Introduction

With the rise of China as a major power, the structure and dynamics of the international system have undergone profound transformations. Whereas global power was once concentrated in a limited number of Western states, China has now emerged as an influential actor shaping international outcomes. Through a range of global initiatives and strategic projects, Beijing has expanded its influence significantly, prompting many countries to pursue multifaceted strategic relations in order to leverage China’s growing capacities and maximize their national interests.

At the same time, the expansion of such interactions and the increasing complexity of international relations—particularly with China’s enhanced role—have imposed new constraints on states seeking to achieve their objectives. Among the most critical of these is the need for an accurate and coherent understanding of China’s foreign policy realities and its underlying behavioral logic.

From one perspective, China’s rise is often interpreted as a form of systemic rivalry with the West, led by the United States—an interpretation that has even led some to speak of a “new Cold War.” This can be described as a predominantly Western perception. However, alternative interpretations also exist, including the Chinese self-representation as a “responsible power.” Such competing narratives can serve as foundations for policymaking in other countries. The nature of interactions between states ultimately depends on which perception dominates the mind of decision-makers. Therefore, developing a nationally grounded and empirically informed perspective is essential for any country, including Iran.

In this context, the growing power of China has generated expectations within the Islamic Republic of Iran that closer ties with Beijing might help shift the balance of power in the Middle East in Iran’s favor. While some of Iran’s political elite hold such expectations, China’s actual behavior in the region does not consistently support this view. In some cases, Beijing has acted in ways that not match with Iranian expectations. This discrepancy suggests that Iranian elite perceptions of China’s behavior are, to a considerable extent, misaligned with both empirical realities and prevailing Chinese and international discourses. Accordingly, this study seeks to explain how such misperceptions have formed and to propose ways to address them.



Research Question: How has the perceptual gap in Iran’s understanding of China’s behavioral logic in the international system been formed?



Research Hypothesis: The absence of a clear and coherent discourse on China’s foreign policy priorities, combined with the lack of an indigenous interpretive framework, has led to the formation of deep perceptual gaps, which are further reproduced and reinforced through identity-based and historical factors.



Methodology and Theoretical Framework

This study adopts the assumptions of the qualitative research paradigm and employs a descriptive–developmental method. Using a deductive strategy and drawing on constructivist theory, it examines the formation of Iran’s perceptual gap regarding China’s behavior in the international system. The research adopts is categorized as fundamental, employing a case study approach with a static perspective.

Among theoretical frameworks, Alexander Wendt’s constructivism offers the most suitable lens for analyzing the formation of perceptual gaps. Constructivism occupies a middle ground between rationalist and reflectivist approaches. It emphasizes the role of ideas, identities, and intersubjective meanings, while not dismissing the importance of material realities.

The usefulness of this framework lies in three key aspects. First, it adopts a developmental view of identity and perception, suggesting that these are not formed instantaneously but emerge through ongoing interaction among different interpretations. Second, identities are not fixed; they evolve in response to new information and changing contexts. Third, constructivism recognizes that identities and perceptions are shaped by interpretations of material realities rather than existing independently of them.

Accordingly, this framework enables an analysis of how Iran’s perceptions of China have been constructed and how they might be reconfigured through the reinterpretation of meanings and assumptions. While acknowledging the secondary role of material factors in constructivist theory, this study also considers them to provide a more comprehensive explanation. The analysis therefore proceeds by first outlining China’s actual behavior in the international system, followed by an examination of the factors contributing to the construction of perceptual gaps.



Results and discussion

At a general level, misperceptions stem from an inadequate understanding of both the international environment and China’s foreign policy priorities. China’s strategic orientation can be summarized in three key points. First, economic development and the welfare of its population remain the central priorities of Chinese policymakers. Second, China’s approach toward the United States is primarily competitive rather than confrontational. Third, this competition is defined largely in economic, institutional, and technological domains, with Beijing deliberately avoiding direct military or security rivalry with Washington and its allies.

From this perspective, one major misreading in Iran concerns the nature of China’s competition with the United States. This misunderstanding is partly rooted in Iran’s own security-oriented rivalry with the United States and regional actors, which makes it difficult to accurately interpret China’s strategic calculus. More broadly, the geopolitical pressures and security imperatives of the Middle East have encouraged Iranian policymakers to adopt a predominantly realist lens, through which international politics—and China’s role within it—are viewed primarily in terms of power balancing.

Beyond material factors, several structural issues contribute to these misperceptions: limited proficiency in the Chinese language among Iranian experts, insufficient academic and research exchanges with China, and the dominance of American International Relations literature in Iran. Together, these factors have hindered the development of a nuanced understanding of China’s worldview.

Historical and identity-related factors also play a crucial role. Here, the concept of “Collective Memory,” drawn from cognitive sciences, provides a useful analytical tool. Collective memory refers to the processes through which groups recall and interpret past events, shaping their identities accordingly. Importantly, such memories are constructed through narratives rather than objective historical facts, and groups often resist revising these narratives even when confronted with new evidence.

This insight is particularly relevant in the case of China. In 1979—the same year as Iran’s Islamic Revolution—China initiated sweeping economic and political reforms, fundamentally redefining its identity in the international system. Prior to these reforms, China positioned itself as a revisionist power opposed to the existing order. Afterward, it gradually transformed into a stakeholder within that order, prioritizing economic development and integration.

In contrast, the Islamic Republic of Iran has largely maintained the ideological foundations of its revolution and continues to identify with a different group of states. Despite China’s transformation, elements of Iranian perception still reflect earlier notions of China as a revolutionary or anti-systemic actor. As suggested by the logic of collective memory, such identity-based perceptions are resistant to change. Consequently, Iran may continue to expect forms of behavior from China that no longer align with Beijing’s current identity and strategic priorities.

Addressing these challenges requires several key reactions. First, Iran needs to clearly define China’s position within its foreign policy framework. Ambiguity in this regard—particularly under conditions of international sanctions—can undermine Iran’s strategic interests.

Second, Iran–China relations should be institutionalized and grounded in realistic expectations. Given China’s prioritization of economic development, it is neither feasible nor rational to expect Beijing to engage in security confrontations with the United States on Iran’s behalf or to incur significant geopolitical costs in this context.

Third, a more accurate understanding of the nature of U.S.–China competition is essential. This rivalry is primarily long-term and focused on economic, technological, and institutional domains. Through initiatives of this kind, China seeks not only to advance its strategic goals but also to promote an alternative model of governance—one that emphasizes economic prosperity as a source of legitimacy.



Conclusion

This study identified three main sources of Iran’s misperception of China’s behavioral logic: first, an incomplete understanding of China’s foreign policy and its competition with the United States; second, the absence of an indigenous Iranian framework for interpreting China; and third, the continuity of identity-based assumptions rooted in pre-reform conceptions of China. To address these issues, three policy recommendations were proposed: clarifying China’s role in Iran’s foreign policy, adopting realistic and evidence-based expectations, and developing a more accurate understanding of China’s strategic orientation.

In closing, it is important to emphasize that identities and perceptions are neither fixed nor immutable. As constructivist theory suggests, they evolve in response to new data and interpretations. What is therefore required is a greater emphasis on analyses grounded in empirical realities. In practical terms, this implies prioritizing economic and technological cooperation with China over security-driven expectations. This does not negate the importance of security relations, but rather reflects the current nature of competition and transformation within the international system.