The twelve-day war between the United States and Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran, beyond being a limited military confrontation, brought significant changes to Iran’s strategic environment, particularly the security, economic, and geopolitical dynamics of the Persian Gulf. The war occurred in a regional security environment already shaped by the Gaza crisis, regional rivalries, emerging alliances, expanding security arrangements between Israel and some Arab states, and the continued presence of the United States. Under such circumstances, Iran’s relations with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can no longer be understood solely through bilateral relations and the traditional logic of the balance of power. Rather, these relations are embedded in a multilayered network of security, economic, maritime, energy, transit, and geopolitical linkages. From this perspective, disruption in a strategic link or node may generate consequences extending beyond bilateral relations and affecting the regional network as a whole.

This study aims to explain the reconfiguration of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the GCC states following the twelve-day war and to analyze this transformation within the framework of “realism in a networked environment.” The main research question is: How did the twelve-day war lead to a reconfiguration of Iran’s strategy toward the GCC states, and how can this reconfiguration be explained through the framework of regional network balancing? The study hypothesizes that by exposing Iran’s network vulnerabilities, the twelve-day war encouraged Tehran to recalibrate its economic, maritime, and security linkages, thereby creating conditions for strengthening network balancing and network deterrence.

The theoretical framework of the study is “realism in a networked environment.” This approach retains the fundamental assumptions of realism, including anarchy, state-centrism, the concern for survival, and the importance of power, while reinterpreting them within an environment structured by interconnected security, economic, and geopolitical networks. Within this approach, network position becomes important alongside material capabilities, and the state is analyzed not only as a material unit but also as a node within international relations and flows. Accordingly, network centrality, control over connecting points and chokepoints, link density, and the capacity to reconfigure networks constitute important sources of power. The study adopts a descriptive-analytical method and draws on secondary sources, official documents, library resources, and data concerning regional security, economic, maritime, and diplomatic developments. The data are analyzed through the concepts of network balancing, nodal power, network deterrence, and triangular deterrence.

The findings indicate that the twelve-day war, as a “security-network shock,” contributed to a gradual reconfiguration of Iran’s position within the regional network. First, Iran has sought to strengthen its nodal power and expand its geoeconomic and maritime linkages by leveraging its geographical position adjacent to the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and major maritime routes. In this context, effective connectivity with energy, trade, and transit networks can enhance Iran’s capacity to influence critical flows and strengthen network deterrence. Second, the pattern of balancing has increasingly moved from a traditional model based primarily on the accumulation of hard power toward network balancing. In this process, greater density of regional and extra-regional linkages, maritime engagement, connections to energy and transit routes, and expanding relations with non-Western powers contribute to enhancing Iran’s strategic depth and network centrality.

Third, the strengthening of cooperation and interdependence with GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, through diplomatic and economic relations and regional dialogue, can increase the costs of forming hostile coalitions and escalating regional crises. This process may also shift Iran’s relations with the Gulf states from merely managing disputes toward structuring reciprocal linkages and developing more sustainable mechanisms for managing regional competition. Fourth, the deepening of multilayered relations between Iran and China in the fields of energy, trade, infrastructure, diplomacy, and security creates alternative pathways for Iran and reduces its dependence on networks influenced by Western powers, although the study does not regard this relationship as fully symmetrical. Fifth, deterrence in a networked environment can emerge through the interdependence of interests, critical nodes, and multilayered linkages and may complement conventional deterrence by increasing the costs of crisis escalation for competing actors.

The study concludes that the twelve-day war can be regarded as a significant rupture in the geopolitical dynamics of the Persian Gulf and West Asia, increasing the need to reconsider Iran’s foreign policy pattern. In the post-war period, Iran has maintained the logic of competition and power while moving toward a multilayered policy centered on increasing network density, strengthening nodal power, expanding geoeconomic and maritime linkages, consolidating relations with GCC states, deepening ties with China, and employing network and triangular deterrence. Thus, the transformation identified in this study does not imply abandoning realism or ending regional competition; rather, it reflects a redefinition of realist instruments within an increasingly networked and complex environment. Consequently, the post-war security order in the Persian Gulf appears increasingly characterized by a form of “dynamic equilibrium within overlapping networks,” in which Iran’s position depends substantially on its ability to create, maintain, and reconfigure multilayered linkages.