The conflicts in the South Caucasus, which ultimately led to restrictions on Armenia via the Zangezur Corridor, coinciding with the imposition of sanctions on Iran, created an opportunity. Iran, as the only country capable of supporting Armenia along their shared border, could mitigate the impact of sanctions by designing corridors through Armenia toward Europe. This approach would maintain the geopolitical status quo in its surrounding region while facilitating new transit routes. Theoretical foundations of international transit emphasize that countries can improve their standing by assuming the role of a transit hub. This research aims to examine the potential of the Persian Gulf-Black Sea Corridor to enhance Iran's geopolitical position as an international transit center. The study addresses the following questions: What is the significance of the Persian Gulf-Black Sea Corridor, and how does it impact the enhancement of Iran's geopolitical standing? The research hypothesis posits that the Persian Gulf-Black Sea Corridor significantly facilitates global trade exchanges and holds the potential to transform Iran into a transit hub within the framework of a multi-neighborhood foreign policy. Employing a time-series methodology, the study analyzes the corridor's impact on trade exchanges. The findings indicate that the Persian Gulf-Black Sea Corridor not only improves Iran's trade conditions and elevates its role in international exchanges—thereby helping to overcome geopolitical constraints and reduce the effects of sanctions—but also provides a viable route for trade between India, the Persian Gulf states, and the Black Sea region. Consequently, beyond enhancing Iran's economic diplomacy and preventing adverse geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus, the Persian Gulf-Black Sea Corridor possesses significant potential to upgrade Iran's transit role.

Extended Abstract
Introduction
In the contemporary international system, the significance of international transport corridors transcends mere trade facilitation. They have emerged as instruments of geoeconomic development, geopolitical competition, and even security management. For countries such as Iran, which have been subjected to prolonged economic sanctions and geopolitical containment, the creation and maintenance of alternative transport routes is not only an economic necessity but also a strategic imperative. The Persian Gulf–Black Sea Corridor, proposed in Tehran in 2016, represents one such initiative. It aims to connect the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to the Black Sea through Iran, Armenia, and Georgia, thereby linking the Middle East to Southeast Europe. Unlike other competing projects, such as the Zangezur Corridor promoted by Turkey and Azerbaijan, this corridor highlights the importance of preserving territorial integrity, maintaining regional balance in the South Caucasus, and reinforcing Iran’s centrality in Eurasian connectivity. This extended abstract presents a comprehensive overview of the study on the Persian Gulf–Black Sea Corridor, analyzing its theoretical foundations, geo-economics implications, security and geopolitical impacts, as well as the challenges and policy recommendations for its realization.
Theoretical Framework
From a theoretical standpoint, transport corridors are understood within the framework of transit hubs and network connectivity. International trade networks rely heavily on secure and efficient corridors that reduce costs, shorten delivery times, and provide stability to global supply chains. Countries that successfully position themselves as transit hubs not only accrue economic gains but also elevate their geopolitical status. Corridors also embody security functions. According to theories of complex interdependence, greater connectivity between states reduces the likelihood of conflict and fosters cooperative security frameworks. At the same time, transit hubs act as geopolitical levers: control over key passages such as the Suez Canal or the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates the extent to which corridors can shape international security dynamics. Thus, the Persian Gulf–Black Sea Corridor must be evaluated not only as a geo-economics opportunity but also as a security–geopolitical asset with implications for Iran’s foreign policy, sanctions resilience, and regional balancing strategies.
Methodology The research adopts a quantitative approach using time-series analysis (ARIMA models) to assess trade flows among countries along the prospective corridor. Data were collected from the World Bank and the Observatory of Economic Complexity for the period 2000–2022. The analysis examined three dimensions: Iran’s trade with Black Sea countries; Persian Gulf states’ trade with Black Sea countries; India’s trade with the Black Sea region. The aggregated results were then compared to highlight the potential trade volume that could be channeled through the Persian Gulf–Black Sea route.


Findings The findings underscore the significant potential of the corridor
Iran–Black Sea trade: Despite sanctions, Iran’s exports and imports with Black Sea countries have demonstrated resilience. Notably, exports to Bulgaria increased more than 80-fold during the study period, while imports from Romania and Bulgaria rose sharply after 2018.
Persian Gulf–Black Sea trade
Exports from Gulf countries to the Black Sea region expanded substantially, with most destinations experiencing tenfold growth since 2000. Imports also followed an upward trajectory, highlighting mutual dependence.
India–Black Sea trade: Both exports and imports rose significantly, with Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria serving as major partners. By 2022, India’s trade with the Black Sea countries had multiplied several times over, confirming the region’s attractiveness as a market.
Aggregate potential: The total trade volume among countries that could utilize the corridor reached over USD 23 billion by 2022—six times higher than in 2000. This underscores the corridor’s potential to serve as a major artery of Eurasian trade.
Geoeconomic Analysis: From a geo-economics perspective, the corridor presents several advantages:
Cost and time reduction: Compared to the Suez Canal route, the corridor shortens the distance by 55% and reduces transport costs by approximately 30%. Transit time falls from 42–60 days via Suez to 16–25 days.
Diversification of routes: By reducing dependence on the Suez Canal and Turkey, the corridor lowers risks associated with geopolitical crises and monopolistic control.
Investment opportunities: Infrastructure development in Iran (roads, railways, ports) and Armenia (Southern Armenia Railway) can attract foreign investment and create new logistics hubs.
Regional integration: The corridor fosters “overlapping regionalism,” linking multiple regional clusters (South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, and Southeast Europe) around Iran.
Sanctions resilience: By providing multiple trade pathways, the corridor acts as a structural mechanism to mitigate the impact of sanctions on Iran and its partners.
Security and Geopolitical Analysis: The corridor’s security and geopolitical Implications are equally profound: Sanctions mitigation: The corridor allows Iran to bypass chokepoints vulnerable to Western monitoring and sanctions, such as the Turkish and Suez routes. This diversification makes it harder for sanctions to isolate Iran completely.
South Caucasus balance: Supporting the Armenia–Georgia route strengthens Armenia’s territorial integrity against pressures from Turkey and Azerbaijan, preventing Iran’s isolation through the Zangezur project.
Regional balancing: The corridor counters the Turkish-led Middle Corridor, enabling Iran to maintain strategic relevance in Eurasian connectivity.
Complex interdependence: By linking over 20 countries, the corridor creates economic ties that enhance regional stability and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict.
Diplomatic leverage: Iran’s control over this corridor elevates its bargaining power with the EU, Russia, and even the United States, as excluding Iran would impose higher costs on global trade flows.
Policy Recommendations
To overcome these challenges and realize the corridor, the study proposes:
Infrastructure development: Prioritize the modernization of Iran–Armenia border roads, expansion of Iranian southern ports, and construction of the Armenia–Iran railway.
Multilateral cooperation: Forge agreements among corridor countries for customs harmonization, digital trade facilitation, and security coordination.
Attracting investment: Engage the EU, India, and development banks (e.g., Eurasian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) to co-finance projects.
Active diplomacy: Employ “corridor diplomacy” to ensure political support from Armenia, Georgia, and the EU while counterbalancing rival initiatives.
Security collaboration: Establish joint mechanisms with Armenia and Georgia to safeguard the corridor against regional instability.
Conclusion
The Persian Gulf–Black Sea Corridor is more than a transport initiative; it is a strategic project that intertwines geoeconomics with geopolitics. For Iran, the corridor represents an opportunity to:
v Enhance trade flows and attract investment.
v Mitigate the effects of sanctions by diversifying trade routes.
v Strengthen its strategic position in the South Caucasus.
v Serve as a regional balancer against competing initiatives.
v Transform its geography from a liability into a geo-economics asset.
v By implementing coordinated infrastructural, diplomatic, and institutional measures, Iran can convert the Persian Gulf–Black Sea Corridor into both an economic lifeline and a security buffer. Ultimately, the corridor exemplifies how geo-economics projects can serve as instruments of national resilience and geopolitical influence in an era of sanctions and great-power competition.