. This nuanced understanding of China–Iran relations within multilateralism helps illuminate the broader dynamics of global power transition in a post-unipolar world.